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ABSTRACTS
Previous research on task switching has been confounded by inhibitory control
mechanism and there has been debate on the source of switch costs and how
and when the inhibitory control occurs during task switching. In order to
circumvent this problem, the thesis aimed to investigate the role of inhibition in
task switching by examining switch costs, alternating switch costs and
congruency effect in three tasks when two preparation intervals (short and
long) are given. Task switching experiments in the present study captured both
flexibility (changes in task) and anticipatory control (preparation interval
between cue and target) and provided the measurement for inhibitory control,
'backward inhibition' by alternating switch cost. Backward inhibition was
manifest in longer reaction times (and/or more errors) to alternating switch
trials (ABA) than to double switch trials (CBA). Reaction time and error in the
present study also reflected whether the task in the current trials were easy
when it requires the same response as the task in the previous trials, i.e.,
whether the required response were congruent.
The results in the thesis provided the strong evidence for switch costs as one of
cognitive control mechanism and it was reduced by the long preparation
interval through all the experiments. When the cues were arbitrarily matched
for each task, switch costs were increased, suggesting that high working
memory load and the effort for interpretation of the cues might cause more
additional process during switching tasks. On the other hand, the change of the
cue type was insensitive to backward inhibition since there were no significant
differences on the size of alternating switch costs. The results imply that the
occurrence of backward inhibition is more prone to the type of task you perform
and level of congruency.
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Our natural environment is surrounded by a number of possible
actions that could be taken at any given moment. Thus, it is imperative that
a kind of control mechanism has to be developed in order to resolve the
conflicts and choose the most appropriate action by comparing the multiple
possibilities. Although we tend to take the most appropriate action to
perform the task successfully in many circumstances, we sometimes remain
unresolved or confused and even make errors (wrong choices) without fully
realising because we fail to resolve the conflict.
This happens especially when our environment is changing frequently or is
full of multiple possibilities that are competing against one another. As a
result, we take a certain amount of time for not making errors but choosing
the best action between different possibilities. Whether the task we have to
choose is highly demanding or not, it is important that our action toward
the goal must be flexible. It is the flexibility that helps us to adapt for the
most appropriate action in the face of interference or competition by
promoting task-relevant information and changing the goal for the current
demands.
Imagine if we do not have the control mechanism or if we have some
deficits of the control mechanism, the outcome of our behaviour would be
more confused and inconsistent. For example, there is now ample evidence
that cognitive symptoms observed in striatal disorders bear strong
similarities with those associated with frontal cortex lesions as well as
studies on cognitive control deficits in attention, decision-making, action
planning, reasoning, and retrieval from memory (Brown & Marsden, 1988a;
Saga & Sullivan, 1988; Owen et al., 1992; Passingham, 1993; Lawrence,
1996; Fuster, 1997). These symptoms are frequently observed in patients
with Parkinson's disease and Hun~tiqt:on's disease as well as other
psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia (Morris et ai, 1995). A more
dramatic case is "utilization behaviour" which is occasionally observed in
patients with frontal lobe lesions (Shallice et al., 1989). These patients are
unable to inhibit the performance of complete action patterns
characteristically associated with everyday objects, such as toothpaste,
comb, scissors, teabags etc, When they happen to encounter one of these
objects in the environment, causing their actions to be contextually
inappropriate. We also find some similar cases in non-patients in the class
of everyday action errors. These are known as "capture errors" in which a
person performs an action habitually associated with the context instead of
the action intended. In this case, people might look simply absent-minded.
Alternatively, another approach to the study of cognitive control has been
to explore the functions of the frontal lobe, on the assumption that frontal
lobe functions are 'executive'. Thus, cognitive control mechanisms are often
impaired following dysfunction of the frontal lobes, having devastating
effects on everyday planning and social behaviour.
2
It is now well-known that damage of the frontal lobe can lead to 'executive
dysfunction' or 'frontal syndrome' (e.g., Duncan et ai, 1997). 'Executive
dysfunction' or 'frontal syndrome' includes more specific manifestations of a
loss of controlled behaviour such as a tendency to perseverative behaviour
(Luria et al; 1964; Nelson, 1976; Sandson & Albert, 1987; Rogers et ai,
1998), difficulties with response suppression (Burgess and Shallice, 1996),
increased distractibility (Knight, 1984) and an inability to plan and
coordinate a sequence of actions for the satisfaction of goals that are not
immediately attainable (Shallice, 1982; Owen et al., 1990). The terms
"frontal function" and "executive function" (cognitive control) are often used
synonymously. However, it would be a mistake to ascribe the neural
implementation of 'executive function' to a single brain region. Instead,
'executive function' probably encompasses a variety of specialized sub-
processes mediated by circuits intimately associated with the frontal cortex
(e.g., fronto-parietal and fronto-striatal circuits) (Lawrence et al. 1996;
Lawrence, Sahakian & Robbins, 1998). Brass and Von Crammon (2002,
2004) also argued that executive functioning is likely to recruit a broader
network of areas, both within and beyond the frontal lobes.
Cognitive control which is widely referred to as executive function
is our ability to maintain and update our goals in order to select an
appropriate action. Miller and Cohen (2001) also defined executive function
as a set of higher-order functions that optimize and schedule lower-order
ones. These higher-order functions include attention, memory, judgment,
thinking process, goal maintenance, problem solving, decision making,
action selection etc. However, they assumed that prefrontal cortex (PFC)
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serves a specific function in cognitive control: the active maintenance of
patterns of activity that represent goals and the means to achieve them.
Psychologists have used various methods and paradigms to understand
cognitive control. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) is the most
commonly used paradigm for studying 'set-shifting', which is the ability to
alter a behavioural response mode in the face of changing contingencies
(Gotham et al., 1988; Cools et al., 2001). In this task, participants are
asked to match the test cards to reference cards according to one of three
classification rules which are acquired from the feedback provided after
each matching response. Their performance is then measured by the
perseverative errors (I.e., errors attributable to the fact that the subject
incorrectly used the same classification rule after negative feedback).
Some early studies demonstrated that when the experimenter suddenly
changes the rule, patients with frontal lesions are not able to shift to a new
rule as efficiently as control subjects (Milner, 1963; Drew, 1974; Robinson
et al., 1980). Furthermore, this deficit is associated with perseverative
behaviour where patients with frontal lesions continue to sort the cards by
the previously relevant but now-irrelevant rule (Nelson, 1976). The deficit
exhibited by these patients seems to indicate a failure in controlling and
sustaining the normal flexibility of behaviour (Rogers et al., 1998).
However, Roger et al. (1998) outlined that performance on the WCSTdoes
not only rely on the ability to switch from one task-set to another, but it
also relies on concept formation, rule learning, the ability to make effective
use of error feedback and on the ability to maintain task-relevant rules in
working memory while performing the task. In other words, WCST
performance involves several distinct cognitive abilities: performance
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deficits could therefore be due to one or more of several independent forms
of dysfunction.
Another well-known behavioural paradigm is the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935;
Macleod, 1991). On incongruent trials, participants have to name the ink
colour of a word (such as green) written in a different colour whereas on
the congruent trials, participants have to name the word or colour of the ink
when the word and ink colour are the same. To perform this task, they
must selectively attend to one attribute. When naming the colour of
conflicting stimulus on incongruent trials there is a strong proponent
tendency to read the word ('green'), which competes with the response to
the colour ('red'). The key dependent measurement is reaction time (RT) in
the incongruent trials versus congruent trials. This task illustrates one of
the most fundamental aspects of cognitive control: the ability to select a
weaker, task-relevant response (or source of information) in the face of
competition from an otherwise stronger, but task-irrelevant one (Miller and
Cohen, 2001). Patients with frontal impairment have difficulty with this task
(e.g., Perret, 1974; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Vendrell et al.,
1995), especially when the instructions vary frequently (Dunbar& Sussman,
1995; Cohen et al., 1999), suggesting that they have difficulty adhering to
the goal of the task or its rules in the face of a competing stronger (Le.
more salient or habitual) response.
The flanker test (Hazeltine et al., 2000; HObneret al., 2003) is also related
to the Stroop test in terms of inhibition of competing responses. In the
original Eriksen and Eriksen's flanker paradigm (1974), the target stimulus
is displayed in a predictable (central) location and flanked on both sides by
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irrelevant stimulus. Participants have to identify a target stimulus (usually
letter or arrow) that is presented alone (unflanked) or with response-
incompatible letters (or arrows pointing in different directions) flanking it.
They usually take longer to respond to flanked trials than unflanked trials,
demonstrating interference from stimuli that were· associated with an
irrelevant task. More precisely, it has been shown that transitions to a new
task take longer when the stimulus contains an attribute that affords the
current (n trial) and a previously executed task (n-1 trial) than when the
stimulus is uniquely associated with only one of the tasks used in an
experiment (e.g., Fagot, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This interference
has been attributed to automatic cuing of the previous task set (Hubner et
al., 2003).
Another well-known paradigm is negative priming task that has been used
extensively to study inhibition in normal individuals (Fox, 1995; Houghton
and Tipper, 1994; May et al., 1995; Neill and Valdes, 1996). Typically,
participants are presented consecutive stimulus arrays and are asked to
identify a denoted target that is presented with distracting, irrelevant
stimuli. In the critical condition of the task, called the "ignored repetition
(IR) condition", what was a distractor in the previous stimulus array (N-1
trials) becomes the target in the N trials. Participants were significantly
slower to identify the target in the IR condition as compared with other
conditions in which the target and distractor stimuli in the consecutive
stimulus arrays are different. The majority of the research examining this
finding in normal individuals indicates that the negative priming effect (i.e.,
slower response to a target that had previously been a distractor) is due to
a buildup of inhibition to the irrelevant distractor and that the increase in
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reaction time is the evidence which participants have to overcome this
inhibition (Houghton and Tipper, 1996; Tipper & Cranston, 1985; Tipper et
al., 1992, 1998). However, this paradigm was challenged on the grounds
that the increased reaction time to select the new target which was
previously a distractor could be explained by there being a tag associated
with it that says 'do not respond' (Neil et al., 1992) or by there being a
feature mismatch- for example, the target stimulus is a 'large object' on the
prime trial but is then a 'smaller object' on the probe (MacDonald and
Joordens, 2000; Tipper 2001).
Another paradigm which has been used during the last decade is called 'task
switching' paradigm (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran, 1996;
Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This paradigm captures two core features of goal-
directed behaviour which is one of cognitive control mechanism: flexibility
and anticipatory control: Flexibility is realized by introducing frequent
changes of the relevant goal (i.e. the task to be performed), which is
operationalised by the independent variable task transition (task switch vs.
task repeat). Anticipatory control occurs when the upcoming task can be
prepared in advance, which is operationalised by the independent variable
preparation interval with either a short interval (no advance preparation) or a
long interval (advance preparation).
Consequently, this paradigm became popular in the field of cognitive
neuropsychology to study cognitive control mechanisms and has been
implemented with a variety of experimental designs (Meiran, 2007).
For example, in terms of responses, the task may require manual responses
(often key presses on the computer keyboard, e.g., Rogers and Monsell,
1995), vocal responses (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Arbuthnott and Frank,
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appropriate configuration of mental resources, namely, tesk-set! (Monsell,
2003). The task performed at each point is triggered partly by external
stimuli (e.g., deadline, exam date, the lecture room etc) but each stimulus
affords alternative tasks (e.g., instead of the textbook, reading the gossip
from the tabloid magazine, cancelling the seminar and meeting friends in a
cafe etc). In this situation, we exercise our intentional control to accomplish
the different tasks for achieving the goal (e.g. having good exam results)
successfully by resisting the temptation to do other tasks.
One could simply question how we manage to select the appropriate task
set while having the possibility to attempt to do another task set. If we do
so, how do we sustain our goal in the conflict situations and shift from one
another flexibly?
In order to answer these questions, Roger and Monsell (1995) provided a
task-switching paradigm which was the first paper to investigate task-set
configuration processing for studying cognitive control mechanisms.
However, the task switching paradigm was firstly introduced by Jersild
(1927) who tested either repeating one task or alternating between two
tasks. In his experiment, he presented 2-digit numbers. In an alternating
1 The definition of task set in task switching literature is a bit vague. For example,
Roger & Monsell (1995) wrote that "to adopt a task-set is to select, link and
configure the elements of a chain of processes that will accomplish a task" (p. 208).
However, Mayr and Keele (2000) proposed that task sets "specify the configuration
of perceptual, attentional, mnemoniC, and motor processes critical for a particular
task goal" (p.5). These definitions have evoked some criticism later on (Altmann,
2003; Schneider & Logan, 2005).
Recently, Kiesel et al. (2007) suggested that task set refers to an internal
configuration that relates the task-relevant stimuli to their corresponding responses,
thereby ensuring task-appropriate performance on a given stimulus.
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2000; Jerslid, 1927) or eye movement (e.g., Hunt & Klein, 2002; Mueller et
al., 2005). In terms of memory access, the task may require perceptual
classification (such as colour decision, e.g., Fagot, 1994), semantic retrieval
such as odd-even on digits or vowel-consonant judgments on letters, Rogers
and Monsell, 1995), spatial location judgments (De Jong, 1995; Merian,
1996) or episodic memory retrieval (Mayr and Kliegl, 2000). In terms of
deciSion type, the tasks may require classification (e.g., Rogers and Monsell,
1995), odd-item-out decision (Mayr and Keele, 2000) or same-different
judgment (Merian & Marciano, 2002).
Thus, there are many different tasks one could use for the task switching as
measures of cognitive flexibility. They include the decision of which action to
execute, the vivid representation of goals, the inhibition of previous goals,
and the filtering of no-longer relevant information. These numerous
processes contribute to cognitive flexibility allowing us to perform the task
successfully and adjust our action for the goals. Furthermore, these
processes can be carried out in preparation for action (anticipatory control).
B.Task switching
Our daily life requires us to switch constantly between different
cognitive tasks. For example, if we are revising for exams, it often involves
many highly-cognitive tasks such as reading the textbook, memorising,
problem-solving with classmates, collecting the key notes from lectures,
asking questions to tutors etc while having the time constraint (e.g., three
day study pian). In each situation, these cognitive tasks require us to have
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condition, subjects had to subtract 3 from every number (task A) and add 6
to every number (task B), alternatively (ABAB). In the control condition,
they had either to subtract 3 from every number or add 6 to every number
repeatedly (AAA or BBB). He found that the median time in the alternating
lists was 115.5ms, compared to 84.5ms in non-alternating list. This result
was also replicated by Spector & Biederman (1976).
In their experiment, participants were given columns of 2-digit stimulus
numbers. For each column, the participants added 3 to every stimulus
number and reported the sum verbally, subtracted 3 from every stimulus
number and reported the difference, or alternated between adding and
subtracting 3. No visual cues were presented to indicate which arithmetic
operation should be performed next; instead, the relevant operations had
to be recalled from memory. Under these conditions, participants took
substantially took more time (over 400 ms per item) for task alternating
between adding 3 and subtracting 3 from 2-digit numbers than task
repetition.
However, without cue presentation in this method, there is a greater
working memory load to keep track of the task sequence and maintain two
tasks in a state of readiness and, as a consequence, it might promote
greater effort and arousal (Rogers and Mansell, 1996; Monsell, 2003).
Moreover, in Jersild (1927)'s method, participants must do two things in the
alternating blocks that are not required in the pure blocks, thus they had to
keep two task sets active or available and reconfigure between them on
every trial. Hence, it was not clear which of these demands was indexed by
the switch cost (Rogers and Mansell, 1996).
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In order to avoid this problem, Roger and Mansell (1995) simply compared
switch and non-switch trials within a block. They manipualted this by
alternating between runs of trials of predictable length on each task so that
participants know which tasks in every n-th trial. To help participants keep
track, they used a cue indicating its position in the current run. In this
method, participants alternated between runs of two (or more) trials of
each task (AABBAABB....). The tasks were to classify either the digit number
of a pair of characters as even/odd or the letter number as
consonant/vowel by looking at the character pair (e.g., G7). Participants
were told to perform the digit task when the character pair appeared in
either of the bottom two positions and the letter task when the character
pair appeared in either of the top two positions (e.g., G7 appeared in the
right side of the top in the screen- letter task). They computed the switch
cost by subtracting RT on the non-alternating or repetition trials (AA, BB)
from RTon the corresponding switch trials (BA, AB).
By demonstrating the substantial switch costs, they argued that these costs
would reflect an endogenously controlled, time-consuming, stage-like
process of reconfiguration, which they referred to 'task-set
reconfiguration'- a sort of mental 'gear changing'- which must happen
before appropriate task-specific processescan proceed (Mansell, 2003).
On the other hand, Allport et al. (1994) proposed that the switch cost
reflects a kind of proactive interference from one trial to another. Within
this account, a switch trial is harder because some residual activation from
a previous trial, involving a different task, causes carry-over e«ects. He
also proposed that one must apply extra inhibition to the stronger task-set
to enable performance of the weaker task set. They conducted a task
11
switching experiment using Jersild (1927)'s paradigm. Two stimulus pairs
were used each affording two different tasks: 1) incongruent Stroop colour
words (e.g., RED printed in blue ink); participants had to name either the
colour or word 2) the digit between 1 and 9 tokens of the same digit:
participants had to name either the digit ('value') or the number of digits
('group size'), and these were all incongruent (in their experiment 4).
Participants first performed a block where they read colour words printed in
conflicting colours, named the digit in a stimulus (e.g, "3333"), or
alternated between two tasks. In a subsequent block, they had to perform
different tasks with the same stimuli (naming the print colour and counting
the number of digits). Whereas in the first block, the switch costs were
dissipated almost completely across 8 runs of trials, at the beginning of the
second block they were significantly greater than in the first block. This was
found throughout the block. The author interpreted this as evidence that
the stimulus-response mapping from the first block persisted for at least
some minutes and interfered with the tasks in the second block (pp, 436 in
their article).
The authors also found that the costs of task switching were smaller when
participants had to switch between pairs (e.g., between colour naming and
value naming) than when they had to switch task within pairs (e.g.,
between colour naming and word naming). Their results supported the idea
that task-switching is easier when the stimulus provides an effective cue for
the task required and this idea of the cue has been developed in many
task-switching experiments afterwards.
In line with Allport et al. (1994)'s idea, Sohn & Anderson (2001) and Sohn
& Carlson (2000) compared switch and repeat trials with and without
12
foreknowledge about whether to switch or repeat a task. They observed
significant effects of task type (switch vs. repetition) and foreknowledge,
but no interaction between task type and foreknowledge. Their results
supported the view that switch costs represent an automatic carry-over
effect that is not affected by advanced preparation and suggested that
repeating the same task had benefits over task switching regardless of
foreknowledge although foreknowledge allowed preparation of both repeat
and switch trials.
In conclusion, Allport et al. (1994) proposed the term 'task set Inertia
(TSI)' which is dissipated only after several minutes of performing other
tasks. They argued that the switch cost was accounted for not by the
duration of an executive reconfiguration process but by post-stimulus
interference from a (recently activated) competing task set- task set inertia
(pp. 436 in their article). Later on, Allport and Wylie (2000) suggested that
during task-switching, stimulus-response associations are constantly
modified. When a stimulus is presented, previous response-related
information of that stimulus is retrieved. Accordingly, switch costs are
increased for stimuli that have been previously associated with the
alternative task set (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Wazak
et al., 2003). Note that unlike the task-set inertia idea, assuming that the
task set persists in an active state, the stimulus-response association (Le.,
stimulus-set binding) is that the task set gets automatically retrieved when
the stimuli are re-encountered.
Meiran (1996) also agreed with Rogers and Monsell (1995)'s idea
that the reconfiguration process is working proactively if enough time
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permits and especially he referred to this active readiness as advance
preparation. In his experiment, when the participants were allowed
sufficient prewarning (precue) about the nature of the upcoming task, the
task shifting cost was nearly diminished. In his experiment (1996),
participants responded according to the position of a target stimulus, which
was presented in one of the four quadrants of a 2 x 2 grid. The position of
the target stimulus could thus be classified along both the vertical and the
horizontal dimension for up-down and right-left discrimination respectively.
The two tasks were ordered randomly within a block of trials so that
participants were given an instructional cue in each trial in order to know
which task to perform. Thus, the instructional precue enabled the process
of advance reconfiguration to discriminate from that of fast dissipation of a
carry-over effect. Nevertheless, she questioned that task shift manipulation
between runs or between blocks of trials was potentially confounded with
working memory demands and division of attention between perceptual
dimensions.
Since Rogers and Mansell (1995) concluded that task set-reconfiguration
process involves the selection, ordering and coordination of a set of
elementary processes need to perform the task, therefore they suggested
that switch costs reflect an additional control needed to reconfigure the
system for switching to a new task. Merian (1996) also suggested that
switch cost indicates a time-effort consuming process that operates after a
task shift, precedes task execution, and presumably reflects the advance
reconfiguration of processing mode. These two studies represented a
breakthrough for task switching research as they argued that switch cost
itself reflects the time consumed by the task set reconfiguration process, a
14
kind of mental 'gear changing' set for the appropriate task-specific
processes. More importantly, both studies showed the preparation effect-
if advance knowledge is given of the upcoming task and time allowed to
prepare for it, the average switch cost is usually reduced (Mansell, 2003)-
which implies that task switching is associated with a process that operates
prior to task execution. In particular, Merian (1996) believed that the
existence of this process is compatible with the notion of advanced
reconfiguration and therefore with the idea of executive control processing.









Figure 1. Reduction in switch cost? is found as preparation interval extended.
Note that switch cost was not completely eliminated but remained despite the ample
amount of preparation interval (residual switch cost).
2 This is also known as RISe (Reduction in Switch Cost) effect which is equivalent to
preparation effect in the literature. This effect has been interpreted an index of
endogeneous control processes. The assumption is that, when the cue indicates that
the task will change, the participants can take advantage of any time remaining
before the stimulus to engage in task set reconfiguration (Monsell & Mizon, 2006).
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Although the preparation effect indicates the time required to establish
a task set, showing a benefit of longer cue-target-intervals (CTls), it is not
sufficient to demonstrate that a task set has been established during this
period. For example, Sakai (2008) argued that the preparation effect may
be due to facilitation of processes non-specific to the task, such as
interpretation of task cues or general readiness for the presentation of a
target. Alternatively, one can easily argue that the switch cost should be
removed completely when participants are allowed to have sufficient time if
ample amount of preparation is essential for advanced reconfiguration
processing of that task set. Contrary to this simple logic for the preparation
effect, Roger and Monsell (1996) found that no further decrease of switch
cost occurred after 600 ms of response-stimulus interval (RSI) and a
stubborn residual cost remained even when this RSI was as long as 1200ms.
They suggested that a part of task set reconfiguration cannot be done until
exogenously triggered by stimulus attributes that are associated with the
task. This residual switch cost allowed researchers to believe that there
is a substantial component of the switch cost that cannot be eliminated by
allowing the participant enough time to prepare for switching tasks. This
residual switch cost also suggests that complete reconfiguration is either
impossible or at least difficult to achieve without actually executing the task
(Mayr and Kliegl, 2003).
Rubinstein et at. (2001) characterised this part as retrieval of stimulus-
response rules into working memory. They hypothesised that executive
control processes include two distinct stages; a) goal shifting, presumably
related to updating the contents of declarative working memory where task
demands are represented and b) rule activation, related to the activation of
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procedural working memory aspects related to task performance. They
believed that these two stage-like components respectively ensure that the
contents of declarative working memory are appropriately configured for
the task at hand. Suppose that some of the features enter declarative
working memory before rule activation has finished for the next task, then
the occurrence of such partial matches could make it more difficult to
disable the preceding task's rules. Therefore, prolonging the rule-activating
stage may indicate why the switch cost is not entirely eliminated by the
ample amount of preparation interval. These considerations could also
justify having the rule-activation stage as an exogenous (stimulus-triggered)
control process (Rubinstein et al., 2001).
Alternatively, De Jong (2000) made no distinction between endogenous and
exogenously-triggered task set reconfiguration. He proposed the 'failure-to-
engage (FTE), hypothesis in order to investigate the cause to the residual
switch cost by providing two explanations: 1) failure to achieve endogenous
task set reconfiguration on a proportion of trials, and 2) limitations to the
completeness of reconfiguration attainable by endogenous means. Simply,
this hypothesis started from the notion that advance preparation is optional.
If so, advance preparation is useful because it promotes fast response to
the imperative stimulus, but postponing task set reconfiguration until the
arrival of the imperative stimulus still suffices to ensure an accurate, albeit
slow response (De Jong, 2000). Fundamentally, the residual switch cost
phenomena caused researchers to question the source of switch costs,
either 1) time taken by control operations (Rogers & Monsell, 1995, Merian,
1996) or 2) transient task-set inertia (TSI, Allport et al. 1994) although
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many researchers now agree with the idea that these are not mutually
exclusive (ref. pp, 22-23 in the current chapter).
Returning to the point where the residual switch cost was found in
Roger and Monsell (1995)'s experiment, it was noteworthy to highlight the
transient carry-over of task set activation from trial to trial by some studies
(Merian, 2000; Ruthurff et al. 2001; Altmann, 2004; Hsieh & Cheng, 2006)
for which they argued that a longer delay after the last performance of the
previous task improved performance on the switch trial.
According to the Allport et al. (1994)'s task-set inertia (TSI) hypothesis, the
residual switch cost is evidence for the continuing interference of past
configuration settings on currently relevant sets.
Alternatively, Merian (1996) suggested that the residual switch cost reflects
the retroactive adjustment and even if the residual switch costs reflect a
kind of intrinsic limitation to prepare, he believed that this limitation is
transient and can be overcome by practice (Merian et al., 2000, experiment
2). Merian et al. (2000) wanted to see how practice (session) affects
switch costs and how it is modulated by RCI (response-cue-interval) and
CTI (cue-target-interval) on switch costs in their experiment 2. The results
showed that practice drastically reduced switch costs. These results
paralleled exactly the practice effects reported by Merian (1996). However,
the results of both experiments indicate that one session of practice
reduced switch cost in the early eTIs, but had no effect whatsoever on the
costs in the long CTI. Note that the practice was influential for the short CT!
conditions (in her experiment 2, the CTI varied randomly from trial to trial
116, 316, 516 and 2016ms).
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Merian et al. (2000) thus concluded cautiously that limited practice usually
affects the preparatory reconfiguration, at least when instructional cues are
supplied. After all, it was not possible to eliminate switch costs completely
by either the ample amount of preparation interval or practice.
On the other hand, De Jong (2000) suggested that residual switch costs
reflect a lack of motivation to prepare. He proposed that people are, in fact,
capable of preparing their cognitive systems to perform a task-switch trial
just as quickly and accurately as a task-repeat trial. He thought people
have competence to prepare fully for a task-switch, yet their performance
frequently does not reflect this competence. According to him there are
factors that contribute to preparation failures: a) weak goal-driven intention
(e.g., a lack of motivation), b) weak environmental support (e.g., a lack of
explicit task cues or a lack of clear feedback), c) special circumstances such
as fatigue. In this case, residual switch cost simply reflects the failure to
utilise available control capabilities, which he termed as 'goal neglect' (De
long et al., 1999).
It seems still controversial to interpret the reason why there is a
residual switch cost even when participants are given enough time for
advanced configuration processes. Therefore, there has been debate to
interpret the source of switch cost and task preparation over the last
decade. Rubinstein et al (2001) summarised two classical contradictory
views on this matter. Table 1.summarises two contradictory empirical
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·Switch costs remained after very
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-Inconqruent irrelevant characters
induced large switch costs
(Experiment1)4
Tab/el. presents two contradictory evidences from Rogers & Monsell (1995) and
Allport et al. (1994)'s studies which led the classical debate on the interpretation of
switch cost and its theoretical views. (modified from Rubinstein et al.,2001)
One proposes that switch costs represent the time taken for an
executive process to establish a changed task set, with task reconfiguration
views as an extra processing stage (or stages) inserted prior to completion
of task-specific processing (De Jong, 2000; Kieras et al., 2000; Meiran,
1996, 2000; Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001). Obviously,
this theory was bolstered by the finding that switch costs decrease as the
3 Participants should have suppressed colour naming and imposed word reading task
set for the reverse Stroop task in alternating task block, thus switching back to
standard Stroop task, involving colour naming rather than word reading, might have
caused the switch cost. But the switch cost for this standard Stroop task was
virtually nil.
4 However, substantial switch costs were also found in the context of neutral
irrelevant characters even though they presumably induced no proactive
interference with the current task. Hence it might be that executive control
processes are needed to switch between tasks regardless of which irrelevant
characters appear in a stimulus display.
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interval between trials (preparation effect), and thus between successive
tasks, is lengthened, suggesting that when subjects are given longer
preparation intervals, executive control process would enable them to
accomplish more 'reconfiguration' of the system (e.g., Rogers and Mansell,
1995; Meiran, 1996, 2000). However, this view was questioned by those
who observed that there appears to be no systematic relationship between
the length of time subjects are given to prepare and the decrease in the
switch cost, and the mere existence of residual switch cost (Allport and
Wylie, 1999, 2000; Wylie and Allport, 2000).
The various researches about the cause of switch cost and residual
switch cost have led other researchers to espouse another view which is a
kind of competition hypothesis (Wylie et ai, 2003). According to this
hypothesis, a switch of task is accomplished by changing the weights in a
competing cognitive system, thus switch costs result from the competition
in the cognitive system as it settles to a stable state that is consistent with
the newly instituted weightings. In other words, switch costs reflect the
positive and negative priming: In a switching situation, there might be
persisting suppression (negative priming) of a task now required and/or
additional activation (positive priming) of the previous task resulting in
performance decrements (Yeung and Monsell, 2003). This view is in line
with Allport et al. (1994)'s task set inertia hypothesis on the ground that
switch costs reflect interference between the previously used stimulus-
response mapping and the now-required stimulus mapping.
Many parties to this debate now acknowledge that the switch costs
reflect both task priming effects and the time taken by control processes
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(e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2000; Goschke, 2000; Kiera et al., 2000; Meiran,
2000; Monsell, Yeung & Azuma, 2000; Ruthrff et al., 2001; Sohn &
Anderson, 2001; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). Consequently, researchers have
been studying to determine the relative contributions of these factors and
the relationship between them nowadays.
Recently, Ruge et al. (2005) discussed two different views on the relation
between switch cost and preparation. These views were simply based on
the empirical evidence that switch costs are often reduced with prolonged
preparation intervals (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Merian, 1996).
According to their one view, the system tends to perseverate because the
previously adopted task set is persisting over time into the next trial. Thus,
establishing the competing task set in a current switch trial requires
additional time consuming control effort because proactive interference
from the perslstentlv activated, now misleading task set has to be
overcome. In theory, this same process can be finished in advance of target
presentation with sufficient preparation time. As proactive interference has
been overcome during the preparation interval, it is no longer slowing down
appropriate task implementation after the target has been presented (Ruge
et al., 2005). According to the other view, a previously adopted task set is
dissipating rapidly before the next trial is presented. Recent studies suggest
that interference might be induced by the target stimulus itself which is
retrieving the previous task set from memory (Allport & Wylie, 2000;
Waszak et al., 2003; Wylie & Allport, 2000).
However, when every new trial starts with a neutral task set because
interference is induced only after the target has been presented, there is
nothing that can be done during the preparation but biasing the initially
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neutral task set in the direction of the currently instructed task set- and this
is equal for both switch trials and repeat trials according to Ruge et al.
(2005). Thus, the authors argued that it was not clear why advance
preparation being equally engaged for both trial types should have a benefit
that is differently stronger for switch trials compared to repeat trials as
being indicated by reduced switch costs.
Despite the fact that researchers still struggle to understand different
results and interpretations, now they agree with the assumption that there
are at least two distinctions of control processes in the task switching
paradigm: 1) overcoming inhibition of a previously performed task when re-
engaging and 2) restarting a sequence of tasks after a period of
interruption. Baddeley et al. (1998) also hypothesized that two processes
are necessary for efficient task switching: activation of relevant task-sets,
and inhibition of no-longer-relevant task sets. Behaviourally, these
processes were reflected in the facts that: a) switching to a task that was
recently performed takes longer than switching to a task less recently
performed because it is unlikely to have fully recovered from inhibition
and b) re-engaging in a sequence of tasks after a period of interruption
transiently increases reaction time.
Mayr and Keele (2000) tested the hypothesis that disengagement during
intentional shifts between task sets is accompanied by inhibition of the
previous task set ('backward inhibition'). Backward inhibition of a no-
longer relevant task has been proposed to be automatically triggered by
competition between cognitive demands during task disengagement
because it occurs even when participants know that the inhibited task will
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become relevant again in the immediate future (Mayr and Keele, 2000;
Dreher and Berman, 2002). Since Mayr and Keele (2000),s study on
backward inhibition, the role of inhibition has been proposed to be a
component process of cognitive (executive) control.
c. Backward inhibition
If the inhibition plays an important role in cognitive control and it is
another component involved task switching, what kinds of evidence suggest
that such inhibition is a critical component of task-switching, and that active
maintenance of a new task-set is not enough?
Some evidence of the idea that task sets must be inhibited comes from Mayr
& Keele (2000), in which they conducted a series of experiments where
subjects select the object that does not belong among a set of four objects,
namely the 'odd-item-out' task. In their experiments, participants were
required to press one of four response keys that were spatially compatible
with four objects. Three objects are the same colour, while one is a different
colour. Another object has a different orientation than the other three. Lastly,
a third of the four displayed-objects are moving, while the others remain still.
Thus, this paradigm involved high perceptual demands, but response conflict
between the tasks was rather low. The meaning of the responses probably
did not change because they always referred to the same four object
positions. Nevertheless, substantial backward inhibition occurred, which was
calculated by subtracting the reaction time in the inhibition condition:e.g.,
colour (task A: n-2trial)- orientation (task B: n-1 trial)- colour (task A: n
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trial) from the reaction time in control condition: e.g., movement (task C: n-
2trial)- orientation (task B: n-1 trial) - colour (task A: n trial). There was no
significant difference between the backward inhibitions regardless of the
different preparation interval. The reason why they varied the preparation
intervals such as CSI (cue-stimulus-interval) and RCI (response-cue-interval)
was that they thought preparation intervals would give a key to understand
participants' active preparation for the upcoming task-set as well as the
passive decay of the previous task-set. First, in the short RCI and short CSI
condition, subjects should have little time to prepare a new task-set
representation, and the previous task-set should have had little time to
decay. Thus, participants should have more difficulty switching back to a
task-set that had been used two trials ago- in other words, one that had
recently been used, but then abandoned-than switching to a task set that
had been used more than two trials ago (trial n-2). Second, in the long RCI
and short CS! condition!, the old task-set would have decayed, but
participants should have little time to instantiate a new task set. In this case,
subjects should show reduced backward inhibition when switching to a cue
that had been recently used but then subsequently abandoned. Third, in the
short RCI and long CSI condition, participants have a long time to instantiate
a new task set so that they might be more able to activate the previously-
used-but-more-recently-abandoned task set, and thus show less backward
inhibition than the first preparation condition.
Although the second and third condition of preparation intervals showed less
backward inhibition than the first one, there was no difference between the
backward inhibitions found in terms of the different preparation interval
conditions. This indicates that switching to a previously abandoned task set is
not made easier by having longer to prepare- suggesting that 'task set
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inertia' (Allport and Wylie, 1994) appears to be unrelated to how strongly
one is able to activate the new task. They interpreted this as evidence that
switching involves inhibitory processes acting upon previous task sets.
Mayr and Keele (2000)'s results suggests that backward inhibition is not a
side-effect of not having fully activated the now-relevant-task set, which
would be predicted by many computational models of task switching (e.g.,
Burgess and Shallice, 2000; kieras et al.,2000; Yeung and Mansell 2003b;
Logan & Schneider, 2004). Instead, it suggests that maybe old task-sets
are actually inhibited. Because it suppresses representations of a to-be-
abandonded task set, backward inhibition is thus presumed to support the
application of a new task set in that it relieves competition from the
preceding one (Hubner et al., 2003). In other words, Mayr and Keele (2000)
suggested it would function as a counterforce to the persistent-activation
property of control settings and thus, 'clear the slate' for the currently
relevant task set (p. 5 in their article).
Mayr and Keele (2000) argued that selection of an appropriate set needs to
occur against a task set which not only has full control over behaviour in a
rapid transition but probably also has a tendency for self-sustained activation
(e.g., Anderson, 1993; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). They painted out the
problems of the competition model of selection (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar &
McClelland, 1990), which causes insufficient activation to the appropriate
code alone for differentiating between potentially relevant codes (e.g.,
Houghton & Tipper, 1994) when selection needs to occur against highly
activated competitors.
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In other words, they showed that there are much more processes going on
than removing a code that is already highly active within an active-relevant
representation in concurrent selection situations.
Thus, they assumed that passive decay of once-activated task sets would not
be enough for avoiding the perseverations, which might cause slower
response and errors. In that case, the other process might be helpful to avoid
the perseverations which was called hypothetically 'backward inhibition' in
their article.
Although the notion of inhibition as a general sequencing mechanism
and the low level of sequential inhibition such as a perceptual and motor
code (e.g., Estes, 1972; MacKay, 1987; Rumelhart & Norman, 1981,
Arbuthnott, 1996) was not new, Mayr and Keele (2000) questioned whether
backward inhibition can be generalised to the domain of endogenous control
of abstract situations such as goals or task sets. Because they realised that
the empirical evidence of some theoretical models of inhibitory mechanism
(e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986) in terms of high-level control was only
indirect. For example, some patients with frontal lobe damage exhibit
problems with shifts between abstract control settings (Owen et al. 1994;
Rubinstein, Evans & Meyer, 1994) and patients with Parkinson's disease have
been reported with shift problems (.e.g., Downes et al., 1989; Hayes et al.,
1998; Owen et al., 1993). Either way, it is not clear such deficits are due to
incomplete inhibition of task sets (Downes et al., 1989) or a lack of sufficient
activation of the appropriate schema (Cohen & Dehaene, 1998). I could only
speculate that recently used task sets are never completely abandoned, but
instead diminishing activation gradually as new task sets are activated. At
this stage, this account would only be strengthened by an actual
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implementation of the backward inhibition phenomenon within computer
network model.
Despite these reservations, Arbuthnott and Frank (2000) agreed with Mayr
and Keele (2000),s hypothesis that backward inhibition is automatically
triggered by competition between task sets during task-set disengagements
and suppresses to-be-abandoned task set unconditionally for a certain period
of time. They also suggested that task-set inhibition is an executive control
process. In both Mayr and Keele (2000) and Arbuthnott and Frank (2000)
studies, they agreed that resolving inhibition associated with an previously
abandoned task-set may be the main process underlying residual switch
costs. However, it was more an assumption rather than their conclusion
because their research idea was based on the task-set inhibition as an
important executive control processes, rather than the cause of residual
switch costs.
Therefore, the authors in both studies suggested that any type of switch cost
reflected the time necessary for executive control process to operate. The
reason why they assumed that BI effect might be another explanation for
residual switch cost was that the previous studies for task switching only
involved two tasks and thus, every switch necessarily was a switch back to a
recently inhibited task set. They proposed that the residual switch cost
probably contained an inhibitory component whereas the other explanations
for residual switch costs such as proactive interference (Allport et al., 1994)
and retroactive adjustment (Merian, 1996) were overlooking the inhibitory
component in switching situations.
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So far, it seems that backward inhibition (or sequential inhibition) is
present only when there is sufficient interference with a current trial. Thus,
the most recent task would result in the most interference, and thus would
receive the most inhibition. It might be also possible to think that this
inhibition decays over the time, and so it is likely to be only observable
when performance requires the inhibited task to be used again immediately
(alternating switching trials). This means that backward inhibition could be
found in any task switching situation, however, the studies on backward
inhibition shows that backward inhibition in task switching would only be
measurable by subtracting RT at the current trial in the alternating switch
sequence (e.g., task A at the n-2 trial~ task B at the n-l trial-s task A at
the n trial) from RT at the current trial in the double switch sequence (e.g.,
task C at the n-2 trlal-s task B at the n-l trial ~ task A at the n trial),
requiring the three-task design for studying backward inhibition in task
switching. Slower RT at the current trial in the alternating switch sequence,
which suggests the backward inhibition effect, is also known as alternating
switch cost 5(Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Arbuthnott and Woodward, 2002;
Arbuthnott, 2005). Figure 2 idealises the alternating switch cost between
alternating switch trials and double switch trials.
5 Theauthors reservedusing the term 'backward inhibition' for this cost becausethis
cost is one of Independentvariablesthat measurebackwardinhibition. Forexample,
Hubneret al. (2003) measurebackwardinhibition by usinga flanker task paradigm.

















Figure 2. presents the alternating switch cost which is found from slower
RT in the alternating switch trials than in the double switch trials.
Hypothetically, the additional cost for alternating switches occurs because
the just-abandoned task set is still in an inhibited state and extra time is
needed to overcome this residual inhibition in order to perform that task. To
avoid confounding an observed effect with its hypothesized mechanism
(Macleod, 1999), Arbuthnott and Frank (2000) and Arbuthnott and
Woodward (2002) referred to the greater switch cost for alternating tasks
as alternating-switch cost and reserved the term backward inhibition for
discussion of the proposed source of the effect.
Hence, it was simply possible to obtain the backward inhibition effect
between alternating task switching sequence and double switching task
sequence as well as the switch cost effect between switching tasks and
repeating tasks. Measuring both backward inhibition and switch cost might
give more answers for some unresolved issues in both phenomenon a to
broaden the understanding of cognitive control. Arbuthnott and Frank
(2000) originally provided both BI effect and switch costs in their study.
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In their experiment, participants had three tasks: the digit (odd/even),
letter (vowel/consonant) tasks that had been used by Roger and Monsell
(1995) and the symbol (math/text context) task. They manipulated the
switch condition by sequencing the order of tasks across a five-trial series.
The first two trials in the sequence involved the same task (trial 2=no-
switch condition), the third trial was one of the other tasks (one switch
condition), the fourth trial was the remaining task (double switch
condition), and the fifth trial was a return to the trial three task
(alternating-switch condition). The CTI (cue-target-interval) was SOOmsfor
ample warning of the upcoming task as this duration of SOOmsCTI has
been previously observed to reduce switch cost to asymptotic level (Mayr
and Keele, 2000; Merian, 2000), suggesting that the preparatory retrieval
of the task set is completed. The cue was presented in the centre of the
screen (i.e., Odd or Even?/ Vowel or Consonant?/ Math or Text?) and this
cue question then joined by the three character stimuli until the
participant's vocal response. They found that RTs in the alternating switch
conditions (1318 ms) were longer than the other conditions (1178ms,
i iaorns, and i220ms for the no-switch, i-switch and 2-switch condition
respectively). The t-swltch and 2-switch conditions did not differ, and
neither differed significantly from the no-switch condition. From these
results, they suggested that switch costs for t-swltch and 2-switch were
equivalent and the alternating switch cost (lOams in this experiment) effect
reflects an executive control process. In addition, their argument was in
accordance with Mayr and Keele (2000) by saying that task set inhibition is
the most likely explanation of selective interference for alternating tasks.
They also suggested that when a recently abandoned task-set must be
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reinstated, resolution of task-set inhibition would result in longer RTs for an
alternating switch than for a switch to a less recently inhibited task-set.
Additional evidence for the involvement of inhibition in task switching came
from Logan and Burkell (1986), who studied inhibition within the framework
of the stop-signal paradigm (Logan, 1994, for review). In the stop signal
paradigm, subjects were first pre-trained on a task to create a strong
tendency to execute this task. Afterwards, they were required to withhold
task execution on a certain (low) proportion of the trials, and their
inhibitory abilities were measured. Their paradigm required that instead of
withholding responses (as in the standard stop-signal paradigm), subjects
execute another task. In that respect, it resembled the task switching
paradigm. Their result indicates that inhibition was less effective (and more
demanding) in this stop-switch paradigm as compared to the standard stop
signal paradigm in which no task switching was required. Nevertheless, the
difference was not large but just about 40 ms. However, this paradigm
would not give any measurement for switch cost in task switching situation,
which is not practically applicable for studying the role of inhibition in task
switching.
Although both the Mayr and Keele (2000) and Arbuthnott and Frank
(2000)'s studies really drew attention for inhibitory control mechanisms in
task switching and there have been more interests in backward inhibition
effect since then, it is not clear to conclude whether the backward inhibition
effect is really part of task switching to give the insight for inhibitory control
mechanism, or it could be the independent process which is not necessarily
found in the two-task switching paradigm. Note that by comparing RT
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difference between ABA (alternating switch sequence) and CBA (double
switching sequence), it had not been shown that this inhibition indeed
facilitates the application of a new task set by reducing competition from
the preceding one.
In order to address whether backward inhibition reduces interference from
a preceding task set, Hubner et al. (2003) focused on the impact of a to-
be-abandoned task set on performance in the following task instead of
comparing the executability of task sets that were more or less recently
switched away from. Using a flanker paradigm, they replicated the finding
of backward inhibition in Mayr and Keele (2000)'s experiment 3.
Moreover, they provided evidence that the backward inhibition mechanism
reduces interference from a directly preceding task set compared with a
task set not as recently applied when a switch to a new task is
endogenously prepared for (in their experiment 1). In their flanker
paradigm, three simple classification tasks were applied: odd vs. even,
vowel vs. consonant, straight line symbol vs. curved line symbol. And these
tasks have three aspects: a) one that on each trial executed as the
relevant task, b) one that was executed directly in advance (i.e., the
preceding task), and c) one that was not executed as recently (i.e., the
control task). On a task switch trial, the target stimulus was presented
alone, either flanked by a stimulus of the preceding task, or flanked by a
stimulus of the control task, with equal probability (i.e., one third each).
The results showed that flanker characters from the preceding task
interfered more than flanker from the control task and they accounted for
this in terms of residual activation of the task set most recently executed:
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If an abandoned task set is not inhibited, interference might be stronger
because it is the most recently used task set. But in this case, the results
showed that abandoned task set (preceding task) was inhibited, thus
backward inhibition actually reduced the interference from the preceding
task set. More importantly, they found that flankers from the preceding
task interfered significantly less than flankers from the control task on
switch trials that were precuedand this was expected on the assumption
that the preceding task set is subject to backward inhibition.
Thus, they concluded that backward inhibition facilitates switching task sets
by reducing perseverative tendencies. In summary, their study supports the
idea that executive control processes reduce interference by inhibiting
representation (backward inhibition) and this backward inhibition has the
effect of shielding the application of a novel task set by selectively reducing
interference from the preceding one.
Mayr and Kliegl (2003) also demonstrated that backward inhibition affects
the actual configuration, not the retrieval stage according to their two stage
model. Their initial question was on what level of representation or
processing backward inhibition has its effect. One hypothesis was that
inhibition affects encoding of the cue or of processes that lead from the cue
to a task-set representation in working memory (cue-associated process).
Another hypothesis was that backward inhibition would affect the
application of a task set to the stimulus after it has been loaded into
working memory (cue-independent application stage). These hypotheses
stemmed from two distinct serial processing stages they proposed: 1)
retrieval stage: cue-driven retrieval of rules for upcoming task demands
from long-term-memory (LTM) to working memory. They believed that this
34
stage can be triggered through any internal or external signal that indicates
an upcoming task, and it can run off in an anticipatory manner (i.e., before
the response-relevant stimulus appears). 2) application stage: In this
stage, task rules are applied in a relatively automatic manner once the
stimulus is presented.
They proposed that these two stages are critical during changes of task
configurations thus for the emergence of switch costs.
To explore their hypotheses, they used 2: 1 mappings between cues and
tasks to distinguish between these two theoretical options. In other words,
there were two alternating switching conditions: one was where the cue
was repeated ( A cue 1- B cue x- A cue1), the other was where the cue was
changed (A cue 1- B cue x- A cue 2). Participants had to judge an object's colour
(red vs. blue: task A), shape (circle vs. square: task B) or size (small vs.
large: task C). The task cues were letters (l.e., 0 and R for the colour task,
M and V for the shape task, and T and K for the size task).
When they compared RTsfrom these two alternating switch sequences (one
for the cue repeat, the other for the cue change) with CBA sequence, they
found the significant backward inhibition effect (51 ms) in the cue-change
condition. However, there was no significant backward inhibition found in
the cue-repeat condition (18ms of difference which was not reliable: t (14)
= .067, P >.6).
This result suggested that inhibition affected the representation associated
with the task-set application. Although they concluded that backward
inhibition affects the actual task-set configuration, they were cautious for
their interpretation and open to another possibility that the absence of
backward inhibition in the cue-repeat condition might be the result of a cue
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specific, positive priming effect that occluded the otherwise observable
inhibition effect.
It can be reasonably supposed that backward inhibition is part of the
executive control (cognitive control) according to several studies' findings
(Mayr and Keele, 2000; Arbuthnott and Frank, 2000; Hubner 2003; Mayr
and Kliegl, 2003) but it is not clear how much the role of inhibition affects
the switch cost and whether alternating switch costs is a good
measurement to understand the role of inhibition in task switching.
Moreover, the relationship between switch cost and alternating switch cost
for backward inhibition has not been fully examined and little literature is
available on the dynamics of these two phenomena in task switching.
D. Congruency
Based on the assumption that there are at least two distinctions of
control processes in task switching paradigm: 1) overcoming inhibition of a
previously performed task when re-engaging and 2) restarting a sequence
of tasks after a period of interruption (ref. page 23in the current chapter),
one could simply question how to overcome the persisting inhibition of a
previously performed task. As discussed earlier, one mechanism to
overcome this persisting inhibition is backward inhibition because it
suppresses the to-be-abandoned task set unconditionally for a certain
period of time according to Mayr and Keele (2000). However, it is
noteworthy that persisting activation of a previous task set might affect the
switching performance, depending on whether it activates a response that
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is the same (congruent) as or different (incongruent) from the response
activated by the new upcoming task set (current task set). In this case,
persisting activation could either interfere with or facilitate a subsequent
task switch.
In other words, task switching performance not only depends on the
currently relevant task-set, but is also influenced by irrelevant task-sets.
This can be most clearly seen in the finding that stimuli which are assigned
different responses under the two task instructions (incongruent stimuli)
yield longer RTs and higher error rates than stimuli that are assigned the
same response under both task instructions (congruent stimuli) (e.g.,
Fagot, 1994; Merian, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This congruency
effect6 presumably reflects response activation according to the irrelevant
task's stimulus-response (S-R) rules, resulting in performance decrement
due to response conflict in the incongruent trials and/or facilitation due to
parallel activation of the same response in the congruent trials (Kiesel et ai,
2007).
In order to test this hypothesis, Goschke (2000) conducted an experiment
with two tasks: a letter task and a colour task. Stimuli for these two tasks
were the capital letters A, 6, C, 0 which would appear in the colour red,
green, blue or yellow. Among these, letter C and 0 and colour blue and
yellow were irrelevant stimulus and were not mapped to any responses
6 Later on, Yehene & Merian (2007), Merian & Kessler (2008) named it as "task rule
congruency effect (TReE)". Note that congruency effect is the short term for task
rule congruency effect or response congruency effect in the task switching
literature.
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whereas letter A and colour red were mapped to the left key and letter B
and colour green were mapped to the right key for half of the participants
and the other half received the reverse mapping. In one third of the trials of
each block, the task relevant and task irrelevant dimensions were mapped
to the same response (congruent trials); in one-third of the trials, the two
stimulus dimensions required different responses (incongruent trials); and
in one-third of the trials, the value of the task-irrelevant dimension was not
mapped to any response (neutral trials). He found that there was a reliable
congruence effect: switch costs were greater on incongruent than on
neutral trials, whereas they were smaller on congruent than on neutral
trials, indicating that the previous task set persisted in a state of residual
activation (at least after a short RCI (response-cue-interval) condition).
The author argued that these findings were evidence for more specific,
trial-ta-trial after effects of recently activated task sets. Interestingly, he
also suggested that preparatory processes during RSI helped to suppress
the preceding task set on the grounds of the result that the congruence
effect was almost completely attenuated after a long RSI=1500ms.
Basically, the interaction between congruence and switch costs was only
present with a small amount of preparation, RSI=140ms (experiment 1).
However, it should be noted that some of early studies (e.g., Meiran, 1996;
Rogers & Mansell, 1995) have reported no reduction of congruency effect
with an increasing opportunity for preparation.
Consequently, he questioned if the reduction of the switch cost and
attenuation of the congruency effect after the long RSI might have been
due not to activate preparation, but merely to induce rapid dissipation of
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the previous task set. In addition, he questioned if the task retrieval is
actually an important component of advanced preparation .:
To test this, he used only long RSI (1500ms) and participants had either to
verbalise the next task before the stimulus (retrieval group), or to perform
a verbal distractor task during the long RSI (blocking group). The results
showed that the mean RTwas on average 31ms longer on incongruent than
neutral trials and RT was 22ms shorter on congruent than on neutral trials
(p=.005) in the task switch block. However, RT difference between
incongruent and neutral trials in the repeat block was not significant,
suggesting that congruence has a big effect on the task switch block but no
effect on the task repeat block. The effect of congruency on the switch cost
was greater in the blocking group than in the task retrieval group,
indicating that the interpretation in terms of passive decay of the previous
task set during the long RSI is not supported. Based on the result, the
author interpreted that the preceding task set neither decayed in a passive
manner as a function of the length of the RSI nor was it deactivated by a
urelated intervening activity: it was suppressed only by retrieval of a new
intention. Switch costs were again reliably greater after incongruent than
after congruent trials, wherea previous congruence had a small reverse
effect on task repeat trials. The author argued that the results would give
the supporting evidnce for the assumption that task-irrelevant precetual
dimension was inhibited when it activated an incompatible response.
Arbuthnott (2005) also examined the congruency effect (i.e., response
congruency effect in her paper) as an indicator of cross-task interference.
She speculated that the absence of alternating switch cost for spatially cued
tasks in her experiment 1 (three digit-judgment tasks were used-
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magnitude, parity, and prime with the stimuli 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9 ) might be
attributed to differences in the relative activation of category-response
rules (Le., task rules) for the competing sets, with spatially cued tasks
requiring less inhibition of competition prior to response than verbally cued
tasks. She suggested that congruence effects indicate the influence of
factors not directly related to a current task. For example, congruence
between spatial location of a stimulus and its correct response can influence
performance, even when location itself is not relevant to a current
judgment (e.g., Lu & Proctor, 1995).
In the context of her experimental design, congruence refers to the same
response to a digit (i.e., left or right key press) across all three tasks. If
other response rules are suppressed because of backward inhibition,
congruence between responses across the tasks would have little effect on
performance. Conversely, significant effects of congruence would indicate
less suppression of the response for other component tasks.
By using a single pair of keys to indicate responses for all three tasks (l.e.,
trivalent response options), all the left responses for 3 and all right
response for 6 were thus congruent stimuli and the remaining digits
required mixed responses across the task, two of one response and one of
the other, and were thus incongruent with respect to stimulus-association
across the tasks. In this experiment, it was found that congruent responses
(900ms) were faster than incongruent responses (900 ms vs. 938ms thus
38ms of congruency effect).
This congruency effect has greater influence with spatial cues (56ms) than
verbal cues (19ms), indicating that other tasks remain activated to a
greater degree for spatial cues than for verbal cues. The author interpreted
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that spatial localization of tasks could provide a distinctive means to
discriminate task sets during judgment, resulting in greater activation of
the current category-response rules relative to competing rules whereas
retrieval of verbal cues might result in less distinctive means to discriminate
the task set, resulting in lesser activation of the current category-response
rules.
So far, the evidence supports the view that the congruency effect is
another important issue to understand the dynamics of switching between
different tasks, however, many researchers more focused on the underlying
mechanism in switch costs and its relationship with preparation interval in
task switching.
In conclusion, the congruency effect indicates that performance is better for
the target stimulus in which both attributes are associated with the correct
response compared to the target stimulus to which two stimulus attributes
are associated with different correct responses regardless of which
paradigm is used for the experiment. In task-switching experiments, it is
generally found that responses to incongruent stimuli are slower amd more
error-prone than response to congruent stimuli (Monsell & Mizzon, 2006).
If the currently irrelevant stimulus-response mappings were completely
suppressed, there would be no congruency effect; thus, this effect may
index the ability to overcome conflict, as exemplified in the task switching
paradigm. However, little work has been done despite the significance and
there have been many different interpretations. For example, this conflict
and/or competition might due to the irrelevant task set persisting from
previous trials (Allport et al.,1994: Yeung & Monsell 2003b) and/or
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retrieved by the stimulus (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Wazak, Hommel & Allport,
2003). Monsell & Mizzon (2006) suggested that this congruency effect is
often larger on task-switch trials (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), reflecting either
greater carry-over when the other task set has just been abandoned
(Allport et al., 1994; Yeung & Monsell, 2003b) or greater susceptibility to
competition from retrieved task sets when the task set is as yet insecurely
established (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Wazak et al., 2003).
Judging from the different interpretations, one has to raise the issues in
order to clarify the nature of the congruency effect and how this effect
interacts with switch cost and backward inhibition under task switching.
E. Outline of the thesis
The goal of the thesis is to investigate the role of inhibition in task
switching by backward inhibition and to examine if backward inhibition is the
main process in cognitive control or independent processing. To achieve this
goal, the thesis examined the backward inhibition effect (alternating switch
cost) and switch costs in a three- task situation. A new experimental
paradigm was introduced and the work reported in this thesis aimed to
investigate the relationship between these two important phenomena in
cognitive control and possibly, providing the conceptual framework (model)
to understand the dynamics of activation and inhibition in task switching by
applying two simple distinct hypotheses: both activation of relevant task sets
and inhibition of no-lonqer relevant task sets for task switching. Additionally,
in order to examine the conflict and interference from other task sets, the
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congruency effect was discussed when a stimulus has attributes relevant to
the three currently active task sets while switching.
The thesis is separated into a general introduction, general methods
section for the experimental paradigm, 6 experimental chapters, 1
descriptive chapter for a proposed model and a general discussion.
The current chapter (chapter 1) so far provided an overview and
introduction to classical issues in task switching and backward inhibition as
well as the congruency effect in the context of cognitive control.
The details of the experimental paradigm and overall analysis procedure will
be presented in the general method (chapter 2).
Experiment 1 (chapter 3) aims to pilot a task switching paradigm for
exploring the relationship between inhibition of previous task sets and
activation of upcoming task sets.
Experiment 2 (chapter 4) aims to examine task switching deficits and
inhibitory deficits in patients with an early stage of Parkinson's disease by
running the same experiment as experiment 1.
Experiment 3 (chapter 5) aims to see the verbal cue effect in the arrow
and location task for switch cost and alternating switch cost: if the verbal
cues reduces switch cost and induce alternating switch cost, based on the
previous literature (Arbuthnott, 2005) that backward inhibition was
incrreased by using verbal cues.
Experiment 4 (chapter 6) aims to examine the cue type effect by using
arbitrary cues in all three tasks and find their influence on the size of switch
cost and backward inhibition then compare the results with experiment 3 to
investigate the underlying mechanisms the different cue types in task
switching.
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Experiment 5 (chapter 7) aims to understand if the feature of the target
would be another important factor to influence the size of switch cost and
BI effect. In order to disentangle the combined information in the target
(word information and perceptual information), the word 'Up'j'Oown' inside
the arrow stimulus is removed and positioned next to the target.
Experiment 6 (chapter 8) aims to examine whether cue-target joint
presentation is crucial for obtaining BI effect and switch costs. The target is
no longer joined together after the cue presentation. In order to compare
the results from the previous experiments for the cue type, two
experiments were conducted: a) all verbal cue experiment b) all arbitrary
cue experiment.
Chapter 9 aims to introduce some of task switching models and propose
the conceptual model of backward inhibition which I developed in order to
understand the relationship between task switching and backward
inhibition.
Lastly, the important findings of all the experiments and theoretical
background will be summarized and discussed in the General discussion
(chapter 10). The brief conclusions and implications for the current thesis




A. The Paradigm and Overview of Experiments
The central idea of the research was from the Mayr and Keele (2000),s
hypothesis: switching to a task set that recently had been abandoned, and
thus is unlikely to have fully recovered from inhibition, should take longer
than a switch to a task set that had been less abandoned, so may have fully
recovered from residual inhibition. Based on Mayr and Keele (2000),s idea
on backward inhibition, three tasks, which participants had to switch
between three tasks, were developed. Sample trials in this design are
shown in Figure 3.
In this thesis, the task used was a simple judgment task: arrow, location
and word task. These three tasks were instructed by the precue for each
task in order to give the information for participants which task they had to
perform and the stimulus was always presented by the arrow shape on the
screen which was used for the three tasks: 1) arrow task was to make a
response by the arrow pointing either 'up' or 'down' 2) location task was to
make a response by the arrow located in either top (position : 'up') or
bottom (position: 'down') of the screen 3) word task was to make a








Figure 3. shows the example of the experimental paradigm. In this case, the
alternating switch trials from the experiment 1 are presented. 'Time' represents the
cue-target-interval (CTI) and response-cue-interval (RCI). All the experiments had
fixed CTI-RCI manipulation: if the CT! was lOOms, the RCI was 1900ms and if the
CTI was l200ms, the RCI was BOOms.The figure does not represent the exact
scaling of the stimuli. Note that in Experiment 6a and b the task cue was
disappeared once the target stimulus was presented, whereas Experiment 1 to 5,
the cue and the target stimulus were presented as shown in the figure.
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In order to develop three tasks which were suitable for all the different age
groups and a clinical group, the task had to be very simple. By using the
arrow shape as a stimulus, it was now possible to manipulate the task. For
example, the shape of the arrow itself already had 'two' features: direction
(for the arrow task) and spatial location (for the location task). As the
arrow stimulus was embedded with these two features, the third task had
to be also part of the stimulus. Thus, the word information inside arrow (for
the word task) enabled participants to do the separate task. Since, it was
embedded in one single target, participants would have to inhibit the
previous task set as well as to overcome the competition from the
irrelevant task information while performing the current task. In other
words, the stimulus for the current task had the task information which was
not only potentially irrelevant but also all congruent for the correct
responses.
The participants' task was to make the correct response by pressing the
mouse button indexed either 'up' or 'down' (see Figure 4) depending on
what kind of task was involved: arrow, location and word task.
Figure 4. present the mouse
key for the response
selection which was indexed
with 'up' and 'down' button.
The middle key was not
allowed to press and it was
fixed on the desk with blue
stick glue.
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The arrow stimulus also gives the two other possible responses: left and
right. However, it might be complicated to have four different responses
with three tasks for participants as well as the analysis. Moreover, right/left
stimulus might provide the lateralization effect in the imaging experiment
such as fMRI and ERPwhich can be used in the near future. Therefore, two
responses (up/down) were only used throughout the thesis.
In the arrow task, they had to attend to the point of the arrow irrespective
of the word inside the arrow or its spatial position of the arrow in the
screen. For example, if the arrow is pointing upward, the correct response
should be the 'up' button. In the location task, participants had to respond
to the position of the arrow whether it was located at the bottom or top of
the screen. For example, if the arrow is up at the top of the screen, they
had to press "up" button and if the arrow is down at the bottom of the
screen, they had to press "down" button. Lastly, in the word task, they had
to attend to the word inside the arrow target. For example, if the word
inside the arrow was 'up', they had to press the 'up' button. The advantage
of this experimental paradigm is that the direction, the position, and the
word inside the arrow could indicate different response for each task, thus
the participants had to attend the appropriate attribute to perform the
current task.
Two eTI (Cue-Target-Interval) - RCI (Response-Cue-Interval) conditions
were implemented, resulting in lOOmsof CTI + 1900ms of RCI and l200ms
of CTI +800ms RCI. In the short preparation interval (CTI= lOOms) when
RCI is long, there was time for the preceding task set to dissipate but little
time for preparing the next task set, whereas in the long preparation
interval (CTI=1200ms) when RCI is short, there was sufficient time to
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prepare for the next task set but little time for the preceding task set to
decay passively. The rationale for this manipulation was based on Mayr &
Keele (2000)'s original idea that they wanted to provide the evidence about
the time sensitivity of a potential inhibitory process. The authors pinpointed
that participants might entertain sequential expectations about upcoming
tasks that contain a bias against ABA sequence (lag-2 repetitions from the
original paper) as they could jugde the probability or frequency of a
sequence by considering how much the sequence resembles available data
as opposed to using a Bayesian calculation (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky,
1972). In that case, they could exhibit a bias toward expecting all three
possible sets to occur within runs of three trials rather than ABA sequence
(lag-2 repetitions). In order to rule out the alternative explanation that an
'inhibitory effect' could be the result of expectancy violations, the authors
believed that the manipulation of the CTI would provide a direct test of the
expectancy account. For example, if the sequential expectancy was the
relevant process that produces an increase in RTone would expect an effect
only in the case of short CTI. In contrast, a CTI of about sOOmswas known
to be sufficient for effective preparation for the upcoming task set (e.g.,
Rogers & Mansell, 1995), so that incorrect expectancies should be
'overwritten'. Thus, if the expected RTeffect was not modulated through the
CTI manipulation, a sequential expectancy explanation would seem very
unlikely (Mayr & Keele, 2000). This Cn-RCI manipulation was used in all
the experiments presented in the thesis. The order of trials and CTI/RCI
manipulation were all in a random order, thus participants had all different
task interval conditions in every block in order to engage them more to the
task. Each block had 60 trials and the experimental session had 12 blocks,
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resulting in 720 trials in total during the experiment. The experiment was
designed by E-Prime version 1.1 and run by Window 98' PC.
Backward inhibition was measured by alternating switch costs by comparing
RTs in the alternating switch trial (e.g., ABA) and the RTs in the double
switch trial (e.g., CBA). For example, in the figure 3 (see page 46), RTs in
the arrow task from the N trial could be compared with RTs in the location
task from the N trial. The main idea for the slower RTs in the alternating
switch trials compared to the RTs in the double switch trials was based on
the assumption that successful performance for switching task requires
inhibition of the previous task set which is no longer useful for the
upcoming task set as well as to activate the upcoming task set. By
measuring the backward inhibition effect with alternating switch costs, it
was possible to see if this is a part of executive control mechanism that can
be independent and separable. Simultaneously, switch costs were measured
by comparing RTs in the switch trials (e.g., BA) and repeat trials (e.g., AA)
to understand the relationship between backward inhibition and switch
costs in task switching. Congruency effects were also measured by
comparing RTs in the incongruent trials and RTs in the congruent trials.
Specifically, there are three different types of congruency as can be seen in
Figure 5.
Congruent trials are when three tasks have all the same responses (the
correct response of the current task is congruent to that of the other two
tasks) whereas incongruent trials are when three tasks have different
responses (the correct response of the current task is incongruent to that of
the other two tasks). In one-third of the trials of each block, task-relevant
information and task-irrelevant information were mapped to the same
50
response (congruent condition), in one-third of trials, task-relevant
information and task-irrelevant information were mapped to the different
responses: one is the single incongruent condition that the response of the
current task was incongruent to one of the other tasks. The other one is the
double incongruent condition that the correct response of the current task
is incongruent to the other two tasks.
Word Word Word
1) Congruent 2) Single incongruent 3) Double incongruent










Figure 4. The word task as an example shows three different congruent
conditions on the current trial. Within a block of trials, these
congruent conditions are presented in a random order.
The goal of this study was to demonstrate the backward inhibition effect as
well as the switch cost effect by using a simple paradigm. The main
question was whether there would be any backward inhibition effect in a
three-task switching paradigm in order to support the idea that suppressing
the old (previous) task sets is as important as activating the new
(upcoming) task set when you have to switch constantly and differently.
Another question was also raised if the interference from the irrelevant task
set really exists in task switching. In order to answer this question,
congruency effect was also measured. Specifically, I reported results from
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six experiments using my experimental paradigm and the results will be
presented in detail throughout the thesis.
B. Analytic Procedures
Because of the same experimental paradigm throughout the thesis, the
analysis for each experiment was adapted in the same manner. The
measurements (Independent variables) from the each experiment were as
follows.
Switch cost was measured by subtracting the mean RT (percent error
scores) in the switch trials from mean RT (error percentage) in the repeat
trials. For the analysis, switch trials were defined as any task switch
between N-l and N trials. Thus, all kind of switch type trials including
alternating switch and double switch trials were categorised as switch
trials'. In the previous analysis for switch cost, switch trials are defined as
any task switch between N-l and N trials. Thus, all kinds of switch trials
including alternating switch and double switch trials were categorised as
switch trials. Note that switch trials are more often than repeat trials
I Note that switch trials are more often than repeat trials (switch trials: repeat
trials =72%: 28%) and the proportion among the switch trials are nearly equal (1-
switch: 2-switch: alternating switch = 23%: 25%: 22%) and the task sequence
was in a random order for each block so each block had different task sequence
order within this percentage of trials.
1) Repeat trials: AAA, BAA,CAA,ABB,BBB,CBB,ACC,BQ;,C~
2) One switch trials: BBA,CCA,AAB,AA.s.,C~, eec
3) Two switch (double switch) trials: CBA,ABC,BAC,CAB,BCA,ACB
Alternating switch trials: ABA,CAC,BAB,ACA,BCB,CBC
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(switch trials: repeat trials =72%: 28%) and the proportion among the
switch trials are nearly equal (l-switch: 2-switch: alternating switch =
23%: 25%: 22%) and the task sequence was in a random order for each
block so each block had different task sequence order within this
percentage of trials.
1) Repeat trials: AAA, BAA, CAA, ABB, BBB, CBB, ACC, BCC,CCC
2) One switch trials: BBA, CCA,AAB, AAC, CCB,BBC
3) Two switch (double switch) trials: CBA,ABC, BAC,CAB, BCA, ACB
4) Alternating switch trials: ABA, CAC,BAB,ACA, BCB,CBC
Alternating switch cost was measured by subtracting the mean RT (error
percentage) in the alternating switch trials from mean RT (error
percentage) in the double switch trials.
Congruency effect was measured by subtracting the mean RT (error
percentage) in the incongruent trials from mean RT (error) in the congruent
trials. As discussed earlier, there were two different incongruent trials:
single incongruent and double incongruent and these are summed up for
the average RT of the incongruent trials. The congruency effect was
analysed in both current trials and previous trials and the reasons are as
follows.
a. congruency on the current trials was analysed to see how active
the other task sets remain. In other words, The current congruency
effects indicates that the current level of activation interferes from the
activation of the other task sets, depending on whether it activates a
response that is the same (congruent) as or different (incongruent) from
the response activated by the new upcoming task set (current task set).
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The congruency effect on the current trials was measured by subtracting
the mean RT (error percentage) in the incongruent trials from mean RT
(error) in the congruent trials. In other words, it is calculated by the mean
RTs (error percentage) in the incongruent conditions (single incongruent
1+ single incongruent 2+ double incongruent)/3 - mean RTs (error
percentage) in the congruent condition. Additionally, the current
congruency was analysed with trial type (switch vs. repeat) and switch
type (alternating switch vs. double switch) in order to determine whether
the interference from the other task sets on the current trials are
interacting with different switch conditions.
b. congruency on the previous trials was also analysed to see if the
persisting activation of a previous task set can interfere with or facilitate a
subsequent task switch, depending on whether it activates a response that
is the same (congruent) as or different from the response (incongruent)
activated by the new task set. In the present paradigm, the congruent and
double incongruent conditions on the current N trials are not necessarily
influenced by the previous trials N-1; however, single incongruent
conditions on the current N trials are inevitably influenced by the previous
N-1 trials. Note that single incongruent 1 is congruent to the previous N-l
trials and single incongruent 2 is incongruent to the previous N-l trials.
Thus, two different single incongruent conditions on the current N trials
shows whether it is harder to do a task during the single incongruent 2
condition on the N trials compared to a task during the single incongruent 1
condition on the N trials. It is noteworthy that participants have to ignore
the features of irrelevant task sets in both single incongruent
conditions.,However, the difference between single incongruent 2 and
single incongruent 1 is to see the interference from the previous
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congruency is stronger in the single incongruent 2 condition. Thus, the
performance will be suffered as it might be more difficult to ignore the
features of irrelevant task sets during the single incongruent 2 condition on
the current trials.
The mean RT (error percentage) between single incongruent 2 and single
incongruent 1was compared in this analysis.
c. Statistical Procedures
For the statistical analysis, significance was tested in an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) for repeated measures. The alpha level of significance was set to
p <0.05. All raw data were screened prior to analysis. The distribution of
the raw data was tested for normality and homogeneity of variance. For all
the experiments except the chapter 4, RTs were removed if it was larger
than 3,000 ms and smaller than 300 ms from the raw dataset. This cut-off
criterion for outliers 2 was made after calculating the mean of the raw
dataset and 2-way standard deviation for each experiment. By this 300-
3,000 ms cut-off, mean of median 3 RT which only included correct
responses and mean error percentage were analyzed as dependent
variables. After collecting the dataset for the analysis, the following
procedures were used for the all the experiments. If four- interactions (or
2 For the chapter 4, the cut-off criterion was 600-6,OOOms for Old control and
patients with an early stage of PD.
3 Mean of median RTwas used for all the experiments.
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high level) were significant, these interactions were split in separate three-
way (or more-way) ANOVAs one for each stage at each level. Two-way
interactions for within factor comparisons in the repeated-measured ANOVA
were followed up with Paired-Samples T-tests.
Error data were calculated as percentage of errors and subjected to
repeated-measured ANOVAwith the same factors as for the RT.
First, trial type (switch/repeat) x CTI (CTI=100ms /CTI=1200ms) x task
(arrow/location/word) x congruency (congruent/single incongruent 1/ single
incongruent 2/ double incongruent): 2 x 2 x 3 x 4 repeated-measure
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the independent variables task switch,
CTI, task and congruency on the current trials was run. This 4-way ANOVA
was run separately for RT and error. If there was 4-way interaction, it was
broken down by each task and 3-way ANOVAby each task was presented.
If there was 3-way interaction by each task, 2-way ANOVA by CTI was
presented. If there was 2-way interaction by each CTI, congruency effect
was examined by each trial type (switch/repeat trials).
Second, switch type (alternating switch / double switch) x CTI (CTI=100ms
/CTI=1200ms) x task (arrow / location / word) x 3 (congruent / single
incongruent 1/ single incongruent 2/double incongruent): 2 x 2 x 3 x 4
repeated-measure analysis of variance CANOVA) with the independent
variables alternating switch, CTI, task and congruency on the current trials
was run. This 4-way ANOVA was run separately for RT and error. If there
was 4-way interaction, it was broken down by each task and 3-way
ANVOVA by each task was presented. If there was 3-way interaction by
each task, 2-way ANOVA by CTI was presented. If there was 2-way
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interaction by each CTI, congruency effect was examined by each switch
type (alternating switch/double switch trials).
Third, Paired-Samples T-test between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was run to see if the single incongruent 2 condition made
slower RT and more errors because of the interference from the previous
incongruence to the current trials. This t-test was run separately for RT and
error for the effect of task switching (trial type: switch/repeat) and the
effect of alternating task (switch type: alternating switch/ double switch).
Finally, group analysis between experiments was run with a repeated
measured ANOVA. Table 2. shows the summary of the comparison between
experiments. The group comparison will be discussed in the result section




Exp 1 To examine the effect of age Task- oriented Young controls Vs.
on switch cost and cue experiment Old controls
Vs. backward inhibition effect Arrow (average age: 27 vs. 59)
task: ¢::=>
Old Location
control task: 0 0in Exp 2 Word
task: WORD
Exp 1 To see if the verbal -Young controls Expl: task-oriented cue
cue effect on switch cost -the cue for the Vs.
Vs. and alternating switch cost word task is the Exp3: all verbal cue
same as exp 1
Ex~ 3
Exp 3 To see whether the strength Young controls Exp3: all verbal cue vs.
of the cue-target association Exp4: all arbitrary cue
Vs. influence the performance Arrow task cue: &&&&&
of switch cost and alternating Location
Exp 4 switch cost (strong cue vs. task cue:%%%%%
weak cue comparison) Word task cue:#####
Exp 3 To examine if -Young controls Exp 3: the word information
the separate information in -all verbal cues inside the arrow stimulus
Vs. the target feature vs.
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(verbal/visual) Exp 5: the word information
Exp 5 influences the magnitude of outside the arrow
switch cost and (e.g . .n )
alternating switch cost Up
Exp 3 To see the different cue-target -Young controls Exp 3:target is jointed
joint/ separate display -All verbal cue with cue vs.
Vs. influences the switch cost Exp6a: target is
and alternating switch cost presented
Exp 6a after cue disappeared
Exp 4 To' see the active preparation -Young controls Exp4:target is jointed with
for the upcoming task even -All arbitrary cue cue vs.
Vs. when the cue information Exp6b: target is
is disappeared when the cues presented
Exp 6b are arbitrary. after cue disappeared
Exp 6a To see the strength of the cue Cue and target Exp 6a: all verbal cue
-target association are separately Vs. Exp 6b: all arbitrary cue
Vs. when both cue and target presented
for all the tasks are
Exp 6b presented sepa rately.
Table 2. presents a brief summary of group comparisons between experiments.
The analysis for different experiments will be discussed in the experimental chapter.
Note that this group analysis was made mainly to see the effect of cue type or cue-
target temporally overlapping or separately presented in terms of backward
inhibition mainly and the switch costs. However, the congruency effect was also
examined if there is any change between group comparisons.
D. Research Questions
Throughout the thesis, same research questions were raised for the results.
All the results in the thesis were presented with reaction time and error
percentage separately. The structure of the discussion in each experiment
also followed the questions in order to answer this question based on the
results.
First, the research questions for the effect of task switching were
presented and the results for all the experiments follow the questions.
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a. Is there any switch cost?
This question is the fundamental and important for task switching. In
order to answer the question, the switch costs for reaction time and
error were calculated for each task. If there is any switch cost, the next
question is to know whether it is reduced by the long preparation
interval and whether it is influenced by the different type of cues and
tasks. The presence of switch cost in task switching simply gives more
evidence to support the idea that it is an index of extra time to
reconfigure the upcoming task set while switching tasks.
b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
The main effect of congruency on the current trials shows how active
and persistent the other task sets remain, indicating that the current
level of activation from the current task get interference from the
activation of the other task set. As described earlier, the congruency
effect is calculated for each task in order to see whether the congruency
influences the task differently. Additionally, it is interesting to see if the
congruency effect is immune to the preparation interval or not.
c. Does congruency Interact with switch/repeat trials (trial type)?
The main interest in this question is to see if the switch trials are more
influenced by the congruency than the repeat trials and to see if the
switch costs are reliably bigger on the incongruent trials than the
congruent trials. If there is significantly bigger congruency effect on the
switch trials than repeat trials, it might be assumed that switching
different tasks have more interference from the other task sets which
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are on a currently activated state. Additionally, it is interesting if the
interaction depends on the task and preparation interval.
d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
Previous congruency effect shows if the persisting activation of a
previous task would interfere with or facilitate a subsequent task switch
or repeat trials, depending on whether it activates a response that is the
same as (single incongruent 1 condition on N trials) or different from the
response activated by the new task set (single incongruent 2 condition
on N trials). To answer the question, the single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 on the current trials are compared as both trials are
directly influenced by the previous N-l trials. Previous congruency effect
on reaction time and error is examined for each preparation interval and
task separately as well as the each trial type (switch/repeat).
Second, the research questions for the effect of alternllting task were
presented and the results for all the experiments follow the questions.
a. Is there any alternating switch cost?
This question gives the evidence of backward inhibition in task
switching. In order to answer the question, the alternating switch costs
for reaction time and error were calculated for each task. If there is any
alternating switch cost, the next question is to know whether alternating
switch cost is reduced by preparation interval or not. According to the
previous literature (Mayr & Keele, 2000; Arbuthnott & Woodward, 2002;
Arbuthnott, 2005), they have argued that backward inhibition is immune
to the preparation interval. Moreover, it is interesting to see if the
different cue type and tasks also influence the backward inhibition.
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b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
The definition of the congruency effect is the same as before, however it
is noteworthy that the congruency effect occurs in three-task switching;
one is the alternating switch and the other is double switch. Thus, this
question is about whether the interference from the irrelevant task sets
influences the switching trials. Congruency effect is calculated for each
task and preparation interval separately.
c. Does congruency interact with alternating switch/double switch
trials (switch type)?
This question is related to the previous question b. If there is any
congruency effect, it is interesting to find whether the congruency
influences the alternating switch and double differently. One could argue
that if an abandoned task set is not fully inhibited, the interference from
that just-abandoned task set might be stronger. According to Hubner et
al (2003)'s study, backward inhibition could reduce the interference
from the preceding task set. Hence, it is interesting to find if the
congruency effect is smaller on the alternating switch trials than double
switch trials on the basis of the assumption that backward inhibition in
the alternating switch trials can reduce the interference by inhibiting the
task set representation which has just been abandoned.
d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
The main interest of this question is the same as before; if the residual
activation of the task set on the N-l trials interfere with or facilitate the
current trials which are either alternating switch trials (e.g., task
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A~B~A) or double switch trials (e.g., task C~B~A). Note that the
previous trials in both alternating and double switch trials are the same
tasks, thus this previous congruency is about the response congruency
effect. In other words, if current task on N trials have the different
response as the previous task on N-l trials (single incongruent 2
condition) have more interference from when the current task on N trials
have the same response as the previous task on N-l trials (single
incongruent 1 condition). This effect of previous congruency on reaction
time and error is examined for each preparation interval and task
separately as well as each switch type (alternating switch/double
switch).
Lastly, the effect of cues between experiments (see Table 2, page 57 in the
current chapter) is examined by the previous research questions and
presented only for the important issues.
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Chapter3
Experiment 1: Switch cost and backward
inhibition with task-oriented cue: Pilot study
INTRODUCTION
Mayr and Keele (2000),s rationale for backward inhibition (BI) was
simple: the previous task set must be inhibited to implement a new task
set. Because a to-be-established task set is always a recently abandoned
one in the task switching paradigm, persisting inhibition must be overcome.
Schuch and Koch (2003) argued that when switching between only two
tasks, inhibition of task sets cannot be distinguished from activation of task
sets. That is, proactive interference might result from persisting inhibition
of the currently relevant task set and/or from perslsttnq activation of the
previously relevant task set. Thus, they suggested that switch costs
between two tasks may be due to the relative activation of one task set as
compared with the other, but it cannot be decided whether inhibition is
involved as an extra component. They also questioned that which processes
involved in task switching are related to the inhibition mechanism. In order
to answer this question, they made two hypotheses: 1) if backward
inhibition is related to preparation process, the onset of a new task cue
during the preparation interval might trigger inhibition of the previous task
set, or 2) if backward inhibition is related to response process, in other
words, if response related processes required inhibition of the competing
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task set, then this would imply that a new task set could be prepared
without inhibiting the previous one. For example, Meiran (2000b) varied the
degree to which the response sets of two tasks overlaps and the result
demonstrated that residual switch cost occurred when the same two
response keys were used for the two tasks but no residual switch costs
occurred when if the different sets of response keys were associated with
the task. This implied that response-selection requirement indeed played an
important role in task switching. Thus, Schuch and Koch (2003) suggested
that if the response conflict between the current and previous task set is
resolved by inhibiting the previous task set, in other words, they wanted to
examine backward inhibition as a function of response selection.
In order to answer these, three tasks were used by digits: 1) smaller-larger
task (if the digit is smaller or larger than five) 2) odd-even task and 3)
number classification task- whether a number was centrally located, i.e., 3,
4, 6, 7 or peripherally located, i.e., 1, 2, 8, 9 by using Go/No-go paradigm,
indicating whether the response selection was required.
Of importance, this Go/No-go signal was provided by the different sound
only at the time of stimulus onset, and it was completely unpredictable.
This Go/ No-go paradigm enabled them to explore the role of response
selection for inhibition of task sets. The result showed that backward
inhibition (BI) was affected by No-go signals: large BI effect was observed
in the Go condition but not in the No-go condition. Therefore, Schuch and
Koch (2003) concluded that preparation processes do not involve backward
inhibition in line with the notion that backward inhibition did not interact
with preparation interval as Mayr and Keele (2000),s result, because
response selection cannot start during the preparation interval.
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However, No-go manipulation would not only affect response execution but
also response selection because no response had to be given in No-go trials
(Schuch and Koch, 2003). Thus, they had another experiment where
participants had to press the two response keys simultaneously (double
press trials) when the No-go signal occurred. This way all possible
responses were executed without requiring the selection of one response
against another competing response. In other words, these double press
trials required execution of all possible responses but not selection. Again,
the result was that backward inhibition was found after Go trials but not
found in the double press trials where response selection was not required,
providing evidence that the inhibition does not depend on response
execution but on response selection.
Schuch and Koch (2003)'s findings showed that backward inhibition is
immune to the preparation interval in line with Mayr and Keele (2000) and
Arbuthnott and Frank (2000),s previous findings, furthermore, their double
press trial manipulation in the No-go trials demonstrated that selecting a
response caused inhibition of previous response meanings because they are
interfering, and such perslstlnq inhibition must be overcome when switching
back to this task.
However, it is noteworthy that Gol No-go paradigm is only limited to
measure the response inhibition, hence it is difficult to generalize or
conclude that backward inhibition only occurs in the process of selecting
responses because task sets interfere with respect to response selection.
That is, inhibition is always inhibition of something (e.g., a response,
previous stimulus, previous stimulus-response mapping, and intention) in
switching different tasks. For this reason, there is an open issue that any
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putative task also involves other process for backward inhibition. In their
study, there was only one stimulus at a time, and stimulus dimension was
purely cognitive, so that visual search and perceptual filtering process could
not have played any role unlike Mayr and Keele (2000),s odd-item-out
paradigm. In this case, there was no conflict or interference once the
stimulus was presented. Hence, one could argue that there might be
another possibility that backward inhibition might influence specific stimulus
representation or cue-processing.
For example, Hubner et al (2003) observed selective reduction of
interference for all characters associated with a just-abandoned task for
incongruent trials in a flanker task: If the target was 'SAS' (letter task:
vowel/consonant) on n-1 trial, interference was reduced for 'H#H' (symbol
task: if the symbol contains straight line or curved line) on n trial and the
author suggested that backward inhibition mechanism played a role in
reducing inference from a directly preceding task set (flankers from the
preceding task) compared with a task set not as recently applied (flankers
from control task) when a switch to a new task is endogenously prepared
for by a precue (experiment 1). However, when they manipulated the
precue/ no-cue condition where precue did not specify the identity of the
upcoming task- the only information by a precue was that there was going
to be a task switch on the next trial, leaving open which of the two possible
tasks would follow- there was no reduction of interference from preceding
task set in this condition (experiment 2). This result demonstrated that the
mere knowledge of having to abandon a task set without the option to
prepare specifically for the new task is not sufficient for backward inhibition
to occur. Furthermore, such a result would be line with by Mayr and Keele
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(2000) with the idea that backward inhibition emerges only as a
consequence of the activation of a new task set. The authors concluded that
a finding of no reduction of interference from flankers of the preceding task
in the precue condition demonstrated that backward inhibition is bound to
the option of task-specific preparation. They also supported the idea that
result from their experiment 1 was not by accelerated classification of
flankers from the preceding task as irrelevant.
HObneret al (2003),s results suggested that backward inhibition may serve
to reduce interference from all potentially competing task sets depending
on their competitive strength. However, they admitted that it is unclear
whether the interference reduction found in their experiment 1 was due to a
reduction of response conflict or to a more general from of task
competition. In their experiments, response sets were disjointed between
tasks, and thus target and flankers were always associated with different
responses, resulting in the contradictory view with Schuch and Koch
(2003),s view that backward inhibition works on response selection
processes.
If the existence of the cue affected the size of backward inhibition in
HObner et al (2003),s study, one could speculate that cue processing is an
important factor influencing backward inhibition. Arbuthnott and Woodward
(2002) examined these questions and whether task-relevant information
provided by task cues influences the size of switch costs and alternating
switch costs (measurement for backward inhibition). Cues presented SOOms
prior to trivalent stimulus and three tasks were performed which was used
by Arbuthnott and Frank (2000) previously: participants had to categorise
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three types of characters 1) digits (odd/even) 2) letters (vowel/consonant)
3) symbols (primary text/match use) by the task information from three
types of cue. First, verbal cues (l.e., Odd or Even?/ Vowel or Consonant? /
Math or Text? ) were presumed to have a pre-existing association with the
various tasks and characters. Second, the appropriate tasks were indicated
by the position of the stimulus array on the screen precued by a row of
asterisks appearing at the relevant location (spatial cues). Third,:
distinctive objects indicated the relevant task (* for the digit, JJ for the
letter, • for the symbol judgment) (shape cues).
The results showed that substantial switch cost with recently learned cue-
task associations (l.e., spatial/shape cue condition, 297ms and 283ms
respectively) and greatly reduced switch cost (10Sms) in the verbal cue
condition where prior association exists with the relevant tasks or
characters. However, alternating switch costs was observed in both pre-
existing (l.e., verbal cue condition, 102ms) and recently learned cue-task
associations (Le., shape cue condition only 1, 134ms). Thus, alternating
switch cost was not influenced by the strength of the cue-task association
unlike switch costs, indicating that alternating switch cost reflects
somewhat different processes than switch cost per se, specifically the time
necessary to resolve inhibition of a recently abandoned task sets.
It appears that backward inhibition might affect the cue process and
response selection as discussed earlier. However, there are theoretical and
methodological disagreements on these issues, resulting in the lack of
I Alternating switch cost in the spatial location cue was nearly eliminated (8 ms cost). Thus,
the author presumed that cue may influence the application process as Mayr and Kliegl
(2003)'s suggestion.
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generalization. Although both stimulus-based and cue-based information
can activate the relevant task set possibly providing the evidence to
support the role of inhibition in endogenous control processes, it is not clear
whether the inhibition is actively and independently occurs in the cue-task
association, preparation processing, response selection, causing more
speculations. In order to examine these hypotheses from the previous
literature, the current experiment was designed to capture these in three
task switching paradigm which I introduced in the general method (see
page 43 in the chapter 2).
The purpose of this pilot study was to simply measure the switch cost and
backward inhibition by the alternating switch cost and to understand the
relationship between those two by providing the evidence to support the
idea that backward inhibition plays an important role in task switching and
this effect is independent processing from switch costs. Additionally, it was
also possible to measure the congruency effect to examine the interference
from other irrelevant task sets.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty two participants (14 women) were recruited from the University
of Nottingham through the advert and 12 of them were undergraduates and
the rest of them were postgraduate in the psychology department. The
participants ranged age from 18 and 31 years (M= 24.4, 50=6), reported
normal and corrected-to normal vision and were all right-handed. They
received £4 as an inconvenience allowance after completion of the
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experiment. The study took approximately 50 min to complete including the
instruction and practice session.
Stimuli and Design
Stimuli for the target in the experiment were the shape of arrow either
pointing up or down which was made for the whole procedure (height: 5
em, width: 3cm). The target was always located either below (horizontal:
11.1 em, vertical: 12.3 em, from the top left corner) or above (horizontal:
11.1 em, vertical: 2.13cm, from the top left corner for the position on slide)
of the centre of the screen.
In each target, the text saying either 'up' or 'down' was presented inside
the arrow and it was located in the arrow point part with the word in font
Arial, Bold size 20. This text was shown in black ink within a white arrow
target on a black background.
In order to guide participants as to which task they should be doing, a cue
for the each task was visually displayed in the centre of the screen: two
painted arrow shape ('~') for the arrow task, two separate squares (,cc') for
the location task, and letter ('WORD') for the word task in Arial font in
upper case size 20. The cue for each task was presented first and was















=1900ms CT! = 1200ms
RCI=
l800ms
Cue 1 Target 1 Response 1 Cue 2
Until Response
Target 2 Response 2 Cue 3 Target
Until Response 3
Figure 4. An example of the time course of task presentation in Experiment 1.
Tasks were described here were three tasks: arrow, location and word task.
As can be seen, if the CT! (cue-target-interval) was short (lOOms),
RCI (response-cue-interval) was long (1900ms) and if CT! was long (1200ms),
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Apparatus and Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a room with dimmed
lighting. The tasks were explained verbally using the examples of the cues
and targets for each task. The each task was presented using a Window 98
desktop computer with a 14-inch monitor. The software was programmed in
E-prime version 1.1 (W.Schneider, Eschman, & Succolotto, 2002) in all
experiments including the current one. The PC in the experimental room
was connected to the projector in the next room where participants were
tested. They had to look up the wall to see the enlarged screen (Width:
1l0cm, height: 8Sms) and press the mouse button for the correct response
on the desk.
Participants started with a short practice session, which consisted of
repeating each task (16trials for each task) separately followed by
switching between tasks (36 trials). During the practice, feedback (correct/
wrong) after each response was given. PartiCipants were instructed to
respond as quickly and accurately possible. During the switching practice
trials, if participants achieved less than 27 correct out of 36 trials, they
returned to another block of switching practice.
Following the practice session, the experimental session was presented with
12 blocks of 60 trials each, resulting in a total of 720 trials. Unlike in the
practice session, no feedback was provided. At the end of each block,
partiCipants had a break and they pressed any button to start the next
block when they were ready.
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RESULTS
One participant was excluded from data analysis because she was
interrupted by her mobile phone.
I) Effect of task switching
Four research questions for the effect of task switching were raised.
They are as follows.
a. Is there any switch cost?
b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
c. Does congruency interact with switch/repeat trials (trial type)?
d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
On Reaction Time CRT)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors CTI (lOO,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrows, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single inconqruent/ 1, single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) revealed a significant 4-way interaction: [F (5, 93) =2.4, p
=.05] (see the Appendix, page 397 table 1a). This interaction was explored
by conducting three separate 3-way (factors CTI, trial type, and
congruency) repeated measures ANOVAs for each task. These are reported
below.
2 The distinction between single incongruent 1 and single incongruent 2 lies in the
previous N-l trials. If the current task is congruentto the previous task on the N-l
trials, this is the current condition of the single incongruent 1. If the current task is
incongruentto the previous task on the N-l trials, this is the current condition of
the single incongruent 2.
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On Error (0/0)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors CT! (lOa,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrows, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) revealed a non- significant 4-way interaction: [F (3, 72)
=.51, p =.71] (see the Appendix, page 397 table lb). There was only a
marginally significant 3-way interaction (CTI, task and congruency), [F (3,
61) =2.5, p=.07]. This marginal 3-way interaction was explored by
presenting 3 separate figures by each task as these figures were previous
presented on the reaction time (RT). Each figure is reported below.
Arrow task
a. RT
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Figure 6. a. Mean RT (with standard error) (figure 6 a) and b.percent error scores
(figure 6 b) in congruency and trial type in two cn conditions for the arrow task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was only found at
CTI =100, [F (1, 22) =2, P <.001] (142ms of switch cost: switch RT
minus repeat RT, M =1026 [SE: 59) vs. M= 884 [SE: 43}: switch vs.
repeat) but not at CTI= 1200, [F (1, 20) = 2, P =.17}. (See Figure 6 a).
There was also a marginal significant 3-way interaction (CTI, trial type and
congruency) for the arrow task, [F (2, 49) =2.5, p =.08] which resulted
from two effects which impacted CTI= 100 but not CTI = 1200. Both of these
effects can be clearly seen in Figure 6 a and were confirmed an analysis of
the simple effects (the factors trial type and congruency were examined at
each CTI separately).
Firstly, there was a significant 2-way interaction between trial type and
congruency at the CTI=100, [F (3, 54) = 3.2, p =.04] but not the
CTI=1200, [F (2,47) = .60, P =.58]. Paired-samples T-test revealed that at
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the eTI = 100 switch trials were significantly slower than repeat trials for all
levels of congruency: t (20) =8.9, p <.001 in the congruent (234ms of
switch cost, switch M= 991 [SE: 54J vs. repeat M= 753 [SE: 36]), t (20)=
-2.5, P =.02 in the single incongruent 2 (123ms of switch cost, switch M=
1000 [SE: 60J vs. repeat M= 877 [SE: 54J), and t (20)= -2.7, p= .014 in
the double incongruent (145ms of switch cost, switch M= 1135 [SE: 73] vs.
repeat M= 990 [SE: 58J), except in the single incongruent 1, t (20) = -1.2,
p =.26 (60ms of switch cost, switch M = 914 [SE: 64J vs. M= 914 [SE:
72J).
Secondly, and more interestingly although there was a significant effect of
congruency for both switch and repeat trials at both eT!= 100 [F (2, 41)=
8, p<.OOl ] and eTI=1200 [F (2, 37)= 11, p <.001], the impact of
congruency was much larger on the repeat trials, [F (2, 48)= 7.8, P
<.001] (191ms of congruency effect, incongruent RT minus congruent RT:
congruent M = 753 [SE: 36J, single incongruent 1 M= 938 [SE: 75J single
incongruent 2 M= 880 [SE: 53J, double incongruent M =1013 [SE: 59J)
than switch trial, [F (2, 46) = 9.8, p <.001] (35ms of congruency effect,
congruent M = 1018 [SE: 61], single incongruent 1 M= 982 [SE: 67J, single
incongruent 2 M= 1023 [SE: 63J, double incongruent M= 1153 [SE: 74])
during the CTI=100.
At CTI=1200, switch and repeat trials were equally and significantly affected
by the factor congruency, [F (2, 37) = 11, p <.001]. During the crI
=1200, the congruency effect was slightly larger on the switch trials [F (2,
40) = 12, P <.001], (106ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 641 [SE:
44], single incongruent 1 M= 633 [SE: 40J, single incongruent 2 M= 760
[SE: 55], double incongruent M= 849 [SE: 76]) than on the repeat trials, [F
76
(3, 56) = 6.1, P <.001] (71ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 617
[SE: 39J, single incongruent 1 M= 603 [SE: 35J, single incongruent 2 M=
666 [SE: 39J, double incongruent M= 795 [SE: 57]).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was not significant either on the repeat trials, t (20)= .87, p
=.39 nor on the switch trials, t (20)= -1.3, p=.22.
At the eTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was only significant on the switch trials, t (20)= -3.4, p=.003
but not on the repeat trials, t (20)= - 1.5, p =.15.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CTI=100, [F (2, 45) = 1.7, p=.18] and CTI=1200 [F (2,
39)=1.0, p=.37].
A significant difference in error percentage between switch and repeat trials
for the arrow task was found in both at CTI=100, [F (1, 20) = 9.4,
p=.006] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 20) = 11, p=.003].
The effect of congruency was also significant at CTI=100, [F (2, 47) = 8.8,
p<.OOl] and at CTI=1200, [F (1, 29) = 18, p<.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was not significant either on the repeat trials, t (20)=
.11, p =.91 nor on the switch trials, t (20)= 1.4, p=.18.
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At the eT!= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was only significant on the switch trials, t (20)= -3.4,
p=.003.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the arrow task only occurred at the
'short preparation interval condition for reaction time whereas there
was a main effect of switch costs in both short and long preparation
interval condition on the error
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed for both
reaction time and errors for both short and long preparation
intervals.
c. The interpretation for the interaction between congruency and trial
type (switch/repeat trials) is difficult as it goes different direction for
reaction time and error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task only occurred
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Figure 7. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 7 a) and percent error scores
(figure 7 b) in congruency and trial type in two CT! conditions for the location task.
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RT ems)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at eT!=
100, [F (1, 20) = 36, P <.001] (160ms of switch cost, M = 903 [SE: 47J
vs. M= 743 [SE: 35J: switch vs. repeat) but not at the CTI=1200, [F (1,
20) = .16, p =.70] (see Figure 7 a).
There was a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, trial type and congruency)
for the location task, [F (2, 48) = 3.0, p=.05] which resulted from two
effects which impacted CTI= 100 but not CT!= 1200. Both of these effects
can be clearly seen in Figure 7 a and were confirmed an analysis of the
simple effect (the factors trial type and congruency were examined at each
CTI separately).
Firstly, there was a significant 2-way interaction between trial type and
congruency at the CTI=100, [F (2, 44) = 3.0, p =.05] but not the
CTI=1200, [F (2, 44) = 1.2, p =.30]. Paired-SamplesT-test revealed that
at the CTI=lOO switch trials were significant slower than repeat trials for all
levels of congruency: t (20) =- 3.2, p =.004 in the congruent (151ms of
switch cost, switch M= 866 [SE: 54J vs. repeat M= 715 [SE: 45J), t (20)=
-7.5, p <.001 in the single incongruent 1 (255ms of switch cost, switch M=
955 [SE: 48J vs. repeat M= 700 [SE: 35J), and t (20)= -4.2, p< .001 in
the double incongruent (156ms of switch cost, switch M= 924 [SE: 51J vs.
repeat M= 76B [SE: 42J), except in the single incongruent 2, t (20) = -1.4,
p =.17 (77ms of switch cost, switch M = 868 [SE: 44J vs. M= 791 [SE:
60)).
Secondly, there was a significant effect of congruency for both switch and
repeat trials at the CTI= 1200, [F (2, 51) =12, p <.001] (BBms of
congruency effect, congruent M= 496 [SE:31J, single incongruent 1 M= 603
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[SE: 42J, single incongruent 2, M= 517 [5E:29J, double incongruent M=
633 [SE: 45J) but not the CTI=lOO [F (2, 47) = 1.5, p =.22] (44ms of
congruency effect, M= 790 [5E:44J vs. M= 827 [SE: 39J vs. M= 829 [SE:
43J vs. M= 846 [SE: 43J). At the CTI= 100, the switch trials were
significantly affected by the factor congruency: SOmsof congruency effect
(congruent M= 866 [SE: 54J, single incongruent 1 M= 955 [SE: 48J, single
incongruent 2 M= 868 [SE: 44J, double incongruent M= 924 [SE: 51]) in
the switch trials, [F (2, 54) = 6.9, P =.001] but not in the repeat trials,
[F (3,43)= 1.3, P =.27].
At the CTI= 1200, the switch and repeat trials were also significantly
affected by the factor congruency: 79ms of congruency effect (M= 505 [SE:
35] vs. M= 597 [SE: 44J vs. M= 545 [SE: 40J vs. M= 609 [SE: 46J) in the
switch trials, [F (2, 36)= 3.1, p=.05] and 99ms of congruency effect in
the repeat trials, [F (2, 42)= 6.4, p =.003] (M= 486 [SE: 34] vs. M= 608
[SE: 44J vs. M= 658 [SE: 53J).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was only significant on the switch trials, t (20)= 3.8,
p=.OOl.
At the eTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant both on the repeat trials, t (20)= 2.8, p =
.01 and on the switch trials, t (20)= 2.1, p=.05.
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Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CTI=100, [F (2, 48) =2.3, p=.10] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 32) = 2.4,
p=.12].
A significant difference in error percentage between switch and repeat trials
for the location task was only found at CTI=1200, [F (2, 37) =13,
p<.OOl] not at CTI= lOO, [F (1, 20) = 2.9, p=.10].
The effect of congruency was significant both at CTI=100, [F (1, 24) = 10,
p=.003] and at CTI=1200, [F (2, 37) = 13, p<.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was not significant either on the repeat trials, t (20)=
.57, p =.58 or on the switch trials, t (20)= -1.8, p=.09.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was only significant on the switch trials, t (20)= -2.8,
p=.Ol but not significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= .00, p =1.0.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the location task only occurred in
the short preparation interval condition on the reaction time.
However, it did not occur in the long preparation interval condition
on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on the reaction time for
the long preparation interval only and on error for both short and
long preparation interval.
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c. The interpretation for the interaction between congruency and trial
type (switch/repeat trials) is difficult to interpret the congruency
effect only based on RT result because only switch trials were
affected by the congruency in RT but not in error.
d. The effect of previous congruency was occurred during the switch
trials for the short preparation interval and during the repeat and
switch trials for the long preparation interval for the reaction time.
However, it was all reversed previous congruency effect where the
single incongruent 1 was significantly slower than single incongruent
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Figure 8. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 8 a) and percent error scores
(figure 8 b) in congruency and trial type in two CT! conditions for the word task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at CTI=
lOO, [F (1, 20) = 13, P =.002] (89 ms of switch cost, M = 979 [SE: 41J
vs. M= 890 [SE: 39J: switch vs. repeat) but not at CTI=1200, [F (1, 20) =
2, P =.16] (see Figure 8 a).
There was a non-significant 3-way interaction (CTI, trial type and
congruency) for the word task, [F (3, 54) = .30, P <.80].
However, a significant effect of congruency for both switch and repeat trials
was found at both CTI=lOO, [F (2, 32) = 7.7, P =.003] and CTI=1200, [F
(2, 36) =13, p <.001].
This effect of congruency was found in both switch trials, [F (2, 40)=
6.6, p =.003] (62ms of congruency effect, M= 933 [SE: 41J vs. M =934
[SE: 42J vs. M= 1041 [SE: 55J vs. M= 1009 [SE: 38]) and repeat trials, [F
(2, 32)= 5.6, p =.013] (53ms of congruency effect, M= 859 [SE: 43J vs.
M= 840 [SE: 33J vs. M= 960 [SE: 64J vs. M= 936 [SE: 42]) during the
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CTI=100. At CTI=1200, only switch trials were significantly affected by the
factor congruency: 44ms of congruency effect, [F (2, SO)= 20, p <.001]
(M= 753 [SE: 40] vs. M =710 [SE: 29J vs. M= 829 [SE: 41] vs. M= 853
[SE: 33]) in the switch trials but not repeat trials, [F (2, 39)=2.1, p=.13].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (20)= -2.9, p=.009
but not on the repeat trials, t (20)= -1.7, p =.10 .
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant both on the repeat trials, t (20)= -6.4, p <
.001 and on the switch trials, t (20)= -4.9, p<.OOl.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CT!=100, [F (2, 44)= .29, p=.77] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 40)=.75,
p=.48].
A significant difference in error percentage between switch and repeat trials
for the word task only found at CTI=1200, [F (1, 20) = 7.7, p=.Ol] not at
CTI=100, [F (1, 20) = 1.4, p=.24].
The effect of congruency was significant both at CT!=100, [F (2, 39) =
6.2, p=.OOS] and at CTI= 1200, [F (2, 33) = 22, p<.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was marginally significant on the repeat trials, t (20)=
1.9, P =.07 but not on the switch trials, t (20)= 1.4, p=.18.
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At the eT!= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was only significant on the switch trials, t (20)= 2.6,
p=.02 but on the repeat trials, t (20)= 1.1, P =.30 .
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the word task only occurred in the
short preparation interval condition on the reaction time whereas in
the long preparation interval condition on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on the reaction time and
on error for both short and long preparation interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) occurred on the reaction time when it was the long
preparation interval condition but it was not in error.
d. The effect of previous congruency occurred during the switch trials
for the short preparation interval and during the repeat and switch
trials for the long preparation interval for the reaction time. It was
also occurred during the switch trials for the long preparation
interval.
2) The effect of alternating tasks
Four research questions for the effect of alternating tasks were
as follows.
a. Is there any main effect of alternating switch cost?
b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
c. Does congruency interact with alternating switch/double switch trials
(switch type)?
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d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
On Reaction Time (RT)
The repeated measures ANOVAwith the factors eTI, switch type, task, and
congruency revealed a significant 4-way interaction, [F (2, 47) =3.6, p
=.03] (see the Appendix, page 398 table 2a). This four way ANOVA was
split into three separate 3-way repeated measures ANOVA for each task
separately. Eachof these is reported below.
On Error (0/0)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors CTI (100,
1200), switch type (alternating SWitch, double switch), task (arrow,
location, word), and congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single
incongruent 2, double incongruent) revealed a non-significant 4-way
interaction: [F (3, 67) =.58, p =.65] (see the Appendix, page 398 table 2
b). There was only a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, task and
congruency), [F (4, 74) =2.8, p=.03]. This 3-way interaction was
explored by presenting 3 separate figures by each task as these figures









































Figure 9. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 9 a) and percent error scores
(figure 9 b) in congruency and switch type in two CT! conditions for the arrow task.
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RT(ms)
There was a significant 3-way interaction between eTI, switch type and
congruency, [F (2, 41)= 7.9, p=.OOI]. The simple effects of this
interaction were explored by examining each of the Cl'Is separately.
The effect of alternating tasks at the CTI= 100 (37ms of alternating switch
cost, alternating minus double switch, M = 1124 [SE: 70J vs. M= 1087 [SE:
69J: alternating switch vs. double switch) was non-significant, [F (1, 20) =
1.4, P =.24]. It was also non-significant at CTI =1200, [F (1, 20) =.51
p=.48] (-20 ms of alternating switch cost, M = 732 [SE: 46J vs. M = 752
[SE: 55]).
At CTI=lOO, there was a significant interaction between switch type and
congruency, [F (2, 39) = 5.3, p=.OI]. As is clear from an examination of
Figure 9 a, this was as a result of a large difference in RT between the
alternating and double switch comparison in the second single incongruent
condition only (310ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch minus
double switch, alternating switch M=1343 [SE: 84J vs. double switch M=
1033 [SE: 91]). This difference was confirmed as significant by a Paired-
Samples T-test: t (20) = 3.4, p =.002.
At CTI=1200, there was also a significant interaction between switch type
and congruency, [F (3, 55) = 4.0, p=.014]. As is clear from an
examination of Figure 9 a, this was as a result of a large difference in RT
between the alternating and double switch comparison in the second single
incongruent condition only (-165ms of alternating switch cost, alternating
switch minus double switch, alternating switch M=700 [SE: 47] vs. double
switch M= 865 [SE: 85]).
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In both CT! conditions, the effect of congruency was significant, [F (2, 39)
= 7.88, P <.001] (130ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 1008 [SE:
63], single incongruent 1 M= 1041 [SE: 71], single incongruent 2 M= 1188
[SE: 75] , double incongruent M= 1185 [SE: 84]) in the CTI= 100 and [F
(2, 41) =12, P <.001] (116ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 655
[SE: 41], single incongruent 1 M= 645 [SE: 41] , single incongruent 2 M=
783 [SE: 58], double incongruent M= 884 [SE: 77]) in the CTI=1200.
During the CTI= lOO, alternating and double switch trials were equally and
significantly affected by the factor congruency, [F (2, 39) = 5.3, p=.Ol].
At CTI=100, congruency impacted both the alternating switch trials, [F (3,
54) = 10, p<.OOl] (129ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 1027
[SE: 79], single incongruent 1 M= 968 [SE: 69], single incongruent 2 M=
1343 [5E:84], double incongruent M= 1157 [SE: 95]) and double switch
trials, [F (2, 37) = 2.9, p=.07] (131ms of congruency effect, congruent
M= 988 [5E:67], single incongruent 1 M= 675 [SE: 51], single incongruent
2 M= 701 [5E:47], double incongruent M= 927 [SE: 89]) at the CTI=100.
During the CTI= 1200, although there was a significant effect of congruency
for both alternating switch and double switch trials, [F (2, 41)= 12,
p<.OOl] the impact of congruency was larger on the alternating switch
trials, [F(2, 44)= 9.4, p<.OOl] (142ms of congruency effect, congruent
M= 626 [5E:36], single incongruent 1 M= 675 [SE: 51], single incongruent
2 M= 701 [5E:47], double incongruent M= 927 [SE: 89]) than on the
double switch trials, [F (2, 46) =7.9, p=.OOl] (89ms of congruency
effect, congruent M= 685 [SE: 60], single incongruent 1 M= 616 [SE: 37],
single incongruent 2 M= 865 [5E:85], double incongruent M= 842 [SE:
74]). This may also be contributing to the significant 3 way interaction.
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (20)= -5, p
<.001 but not on the double switch trials, t (20)= .72, p= .48.
At the eTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the double switch trials, t (20)= .-3.6,
p=.002 but not on the alternating switch trials, t (20)= -.49, p = .63.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
both at CTI=100, [F (2, 40) = .31, p=.73] and CTI=1200 [F (2, 42) =.43,
p=.67].
A difference in error percentage between alternating switch and double
switch trials for the arrow task was non-significant both at CTI=100, [F (1,
20) = .007, p=.93] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 20) = .04, p=.84].
The effect of congruency was significant at CTI=100, [F (2, 39) = 5.0,
p=.012] and at CTI=1200, [F (2, 40) = 14, p<.001].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was not significant either on the alternating switch
trials, t (20)= 1.2, p =.25 or on the double switch trials, t (20)= .98, p=.34.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was not significant either on the alternating switch




a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the arrow task did not
occur on the reaction time and on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on the reaction time and
on error for both short and long preparation interval, showing that
congruency affected both alternating switch and double switching
trials.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) occurred on the reaction time not in
error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task occurred only
during the alternating switch trials for the short preparation interval
whereas it occurred only during the double switch trials for the long
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Figure 10. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 10 a) and percent error scores
(figure 10 b) in congruency and switch type in two CTl conditions for the location
task.
RT ems)
There was a non-significant 3-way interaction (CTI, switch type and
congruency) for the location task, [F (2, 34) = 46, p =.60] and 2-way
interaction (CT! and congruency), [F (1,31)= 2.6, p=.lO], (CTI and switch
type), [F(l,20)=.Sl, p=.48] and (switch type and congruency), [F (2, 46)=
1.5, P =.22].
The effect of alternating tasks was non-significant both at the CT!= lOO, [F
(1, 20)= .22, p =.65] and at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 20)= .48, p =.50] (See
figure 8).
The effect of congruency was only significant at the CTI= 1200, [F (2, 44)
=7.7, p =.001] (125ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 502 [SE: 39J
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vs. single incongruent 1 M= 656 [SE: 65J vs. single incongruent 2 M= 583
[SE: 52J vs. double incongruent M= 643 [SE: 57J).
At eTI= 100, alternating switch trials were not significantly affected by the
effect of congruency, [F (2, 40) = 1.6, p =.21] (9.3ms of congruency effect,
congruent M= 949 [SE: 107J vs. single incongruent 1 M= 1022 [SE: 76J vs.
single incongruent 2 M= 867 [SE: 48J vs. double incongruent M= 986 [SE:
60)). Furthermore, response of the double switch trials was slowed by the
congruent condition, [F (2, SO) = 3.1, p=.04] (-38ms of congruency
effect, congruent M= 523 [SE: 47J vs. single incongruent 1 M= 655 [SE:
72] vs. single incongruent 2 M= 695 [SE: 72] vs. double incongruent M=
589 [SE: 61)).
At CTI=1200, the impact of congruency was slightly larger on the double
switch trials, [F(2, 42) =2.9, p=.06] (145ms of congruency effect,
congruent M= 480 [SE: 39J vs. single incongruent 1 M= 657 [SE: 79] vs.
single incongruent 2 M= 629 [SE: 78] vs. double incongruent M= 589 [SE:
61J) than on the alternating switch trials, [F (2, 43)= 3.8, p=.03] (106ms
of congruency effect, congruent M= 523 [SE: 47J vs. single incongruent 1
M= 655 [SE: 72J vs. single incongruent 2 M= 537 [SE: 45] vs. double
incongruent M = 695 [SE: 72J).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant both on the alternating switch trials, t (20)=
2, p =.05 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= 3.8, p=.OOl.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (20)= 2.3,
p = .03 but not on the double switch trials, t (20)= . 53, p=.60.
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Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
in both at CTI=100, [F (2, 40) = .31, p=.73] and CTI=1200 [F (2, 42)
=.43, p=.67].
A difference in error percentage between alternating switch and double
switch trials for the arrow task was non-significant in both at CTI= 100, [F
(1, 20) = .007, p=.93] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 20) = .04, p=.84].
The effect of congruency was significant at CTI= lOO, [F (2, 39) = 5.0,
p=.012] and at CTI=1200, [F (2, 40) = 14, p<.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (20)=
-2.0, p =.05 but not on the double switch trials, t (20)= -.68, p=.50.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was not significant either on the alternating switch
trials, t (20)= -1.5, p =.15 or on the double switch trials, t (20)= -.94,
p=.3s.
Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the arrow task did not
occur on the reaction time and on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on the reaction time
(short preparation interval only) and on error (both short and long
preparation interval), showing that congruency affected both
alternating switch and double switching trials.
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c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) occurred on the reaction time but not on error. However,
marginal interaction was present in the long preparation interval as
the congruency effect was slightly larger on the double switch trials.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task occurred
during the alternating switch trials and double switch trials for the
short preparation interval and during the alternating switch trials for
the long preparation interval on the reaction time. It was occurred
only during the alternating switch trials for the short preparation



































Figure 11. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 11 a) and percent error score
(figure 11 b) in congruency and switch type in two en conditions for the word task.
RT (ms)
There was a non-significant 3-way interaction (CTI, switch type and
congruency) for the word task, [F (1, 32) = 6.7, p=.48]. A marginally
significant interaction (switch type and congruency), [F (2, 38) = 3.0,
p=.06] which was as a result from a large RT on the double switch trials
when it was single incongruent 2 (see Figure 11).
The effect of alternating task was non-significant both at the eT!= 100, [F
(1, 20)= .57, p =.46] and at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 20) = .59, p =.45] (see
Figure 9).
The effect of congruency was significant both at the CTI=100, [F (3, 53)
= 11, P <.001] (121 ms of congruency effect, M= 911 [SE: 38J vs. M=
964 [SE: 47J vs. M= 1110 [SE: 93J vs. M= 1022 [SE: 42J) and at the
CTI=1200, [F (3, 53)= 11, P <.001] (67ms of congruency effect, M= 774
[SE: 40J vs. M= 749 [SE: 32J vs. M= 876 [SE: 47J vs. M= 897 [SE: 47J).
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At CTI=100, congruency significantly affected both on the alternating
switch trials, [F (2, 47)= 502, p=0006] (127ms of congruency effect, M=
896 [SE: 39] vs. M= 988 [SE: 57] vs. M= 1047 [SE: 64] vs. M= 1034 [SE:
44]) and double switch trials and double switch trials [F (1, 23)=309,
p=005] (115ms of congruency effect, M= 926 [SE: 40] vs. M= 940 [SE:
46] vs. M= 1174 [SE: 131] vs. M= 1010 [SE: 43]).
AT CTI=1200, the impact of congruency both on the alternating switch and
double switch trials was reduced, however, it was still significant on the
alternating switch trials, [F (3,54) =604, p=oOOl] (52ms of congruency
effect, congruent M= 794 [SE: 54] vs. single incongruent 1M= 764 [SE:
34] vs. single incongruent 2 M= 862 [SE: 58] vs. double incongruent M=
911 [SE: 47)) and double switch trials, [F (2, 46)=7, p=0002] (82 ms of
congruency effect, congruent M= 754 [SE: 38] vs. single incongruent 1M=
735 [SE: 35] vs. single incongruent 2 M =890 [SE: 58] vs. double
incongruent M= 884 [SE: 50)).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the double switch trials, t (20)= -201,
p=005 but not on the alternating switch trials, t (20)= -1.1, p = .28.
At the eT!= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant both on the alternating switch trials, t (20)=
-205, P = 002 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= -209, p=0008.
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Error (010)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
both at CTI=100, [F (2, 46)= .74, p=.49] and at CTI=1200, [F (2, 35)=
2.8, p=.09].
A difference in error percentage between alternating switch and double
switch trials for the arrow task was non-significant in both at CTI=100, [F
(1, 20)=.001, p=.97] and CTI=1200, [ F (1, 20)= 2, p=.17].
The effect of congruency was only significant at CTI=1200, [F (2, 34)=
13, P <.001] not at CTI=100, [F (2, 40)= 2.4, p=.10].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was not significant either on the alternating switch
trials, t (20)= 1.5, p =.15 or on the double switch trials, t (20)= .38,
p=.71.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (20)=
2.2, p =.04 but not on the double switch trials, t (20)= 1.3, p=.21.
Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the word task did not
occur on the reaction time and on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time and on
error in both short and long preparation interval, showing that
congruency affected both alternating switch and double switching
trials.
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c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) did not occur on the reaction time and on
error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task occurred during
the double switch trials for the short preparation interval and it also
occurred during the alternating switch trials and double switch trials
for the long preparation interval on the reaction time. It was
occurred only during the alternating switch trials for the long
preparation interval on error.
DISCUSSION
The main aim of this experiment was to pilot a task switching
experiment to see if the current experimental paradigm would be applicable
and measurable to answer a simple research question: the relationship
between inhibition of previous task sets and activation of upcoming task set
by providing the switch cost and backward inhibition (BI) effect.
Additionally, the congruency effect from irrelevant task set information was
also examined to see if the persisting activation or inhibition from the
irrelevant task set can interfere with or facilitate the switch cost and BI
effect.
The present results have shown how switch costs and alternating switch
cost were influenced by various separable processes, including advance
preparation, proactive interference from recently activated task set, task-
speclflc effect etc.
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1) Effect of task switching
• Switch costsin all three tasks were dramatically reduced for the
long preparation interval in terms of reaction time compared with the
short interval, suggesting that participants used long preparation
interval for advanced reconfiguration. Having significant switch costs on
error during the long preparation interval demonstrate that participants
still made errors while making a fast response (cf. speed-accuracy
trade-off).
• Congruency effect on the current trials shows how active the
other task sets remain. More precisely, it is shown that the current level
of activation still interfered from the other tasks even when participants
are given a long time to prepare to switch the task and even repeat the
same task. The effect was depending on whether it activates a response
that is the same (congruent) as or different (incongruent) from the
response activated by the new upcoming task set (current task set). In
other word, task switching performance was not only depended on the
currently relevant task-set, but was also influenced by the set of
temporary irrelevant task. In all three tasks, they demonstrated big
congruency effect in reaction time and error, suggesting that
participants made slower response and more errors when it was
incongruent regardless of the preparation interval. Note that significant
congruency effects were observed in both switch and repeat trials.
Having congruency effects during the repeat trials for all three tasks
suggests that the persistent activation of the irrelevant task set indeed
interfered with the current task set because there was no need to
suppress the irrelevant task set during the repeat trials, causing the
other task set to be persistently activated.
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• The interaction between congruency and trial type
(switch/repeat) shows whether switch trials are more influenced by
congruency than the repeat trials. If so, the bigger congruency effect on
the switch trials suggests that switching different tasks are more
influenced by the level of activation from the other task sets on the
current trials. However, the current experiment demonstrated the
significant congruency effect on the repeat trials as well as switch trials.
It might be possible to speculate that there is no need to suppress the
irrelevant task set during the repeat trials, causing the irrelevant task
sets to be persistently activated. In the current experiment, the
significant interaction between current congruency and trial type was
inconsistently observed.
• Previous congruencyshows that the task set from the previous N-
1 trials remains in a state of residual activation. In other words, the
persisting activation of previous task set interfered with a subsequent
task switch, depending on whether it activates a response that is the
same as or different from the response by the new task set on the
current trials. In the current experiment, two different single
incongruent conditions (single incongruent 1 vs. single incongruent 2)
were compared to see if the RTand error are slower/larger on the single
incongruent 2 condition (when the current task is incongruent to the
previous trials) than single incongruent 1 (when the current task is
congruent to the previous trials). Word task only showed a significant
previous congruency effect compared to the other tasks. Word task was
significantly influenced by the previous incongruent trials during switch
tasks as well as repeating the same task. The previous congruency
effect on the word task occurred in both preparation interval on the
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reaction time and in the short preparation interval on error, suggesting
that word information which is visually displayed in the target is the
most conflicting information with the other task set information (e.g.,
the point of the arrow for the arrow task, the position of the arrow for
the location task), resulting in the robust previous congruency effect.
2) Effect of alternating task
• Alternating switch costswere not observed on reaction time and
error for any of the three tasks, suggesting that participants are not
using backward inhibition in this paradigm to shift between tasks.
However, it is noteworthy that arrow task during the short preparation
interval demonstrated a huge alternating switch cost (310ms) only when
it was single incongruent 2 condition. This indicates that backward
inhibition might playa role in reducing the interference from previous
trials only when it was incongruent to the current arrow task during the
short preparation interval. Overall, the lack of backward inhibition might
be due to 4-way ANOVA analysis by adding 4 levels of congruency
condition, causing loss of statistical power. For example, arrow task
during the short preparation interval showed 37ms of alternating switch
cost which could be statistically reliable if the factor of congruency has
not be included.
• Congruency effect on the current trials shows how active the
other task sets remain. In all three tasks, they demonstrated big
congruency effect on reaction time and error, suggesting that
participants made slower response and more errors when it was
incongruent regardless of the preparation interval. Although the
congruency affected both alternating and double switch trials in all three
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tasks, the size of effect on reaction time was different among tasks. For
example, the arrow task showed larger congruency effect on the
alternating switch trials (see page 88) whereas the location task showed
larger congruency effect on the double switch trials (see page 93). For
the word task, it did not show any interaction between alternating switch
and double switch trials. It suggests that the level of activation is
different depending on the task.
• The interaction between congruency and switch type
(alternating switch/double switch) demonstrates if the interference
of the irrelevant task sets occurs the backward inhibition. For example,
there was a significant interaction between switch type and congruency
(p=.Ol) during CTI=lOO in the arrow task and it was as a result of a
huge alternating switch cost (310ms) at the single incongruent 2
condition. Note that single incongruent 2 condition is when the current
task is incongruent to the previous trials, suggesting that participants
indeed used the backward inhibition to reduce the interference from
previous trials for the arrow task.
However, the congruency effect affected on the alternating and double
switch trials equally in other two tasks, causing non-significant
alternating switch costs.
• Previous congruencysignificantly affected the alternating switch
trials in the short preparation interval and the double switch trials in the
long preparation interval for the arrow task (only RT). The word task
was also affected by the previous congruency during the double switch
trials in the short preparation interval and during the both alternating
switch and double switch trials in the long preparation interval in terms
of reaction time. Word task also showed the previous congruency effect
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in the alternating switch trials for the long preparation interval on error.
This previous congruency effect in the word task was previously
observed in the effect of task switching analysis, indicating that word
information is indeed the most conflicting information with the other
task features and participants had struggled to suppress the irrelevant
task sets when their response was incongruent to the response of the
word task on the current trials. It also suggests that different control
processesmay be involved than in the other tasks.
For example, the location task showed the reversed previous congruency
effect which was significant, indicating that participants had more
difficulties performing the location task when it was congruent to the
previous task.
CONCLUSION
The present experiment in this chapter demonstrated that a substantial
amount of switch costs and strong congruency effects throughout all three
tasks whereas alternating switch costs only occurred in the arrow task when
it was single incongruent 2 condition during the short preparation interval.
Incongruent trials were slower and more error prone than congruent trials
regardless of the trial type (repeat, switch, alternating switch or double
switch trials). It is noteworthy that congruency effect was even found in the
repeat trials. This shows that even when a task set is repeated and
presumably more strongly activated than on switch trials, there are still lots
of interference from the other tasks in this paradigm, suggesting that
repeat trials are actively represented and not inhibited. The previous
congruency effect indicates that the task set from the previous trials
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persisted in a state of residual activation especially when the task set is
competing with the other two tasks and that previous task set interfered
with a current task set. In the current experiment, word task only
demonstrated the significant effect of previous congruency, suggesting that
word task set is more prone to be influenced by previous incongruent trials.
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Chapter4
Experiment 2: Backward inhibition in the
early stage of Parkinson's disease
INTRODUCTION
The basal ganglia are a subcortical complex of nuclei through which
parallel circuits pass in a segregated fashion on their way from and back to
the cortex via nuclei of the thalamus (Alexandar et ai, 1986; Middleton &
Strick, 2000; Shook et ai, 2005). These circuits emanate from
sensorimotor, prefrontal, temporal, parietal, cingulated, limbic, and
paralimbic areas (Parents, 1990), and therefore involve both motor and
non-motor regions of the brain. Parkinson's disease results from
degeneration of dopamingergic neurons in the substantia nigra pars
comparcta (SNc) and a consequent loss of dopaminergic innervation of the
basal ganglia (Hornykiewicz, 1973). This dompamine depletion, a lesser
extent, a loss of mesocorticolimbic dopamine (OA) system known to playa
role in cognitive processes of working memory (Williams and Goldman-
Rakic, 1995; Zahr et al., 1997; Arnsten, 1998). This suggests that
behaviours that rely on the integrity of basal ganglia circuitry are
dopamine-dependent, as it has been demonstrated for many of the
cognitive and motor symptoms of Parkinson's disease.
In particular, the cognitive impairments are shown even at its early stage,
resembling those seen in frontal lobe patients (Lange et al., 1992; Taylor
et al., 1986; Owen et al., 1992). Thus, recent attention has turned to
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possible cognitive functions of the basal ganglia, although once regarded
as a motor structure, given motor symptoms are most readily apparent in
Parkinson's disease.
With inputs from virtually the entire cerebral cortex and outputs to areas in
the frontal cortex that influence the control of movement, the basal ganglia
are ideally situated to play a role in response selection that allows some
inputs to receive preferential processing and thereby exert greater
influence during response selection (Albin, Young & Penny, 1989; Jackson
& Houghton, 1995; Mink, 1996). The authors agreed that if this model of
the basal ganglia function was accurate, then it should be possible to
observe the behavioural evidence of altered efficiency during the response
selection when basal ganglia function is compromised, particularly when
the selection of a target response must be made in the presence of
competing response possibilities. Typically, 'selection problem' arises
whenever two or more competing systems seek simultaneous access to a
restricted source. In this case, effective behaviour requires resolving the
conflicts between incompatible actions appropriately and rapidly. Conflicts
are also arising in domains when behavioural expression is more indirect,
for instance between systems competing for access to limited cognitive
resources. Redgrave et al. (1999) advocated that basal ganglia have
evolved to resolve conflicts over access to limited motor and cognitive
resources by selecting between competing systems. They proposed that
the basal ganglia provide the vertebrate brain with a specialised, central
selection mechanism to resolve the conflict between competing systems at
different functional levels.
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Alexander, De Long and Strick (1986) also reviewed that the basal ganglia
participate in at least five loops with the cerebral cortex. These loops were
designated to the skeletomotor, oculomotor, dorsolateral prefrontal, lateral
orbitofrontal, and anterior cingluate circuits, based in part on the cortical
target of their output layer of processing. According to this scheme, the
output of the basal ganglia has the potential to influence not only the
control of movement but also higher-order cognitive and limbic functions
subserved by prefrontal, orbitrofrontal, and anterior cingulated cortex.
In addition, basal ganglia damage has been linked to impaired performance
on a number of switching tasks that asses both the accuracy (Owen et al.,
1993; Downes et al., 1989; Gotham et al., 1988; Taylor et al., 1986) and
speed of set shifting (Hayes et al., 1998; Brown & Marsden, 1988).
Several studies, for example, have indicated that PO patients are
impaired on a wide variety of attention-demanding tasks. Specifically,
patients with PO have been shown to be impaired on task requiring
divided attention (Brown & Marsden, 1991; Caligiuri et al., 1992); selective
attention (Dujardin et al., 1999; Filoteo & Maddox, 1999; Hayes et al.,
1998; Henik et al., 1993; Maddox et al., 1996; McDowell & Harris, 1997;
Sharpe, 1990, 1992); visual search (Filoteo et al., 1997); task switching
(Downes et al., 1993; Flowers & Robertson., 1985); and orienting of
attention (Filoteo, Delis, et al., 1997; Wright et al., 1990; Wright et al.,
1993; Yamaguchi & Kobayashi, 1998).
Apparently, there has been considerable amount of literature on set
cognitive deficits, especially set-shifting performance in Parkinson's disease
patients as it gives more clues to understand the function of basal ganglia
as well as the application of improving the patients' quality of life.
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However, for the most part, subject numbers tend to be small and the
groups are heterogeneous. Moreover, some of inconsistencies in the
literature probably stem from uncontrolled variability in selecting patients
in terms of medication status and progress of the disease. Besides, there
are some contradictory results in terms of task-set shifting in Parkinson's
disease patients although a difficulty with the executive control of task-set
has been widely cited as one of the central cognitive changes in
Parkinson's disease.
For example, Cools et al (1984) have claimed, on the basis of impaired
performance on the WCST (Wisconsin Card Sorting Task) and assorted
motor sequencing tasks, that Parkinson's disease caused a generalised
deficits in 'shifting aptitude". However, some studies (Brown and Marsden,
1988a; Downes et ai, 1993) have failed to provide evidence that
Parkinson's disease patients are impaired at accomplishing these shifts
compared with control subjects. Apart from the fact that these studies
were quite old, recent studies have not provided the definite evidence on
task switching or inhibitory control mechanism in Parkinson's disease since
their materials and designs for the experiment were various. Thus, it is still
difficult to question how Parkinson's disease patients achieve the cognitive
control mechanisms and which part on the frontal cortex are particularly
impaired.
I Ability to recognize behaviour according to the requirement of the tasks (Cools et
ai, 1984).
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The main reason is that there is a difference between set shifting2 and task
switching although it appears to be quite similar in terms of the executive
control in the cognitive processing. Because of that, the recent studies
have shown some contradictory results and their materials and designs for
the experiments were quite diverse. Moreover, some evidence in support of
the hypothesis that the attentional deficits displayed by patients with PD
might not be well explained because the impairments in inhibitory
attentional processes (Filoteo et al., 2002; Filoteo & Maddox, 1999) are
still not in the stage of collecting all the consistent results to consolidate as
a theory. Besides, the studies were confounded with attentional processes
and there have been very few studies that have evaluated PD patients
using direct measurement of inhibition.
Despite this methodological limitation in studying the role of inhibition in
patients with PD, Filoteo et al. (2002) sought to examine inhibitory
processes by the negative priming task. In their task, participants were
presented two stimulus arrays, a prime and a probe array, that consist of
one target letter and three distractor letters and they had to indentify the
underlined letter. In the IR (ignored repetition) condition, the target letter
in the probe array was the distractor letter in the prime array.
Negative priming was examined by determining the amount of RT slowing
in the IR condition as compared with a control condition in which the target
and distractor letters were different in the prime and probe array.
PD patients who are classified as mild/moderate and medicated did not
display any evidence of negative priming effect observed in the control
2 Set shiftingcanbemeasuredby WeST,Odd-man-outtask, intra-
dimension/extra-dimension(ID/EO)paradigm,task switchingparadigm.
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group which was matched to the patients in terms of age, education, and
global cognitive status. The finding that PO patients did not display a
normal pattern of negative priming is consistent with the notion that the
striatum is involved in some form of inhibition. However, the authors
remained the possibility that the locus of inhibitory deficits may be at the
level of response selection. Mink (1996), for example, has proposed that
the striatum is involved in inhibiting 'motor pattern generators' through
active inhibition of output regions of the globus pallidus. Strayer et al.
(Malley & Strayer, 1995; Strayer & Grison, 1999) have also suggested that
negative priming occurs in normal participants because the representation
of two stimuli (the target and distractor) are highly activated after
repeated presentations and these two representations must compete for a
response.
Contrary to Filoeto et al (2002),s result, Wylie and Stout (2002) found the
striking result that POpatients showed larger negative priming effect than
control group. POpatients were again early/mid stage with medication and
control group was matched with education and cognitive capacity.
It is well-regarded that reduced or absent negative priming implies a
breakdown of cognitive inhibitory processes, leading to greater interference
during the selection of a target response on a current trial and little
lingering inhibition on subsequent trials. On the basis of the cognitive
inhibitory interpretation, authors suggested that inhibitory processes in PO
are overactive, generating larger residual inhibition effects during the
probe trials. They also suggested another alternative explanation that
enhanced negative priming effect could be explained as an increased
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difficulty overcoming the effects of normal inhibition, a possibility that does
not require overactive inhibitory processes.
More recently, Faleset al (2006) attempted to examine backward inhibition
in task switching in PO patients and control subjects. Their idea was from
the assumption that cortico-striatal loop in the basal ganglia are involved in
inhibiting response sets during switching while additional prefrontal regions
are engaged in reactivating inhibited task sets. They hypothesized that
patients with POmay have difficulty in overcoming backward inhibition due
to the impairment in directing attention to the new task set, thus patients
with PO may particular difficulty with alternating switch trials. This
hypothesis was supported by the idea that deficits in shifting attention to
the new task set underlie switching deficits in Parkinson's disease (PO)
Patients (Brown and Marsden, 1988; Woodward et al., 2002). Three tasks
previously used by Arbuthnott and Frank (2000) (ref. pp. 30 in the chapter
1) were conducted for both medicated POpatients (dopamine precursor/or
agonist) who were classified as an early/mild stage by Hoehn and Yahr
scale (1967) and healthy controls which were matched to mean age and
education attainment. Both group showed significant backward inhibition
effect (approximately 240ms of size according to the figure 1 in their
article page 4) but both group showed nearly equivalent response time,
resulting in no group difference (p< 1.0). However, patients made
significantly more errors during the alternating switch trials (ABA) than did
controls but both group showed the same accuracy during the double
switch trials (CBA). A neuropsychological battery showed that the patients
as a whole exhibited no strong evidence of executive dysfunction. The
author speculated that this would be the result from the medication
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affecting the dopaminergic system. For example, Cools et al (2003)
demonstrated that L-dopa medication may increase cognitive flexibility in
PD (improving switching performance by reducing switch costs) compared
to the healthy controls, while increasing impulsivity. Thus the overcoming
backward inhibition ought to be related to cognitive flexibility, and thus
dopaminergic medication should have a beneficial effect on this measure.
It is important to pinpoint that the author was not able to show any switch
cost in both groups so did not discuss the result related to switch cost.
Basically, the both groups showed slower RT in the repeat trials than 1-
switch trials (ref. figure 1 in their article page 4). In summary, they
tentatively suggested that Parkinson's disease is associated with either
increased backward inhibition or reduced ability to overcome this inhibition
when reactivating a recently abandoned task set. Thus, it is inconclusive
whether patients with POhave cognitive impairment in backward inhibition
assumed to be a kind of helping mechanism to overcome the persisting
inhibition from the previous task set.
Therefore, there was a need to investigate the cognitive control
mechanism, especially, inhibitory process in patients with PO and to
achieve this goal, the same design of experiment as it was in the pilot
study (ref. Chapter 3) were used in the present study. By looking at both
switch costs and backward inhibition effect as independent variables, it was
possible to compare the healthy control controls with patients with PD and
see any significant differences in their performance.
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The aim of this experiment was to examine the backward inhibition and
switch cost in patients with early stage of Parkinson's disease (PO) and see
if the paradigm used in this study permits a preliminary examination of the
role of the inhibitory processes in the context of task switching. Another
aim was to investigate the congruency effect in POpatients if the response
conflict in the incongruent trials would cause the abnormal decrement in
their task switching performance. In order to do that, the same experiment
as the pilot study was conducted in PO patients and healthy controls. The
prediction is that slower RTs overall in PO patients compared to the
controls and POpatients might show the bigger switch cost and abnormal
(either bigger or smaller) backward inhibition effect compared to the
controls. For the congruency effect, I also predict that PO patients might
struggle to overcome the irrelevant task set information, causing more




Twenty-five participants were initially recruited through the
advertisement from the local hospital (QMC and Derby hospital). All
participants were diagnosed by consultant neurologist or specialist PO
nurses as an early stage (mild or moderate) of Parkinson's disease in the
'on' medication stage based on UK Parkinson's disease Brain Bank Criteria
and assessed the Unified Parkinson's Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS,Fahn,
et al., 1987). Participants ranged in age from SO and 75 years (Male:
Female = 10: 15, mean age=67 years). Exclusion criteria were MMSEscore
of < 25 and BDI score of> 20 and if patients had any neurological or
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serious medical conditions other than PD they were also excluded.
Although twenty five participants agreed to take part in the experiment
and interview, three of them withdrew from the expriment at the beginning
and five of them reported fatigue and confusion during the experiment.
Thus, only seventeen participants accomplished the interview and
experiment. Their clinical information are shown in Table 3.
Number Gender Age Years UPDRS* PD
(Male: with Classification Medications (and dosages)
Female) PD
1 M 63 3 1 Ropimnerol 2mgs
2 M 55 4 2 Pramipexole O.7mgs 1.25 tabs
3 M 74 2 2 None
4 F 73 6 3 Sinemet Plus two tabs
5 M 75 4 2 Sinemet plus 2 tabs
6 M 58 2 1 Requip 5mgs
7 F 71 8 3 Amantadine 100mgs
Madopar CR two tabs
Selegilene 1.25mgs
Co-beneldopa one tab
8 F 72 6 3 Ropinerol3mgs
9 M SO 4 2 Ropinerol 8mgs
sinemet 125mgs
10 F 71 9 3 Careldopa one tab
careldopa slow release
11 M 57 5 2 Ropinerol 4mgs
Ropinerol3mgs
Sinemet Plus one tab
Artane (Trihexyphenidyl HC!)
tabs 2mgs
12 F 52 3 2 Zelopar 1.25mgs
Amantadine lOOmgs
Ropinerol 7mgs
13 F 52 4 2 Amantadine 100mgs
Selegilene 1.25mgs
Sinemet Plus 1.5 tabs
14 M 58 4 1 Pramipexole lmg
Cabergoline 2mgs
Cabergoline 4mgs
Sinemet Plus one tab
15 M 64 1 1 Pramipexole 1 mg two tabs
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16 M 70 2 1 Sinemet Plus one tab
Sinemet Plus one tab
17 F 65 1 1 Mirapexin 1mg plus 250mcg
three tabs a day
Table 3. Clinical data of PD patients (dosage: per day in milligrams)
* UPDRS= Unified Parkinson's Disease Rating Scale
Controls
Twenty participants were recruited through the advertisement from
the QMC initially, and the local church in the Nottingham city and the
village church in desford, Leicester. Some of volunteers withdrawn after
their visits for the experiments. In total, twenty-one participants were used
for data analysis. Those who have Parkinson's disease, transient ischemic
attack, multiple scelerosis, Hungtington's Disease, Alzheimer's disease,
encephalitis, meningitis, brain surgery or having been unconscious for
more than 10 minutes due to head trauma, history of depression was
excluded in the study as these exclusion criteria were given to people who
showed the interest in the study after the advertisement. The age of
participants ranged from 50 and 75 years which was the age band for the
recruitment and 8 of them were male and the rest were female (mean
age=67 years). This group was matched to the patient group in terms of
mean age and educational attainment. All the participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, were right-handed except two participants.
Apart from the exclusion criteria for the presence of any neurological or
serious medical condition, a score of <25 on the Mini-Mental Status Exam
(MMSE, Folstein et al., 1975) and a score of >20 on the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI, Beck et al.,1996) were also measured to screen the
control group. Demographic information and the basic neuropsychological





Gender 13M, llF 12M,9F
Education (years) 15.4 (2.6) 15.6 (2.3)
MMSE 29.0 (1.2) 28.9 (1.4)
BDI 5.0 (2.2) 7.3 (4.3)
NART estimated verbal IQ 112 (2.6)
Verbal fluency test
(total number of output)
Animals (semantic) 29.7 (8.1) 34.3 (12)
Letter 'A' (phonetic) 16.7(7.9) 17 (8.3)
Letter 'F' 17.2 (8.4) 18.0 (8.8)
Letter'S' 18 (9.5) 18.5 (11.2)
Table 4. shows mean values (and standard deviations) for the patient and control
groups. NARTestimated verbal IQ was calculated by 129- (0.92 x error number).
Each verbal fluency test (semantic/phonetic) was tested for 1 min.
Stimuli and Design
The stimuli and task was identical with the previous one for the pilot study
experiment 1 (see chapter 3).
Procedures
Before the experimental session, both patients and controls were invited
to a short interview with research nurse in the office. For the screening test
such as MMSE, BDI was conducted by the research nurse while I was
observing the interview. They also did the verbal fluency
(semantic/phonetic fluency) test, NART (National Adult Reading Test), and
UPDRS (Unified Parkinson's Disease Rate Scale) for the patients group
only. For patients group, they also asked their specific medical conditions
and the length of illness. These took about 50 min before the experiment,
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thus they were allowed to have enough break for the next session. All the
participants 3 were guided to the other room and instructed about the
purpose of task and procedure verbally and encouraged to ask any
question. In order to make them feel supported and safe, I myself stayed
all the way through until they finished. It took approximately two hours for
each participant to finish the interview and experimental session. This
experiment was ethically approved by the school of psychology committee.
RESULTS
On Reaction Time CRT)
• For switch/ repeat trials
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors CTI (lOO,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrow, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 24, double
incongruent) between group revealed the main effect of group, [F (1, 32)
=320, P <.001] (see the Appendix, page 393 table a) because PO
patients demonstrated the slower RT than controls (PO M= 1727 [SE: 131]
vs. controls M= 1592 [SE: 130]). However, there was no group effect in
any factors. Although PO patients showed bigger switch costs (108ms of
switch cost, switch M= 1780 [SE: 135], repeat M = 1672 [SE: 128])
compared to the controls (75ms of switch cost. Switch M= 1634 [SE: 135J,
3 Among the healthy volunteers, six participants from desford, Leicester conducted the
experiment in the church hall, for their convenience.
4 Distinction between single incongruent 1 and single incongruent 2 lies in the previous N-!
trials. Precisely, if the current task is congruent to the previous task on the N-! trials, this is
the current condition of the single incongruent 1.
If the current task is incongruent to the previous task on the N-1 trials, this is the current
condition of the single incongruent 2.
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repeat M= 1549 [SE: 128J) but the group difference was not significant: F
(I, 32) =.34, p=.57.
The Effect of Previous Congruency (see the Appendix, page 394 table
c)
Analysis of the one way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors of previous
congruency (between single incongruent 1 and single incongruent 2) with
group revealed the effect of previous congruency on each task at the two
different trial types (switch/repeat) both eT!= 100 and eT!= 1200.
Switch trials at eTI= 100
Arrow task showed no significant previous congruency effect, [F (1, 32)=
1.4, p=.24] and there was no interaction with group, [F (1, 32)= 2.5, p
= .12] although PDonly showed the big size of previous congruency effect
(266ms, M= 2165 [SE: 181] vs. M= 2431 [SE: 176]) whereas old control
showed the reversed previous congruency effect (-29ms, M= 2190 [SE:
181] vs. M= 2070 [SE: 170]). There was no main effect of group, [F (1,
32)= .79, p=.40].
Location task showed marginally significant previous congruency effect,
[F (1, 32)= 3.5, p=.07]and there was no interaction with group, [F (1,
32)= .00, p= 1.0]. Both group showed reversed previous congruency
effect (controls: -143ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1974 [SE: 235] vs.
single incongruent 2 M= 1831 [SE: 182], PD: -143ms, M= 2304 [SE: 235]
vs. M=2161 [SE: 182]). There was no main effect of group, [F (I, 32)=
1.3, p=.26].
Word task showed the significant effect of previous congruency overall, [F
(1, 32)= 20, p <.001] but there was no interaction with group, [F (1, 32)=
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.001, p=.97]. The separate t-test for the previous congruency effect in
each group revealed that it was significant in both old control, t (16)= 4.2,
p=.04 (227ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1511 [SE: 95] vs. single
incongruent 2 M=1738 [SE: 135]) and PO group, t (16)= 3.8, p= .045
(223ms, M= 1686 [SE: 95] vs. M= 1909 [SE: 135]). There was no main
effect of group, F (1, 32)= 1.2, p=.22.
Repeat trials at CTI=100
Arrow task showed the previous congruency effect, [F (1, 32)= 6.9,
p=.012] and there was a marginal interaction group, [F (1, 32)= 3.4, p
=.07]. Both groups did not show any previous congruency effect (Old
controls: 2ms of previous congruency effect, single incongruent 1 M= 2183
[SE: 176] vs. single incongruent 2 M= 2085 [SE: 234], PO:-572ms of
previous congruency effect, M=2420 [SE: 176] vs. M= 1848 [SE: 234]).
There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= .00, p=1.0].
Location task showed non-significant previous congruency effect, [F (1,
32)= 1.3, p=.25] and it there was no interaction with group, [F (1, 32)=
2.4, p=.13]. There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= 2.4, p=.13]
although old controls only showed the significant previous congruency
effect, t (16)= - 3.4, p=.002 (222ms of previous congruency effect, single
incongruent 1 M= 1700 [SE: 218], single incongruent 2 M= 1921 [SE:
211]) not PO,t (16)= -.55, p=.49.
Word task showed the marginally significant effect of previous congruency
overall, [F (1, 32)= 3.3, p =.08] but there was no interaction with group,
[F (1, 32)= .18, p=.67]. The separate t-test for the previous congruency
effect in each group revealed that it was significant in both old control, t
(16)= 2.2, p=.04 (138ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1426 [SE: 95] vs.
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single incongruent 2 M=1564 [SE:178]) and PO group, t (16)= 3.9,
p=.OOl (222ms, M= 1623 [SE: 95] vs. M= 1845 [SE: 179]). There was no
main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= 1.8, p=.19].
Switch trials at eTI= 1200
Arrow task showed significant previous congruency effect, [F (1, 32)= 16,
p<.OOl] and there was no interaction with group, [F (1, 32)= .87, P =.36].
Both groups demonstrated large size of previous congruency effect (Old
controls: 447ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1232 [SE:127] vs. single
incongruent 2 M= 1679 [SE: 207], PO:277 rns, M= 1431 [SE: 127] vs. M=
1708 [SE: 207]). There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= .25,
p=.62].
Location task showed non-significant previous congruency effect, [F (1,
32)= .26, p=.62] and there was no interaction with group, [F (1, 32)= .01,
p=.92]. Both group showed reversed previous congruency effect (controls:
-32ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1464 [SE: 182] vs. single incongruent 2
M= 1432 [SE: 221], PO: -48ms, M= 1673 [SE: 182] vs. M=1625 [SE:
221]). There was no main effect of group, F (1, 32)= .53, p=.47.
Word task showed non-significant effect of previous congruency, [F (1,
32)= 2.9, p =.09] and there was no interaction with group, [F (1, 32)=
.12, p=.74]. The separate t-test for the previous congruency effect in each
group revealed that it was non-significant in old control, t (16)= .62, p=.19
(36ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1174 [SE: 79] vs. single incongruent 2
M=1212 [SE: 67]) and marginally significant in POgroup, t (16)= 2, p=.06
(58ms, M= 1316 [SE: 79] vs. M= 1374 [SE: 67]). There was no main
effect of group, [F (1, 32)= 2.2, p=.14].
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Repeat trials at eTI= 1200
Arrow task showed no significant previous congruency effect, F (1, 32)=
.19, p=.66 and there was no interaction with group, F (1, 32)= .98, p
=.33. Both groups did not show any previous congruency effect (Old
controls: 2ms of previous congruency effect, single incongruent 1 M= 2183
[SE:176] vs. single incongruent 2 M= 2085 [SE: 234], PO:-572ms of
previous congruency effect, M=2420 [SE: 176] vs. M= 1848 [SE: 234]).
There was no main effect of group, F (1, 32)= .53, p=.47 although POonly
showed the previous congruency effect (95ms, single incongruent 1 M=
1617 [SE: 201] vs. single incongruent 2 M= 1532 [SE: 158]) , however
post-hoc t-test revealed that it was not significant, t (16)= .32, p=.60.
Location task showed significant previous congruency effect, F (1, 32)=
19, p<.OOl and there was no interaction with group, F (1, 32)= .12,
p=.73. Both group showed reversed previous congruency effect (controls:
-321ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1550 [SE: 221] vs. single incongruent 2
M= 1229 [SE: 156], PO: -377ms, M= 1662 [SE: 221] vs. M=1285 [SE:
157]). There was no main effect of group, F (1, 32)= .10, p=.7s.
Word task showed the significant effect of previous congruency overall, F
(1, 32)= 9.5, p =.004 but there was no interaction with group, F (1, 32)=
1.6, p=.21. The separate t-test for the previous congruency effect in each
group revealed that it was significant in both old control, t (16)= 4.5,
p=.02 (299ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1035 [SE: 82] vs. single
incongruent 2 M=1384 [SE: 139]) and PO group, t (16)= 3.9, p=.OOl
(222ms, M= 1623 [SE: 95] vs. M= 1845 [SE: 179]). There was no main
effect of group, F (1, 32)= .61, p=.44.
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• For alternating switch/ double trials
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors CTI (100,
1200), switch type (alternating switch, double switch), task (arrow,
location, word), and congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single
incongruent 25, double incongruent) between group revealed no main
effect of group, [F (1, 31) =1.9, p =.18] and there was no further
interaction between group in any factors (see the Appendix, page 393 table
a). Patient group showed a little bigger alternating switch cost (83ms
alternating switch cost, alternating switch, M= 1848 [SE: 124J vs. double
switch, M= 1765 [SE: 120)) than controls (66ms alternating switch cost,
alternating switch M= 1602 [SE: 128] vs. M= 1436 [SE: 123)), however
the difference was not statistically significant, [F (1, 31) = .61 p=.44].
The Effect of Previous Congruency (see the Appendix, page 395 table
c)
Analysis of the one way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors of previous
congruency (between single incongruent 1 and single incongruent 2) with
group revealed the effect of previous congruency on each task at the two
different switch types (alternating switch/double switch) both CTI=100 and
CTI=1200.
Alternating trials at CTI=100
Arrow task showed a significant previous congruency effect, [F (1, 32)=
6.S, p=.OlS] and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F (1,
5 Distinction between single incongruent 1 and single incongruent 2 lies in the previous N-l
trials. Precisely, if the current task is congruent to the previous task on the N-l trials, this is
the current condition of the single incongruent 1.
If the current task is incongruent to the previous task on the N-l trials, this is the current
condition of the single incongruent 2.
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32)= 1.0, p =.32]. There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= 2,
p= .16]. Both group revealed a large size of previous congruency effect
(controls: 415ms, M=1965 [SE: 160] vs. M= 2380 [SE: 410] and PO:
944ms, M= 2206 [SE: 160] vs. M= 3150 [SE: 416]).
Location task showed a non- significant previous congruency effect, [F
(1, 32)= 2.6, p=.l1]and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F
(1, 32)= 1.1, p= .29]. Both group showed a reversed previous congruency
effect (controls: -447ms, single incongruent 1 M= 2169 [SE: 337] vs.
single incongruent 2 M= 1722 [SE: 155], PO: -91ms, M= 2028 [SE: 337]
vs. M=1937 [SE: 155)). There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)=
.01, p=.91].
Word task showed significant previous congruency effect, [F (1, 32)= 4.2,
p =.05] but the interaction with group was non-significant, [F (1, 32)= .03,
p=.87]. The separate t-test for the previous congruency effect in each
group revealed that it was significant in both control, t (16)= 4.3, p=.025
(190ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1580 [SE: 128] vs. single incongruent 2
M=1770 [SE: 160)) and POgroup, t (16)= 5.3, p=.Ol (224ms, M= 1739
[SE: 128] vs. M= 1963 [SE: 160]). There was no main effect of group, [F
(1, 32)= .96, p=.34].
Double switch trials at CTI= 100
Arrow task showed a significant previous congruency effect, [F (1, 31)=
7.7, p=.009] and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F (1,
31)= 1.1, p =.30). Both groups revealed a reversed previous congruency
effect (controls:-516ms, single incongruent 1 M= 2269 [SE:239] vs. single
incongruent 2 M= 1763 [SE: 198], PO:-228ms, M= 2339[SE: 232] vs. M=
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2111 [SE: 192]). There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 31)= .57,
p=.45].
Location task showed a non-significant previous congruency effect, [F (1,
32)= 1.5, p=.22 and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F (1,
32)= 1.0, p=.32]. Both group showed a reversed previous congruency
effect (controls: -23ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1992 [SE: 269] vs. single
incongruent 2 M= 1969 [SE: 221], PO: -243ms, M= 2640 [SE: 269] vs.
M=2397 [SE: 221]). There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= 2.6,
p=.l1].
Word task showed a non-significant effect of previous congruency, [F (1,
32)= 2.5, p =.12 and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F (1,
32)= .70, p=.41]. The separate t-test for the previous congruency effect in
each group revealed that it was significant in control, t (16)= 5.8, p=.Ol
(217ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1500 [SE: 100] vs. single incongruent 2
M=1717 [SE: 147]) but not in PO group, t (16)= .64 p=.51 (32ms, M=
1450 [SE: 129] vs. M= 1718 [SE: 200]). There was no main effect of
group, [F (1, 32)= .39, p=.54].
Alternating switch trials at CTI=1200
Arrow task showed a marginal effect of previous congruency, [F (1, 32)=
3.3, p=.08] and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F (1, 32)=
1.8, p =.18]. Control group only revealed a significant previous congruency
effect, t (16)= 3.9, p;;:;;:.OOlwhereas POgroup did not show the significant
previous congruency effect, t (16);;:;;:1.2,p;;:;;:2.6,(48ms, M= 1412 [SE: 141]
vs. M= 1460 [SE: 209]). However, there was no main effect of group, [F
(1, 32);;:;;:.07,p=.79].
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Location task showed a significant previous congruency effect, [F (1,
32)= 8.1, p=.007] and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F
(1, 32)= .19, p=.67]. There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= 2.4,
p= .13] although old controls only showed a significant previous
congruency effect, t (16)= - 3.4, p=.002 (222ms of previous congruency
effect, single incongruent 1 M= 1700 [SE: 218], single incongruent 2 M=
1921 [SE: 211]) not PO, t (16)= -.55, p=.49. There was no main effect of
group, [F (1, 32)= .00, p=.99]. Both group showed a reversed previous
congruency effect (controls: -411ms, M= 2013 [SE:308] vs. M= 1502 [SE:
238], PO:-375ms, M= 1949 [SE: 308] vs. M= 1574 [SE: 238]).
Word task showed a non- significant effect of previous congruency, [F (1,
32)= .96, p =.36] and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F
(1, 32)= .85, p=.36]. The separate t-test for the previous congruency
effect in each group revealed that it was non-significant in control, t (16)=
-1.5, p=.15 (3ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1199 [SE: 97] vs. single
incongruent 2 M=1202 [SE:69]) but it was significant in POgroup, t (16)=
2.7, p=.013 (104ms, M= 1318 [SE: 97] vs. M= 1422 [SE: 69]). There was
no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= 2.5, p=.12].
Double switch trials at eTI= 1200
Arrow task showed a significant previous congruency effect, [F (1, 32)=
15, p=.OOl and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F (1, 32)=
.70, P =.41]. Both group revealed a significant previous congruency effect
(controls 418ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1237 [SE:129] vs. single
incongruent 2 M= 1655 [SE: 200], t (16)= 4.3, p= 0.25 PO: 268ms,
M=14S0 [SE: 129] vs. M= 1728 [SE: 200], t (16)= 2.1, p=.04). There was
no main effect of group, F (1, 32)= .39, p=.S4.
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Location task showed a non-significant previous congruency effect, [F (1,
32)= 1.1, p=.28] and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F (1,
32)= .23, p=.63]. Both group showed a significant previous congruency
effect (controls: 142ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1346 [SE: 199] vs. single
incongruent 2 M= 1588 [SE: 302], t (16)= 2.7, p=.04, PD: 93ms, M=
1983 [SE: 302] vs. M=1890 [SE: 199], t (16)= 1.9, p=.05). There was no
main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= 2.0, p=.16].
Word task showed a non-significant effect of previous congruency, [F (1,
32)= .02, p =.88] and the interaction with group was non-significant, [F
(1, 32)= 2.5, p=.12]. The separate t-test for the previous congruency
effect in each group revealed that it was non-significant in both control, t
(16)= 1.3, p=.20 (81ms, single incongruent 1 M= 1166 [SE: 84] vs. single
incongruent 2 M=1247 [SE: 101]) and PD group, t (16)= 56, p=.41 (-
36ms, M= 1352 [SE: 84] vs. M= 1284 [SE: 101]). There was no main
effect of group, F (1, 32)= .83, p=.37.
On Error (%)
• For switchl repeat trials
There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= .74, p=.40] and no
interaction with any factors (see the Appendix, page 394 table b).
The effect of Previous congruency
Analysis of the one way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors of previous
congruency (between single incongruent 1 and single incongruent 2) for
each task at both crI= 100 and eT!= 1200 with group revealed no main
effect of group on each task and all three tasks did not show any
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interaction with group except the word task on the switch trials at
CTI=100, [F (1, 32)= 4.3, p=.OS].
• For alternating switch/ double trials
There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 32)= .39, p=.53] and no
interaction in any factors (see the Appendix, page 394 table b).
The effect of Previous congruency
Analysis of the one way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors of previous
congruency (between single incongruent 1 and single incongruent 2) for
each task at both CTI=100 and CTI= 1200 with group revealed no main
effect of group on each task and all three tasks did not show any
interaction with group.
Discussion
The current experiment aimed to see if the early stage of PO patients
showed any impairment or enhancement of cognitive control by comparing
the switch cost and alternating switch cost as well as the congruency effect
in the experiment which has been previously used (chapter 3). The results
showed that there was no significant group difference in performing
switching tasks except for the fact that PO patients demonstrated slower
RT and more errors overall. However, all participants showed evidence of
costs associated with alternating task switches. These costs were apparent
only for reaction time. There was no alternating switch cost in both groups
for errors. Patients with early stage PO and controls showed a similar
pattern of performance as measured by reaction time, resulting in no
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group difference in the analysis. In addition, patients showed bigger switch
cost than controls but the group difference was not significant for both
reaction time and errors.
It is noteworthy that all patients were receiving treatment affecting the
dopaminergic system. There have been three studies demonstrating a
significant alleviation of task switching/shifting deficits in PO following L-
dopa administration (Cools et al., 2001a; Cools et al., 2003; Hayes et al.,
1998). These cognitive operation relied on the integrity of strialtal-
dorsolateral prefrontal cortext circuits (Brass et al., 2003; Cools et al.,
2001a, 2001b, 2003).
Cools et al (2001, 2003) have reported that chronic L-dopa administration
relieves the motor systems of PO, but also induce cognitive changes. For
example, Cools et al. (2003) demonstrated that L-dopa medication may
increase cognitive flexibility in PO (improving switching performance by
reducing switch costs), while increasing impulsivity. Contrasting effects on
operations medicated by ventral frontial-striatal circuitry have been
reported in PO patients in impulsive control (Cools et al., 2003) were
similar to those seen in non-medicated patients with first episode
Schizophrenia (Hutton et al., 2002). Thus, determining the properties of
cognitive tasks that are influenced by either positively or negatively with
administration of L-dopa provides a very valuable method to further define
the operations of the basal ganglia circuitry, as well as the influence of
dopamine innervation (Shook et al., 2005).
Oue to these contrasting effects from dopaminergic medication, it is
unclear to conclude that bigger switch costs in PO patients in the present
study is the sign of the mild executive dysfunction.
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If the influence of dopamine medication was beneficial and enhancing the
cognitive function in PO, such as smaller switch cost and alternating switch
cost compared to the control group in the present study. Therefore, it
remains possible to run the current experiment when PO patients are off-
medication. Shook et al. (2005) reported that regular dopamine medication
was interrupted temporarily, the patients suffered much worse switch
deficits on both cognitive switch task and the simple version of response
switching. In addition, the interaction of response switching and cognitive
switching revealed significant response effect, particularly for PO patients
in the off-medication state in their study (2005). Although the relation
between dopamine and inhibitory process is not yet fully understood, given
the on- versus off-medication differences found in a number of studies
using that tasks that require some form of inhibition (Rogers and Monsell,
1995; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Filoteo et ai, 2002; Franz & Miller, 2002; Aron
et al., 2003a). Studies using task implicate inhibitory processes have
demonstrated evidence in support of abnormal response inhibition in PO
(e.g., Filoteo et al., 2002; Franz & Miller, 2002) and Huntington's disease
(Aron et al., 2003a) patients. Hence, it is possible to argue that general
deficits in activation and inhibition that are associated with POpatients and
level of dopaminergic medication, yet the design of the task, and
medication has to be more carefully restricted for the future.
Apart from the dopaminergic medication issue, the lack of group difference
in the present study might be due to the 4-way ANOVA design with
different levels for each factor. Thus, it is reasonable to run the simple one
-way ANOVA between switch and repeat trials as well as between
alternating and double switch trials. Tentatively, it is assumed that the lack
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of group difference in backward inhibition was due to the fact that
participants in both groups showed the alternating switch cost; yet again it
was not statistically different. Both group showed the similar pattern of
performance in terms of reaction time but PO showed more errors than
controls. However, there was no group difference in errors. It is interesting
to note that PO patients showed the benefit of alternating switch when the
current task was the location task. In other words, there was a reversed
alternating switch cost" in the location task for PO group, suggesting that
PO patients might have difficulties selecting the location task set especially
when they have to switch from the other tasks. Alternatively, they might
fail to overcome the inhibition for the location task, suggesting that spatial
information processing in PO patients is different from controls.
Congruency effect between two groups did not show any differences. In
other words, they showed the strong congruency effect in task switching
regardless of preparation interval, suggesting that the interference from
the irrelevant task set was quite strong and dominant so that the switching
performance in both groups are equally influenced by the congruency.
Lastly, the effect of previous congruency in task switching and alternating
tasks were significant in all three tasks and it appears that PO patients
were more influenced by the residual activation of the task set on the N-l
trials which is no-longer-use on N trials as they showed significantly
stronger previous congruency effect than controls. Note that location task
in trial type (switch/repeat) and switch type (alternating switch/double
switch) revealed the reversed previous congruency effect in most
conditions when the one-way ANOVA for each task at the each CTI
6 PD patients were much slower in the double switch trials when the current N
trials are location tasks comparedto in the alternating switch trials, causingthe
facilitationfrom alternatingswitchtrials.
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condition was run. In other words, when the location task on the current
trial N was congruent to the previous task on the trial N-l, the mean
reaction time was significantly slower than when the current location task
was incongruent to the previous task on the trial N-l. PO patients also
showed the facilitation (reversed alternating switch cost) in the location
task on the current trials. It is still not certain why the location task has
the facilitation effect when the level of congruency are supposed to be less
difficult and when the residual inhibition from the task you had just
abandoned (e.g., Location task-7 Word task-7 Location task ABA) are
supposed to be strongly dominant compared to the double switch trials
(e.g., Arrow task-s Word task-7 Location task, CBA). This result might
suggest that POpatient would not use backward inhibition necessarily only
for the location task. Further study has to be established in order to
examine if the visual/perceptual processing in patients are directly linked
to the result. Previous studies (Brown and Marsden, 1988, 1991;
Woodward et ai, 2002; Pollux and Robertson, 2001) have studied the
visual spatial shifts of attention in POpatients and their impaired ability to
maintain attention. Thus, it is worthwhile to run the location task
separately with different cue (e.g., peripheral/ central) and target (spatially
located) to see the change of alternating switch cost and previous
congruency effect in the near future.
In summary, the absence of impairment in PO group for the current
experiment in the present study would be directly to the dopamingergic
medication and their less severity of disease (early stage).
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Chapter 5
Experiment 3: Effect of the verbal cues on
switch cost and backward inhibition
INTRODUCTION
Typically, studies of backward inhibition involve three different tasks,
and task precues are presented in the intertrial interval to enable random
sequencing of the three tasks (Arbuthnott, 2005). Obviously, the role of the
cues is to inform subjects what task they have to perform and the interval
between cue and target/stimulus (CT!: cue-target interval! CSI: cue-
stimulus interval) is important since it affects the time available for advance
preparation. The issue of advanced preparation is one of topics that
researchers have been debating over the last decade as discussed in
chapter 1 (ref. see page 11-20 in the chapter 1).
Apart from discussing different views on interpreting the effect of
preparation intervals and residual switch costs, recent studies suggested
that a considerable portion of switch cost is actually related to switching
cues rather than switching the task itself (Arrington & Logan, 2004; Logan
& Bundesen, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Miyake et ai, 2004). For instance,
Mayr & Kliegl (2003) used two cues: 1) G or S for colour judgement 2) B or
W for shape judgement thus, trials involves cue switch without changing
task as well as the typical cue-task switch and the results was that
considerable switch costs were observed when cue changed, even when the
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task remained the same. They concluded that switch costs were not
actually due to a change in task per se but rather due to a change in cue-
associated processes.
Undoubtedly, it is obvious that cue processing in task switching plays an
important role in task switching which· influences directly on the size of
switch costs although cue switch costs (: the cost caused by cue changes,
not task changes) in Mayr and Kliegl (2003),s experiment have shown that
cue is not only helping for the advance preparation for task set
configuration but also for initiating the retrieval from Long-Term Memory
(LTM) prior to task performance. However, in the same study of Mayr and
Kliegl (2003) demonstrated that alternating-switch cost was not influenced
by switching cues but was observed only when the task switched. In their
experiment 3, three different tasks were used: participants had to judge an
object's colour (red vs. blue), shape (circle vs. square) or size (small vs.
large). Task cues were letters (i.e., 0 and R for the colour task, M and V for
the shape task, and T and K for the size task). For the backward inhibition
effect, they compared between task C-B-A sequence and task A-B-A
sequences that one is repetition of cues (e.g., AI- Bx- AI) and the other is
change of cues (e.g., AI- Bx- A2). For the cue repeat condition, there was
no backward inhibition effect between CBA sequence and ABA sequence.
On the other hand, there was significant backward inhibition between CBA
sequence and ABA sequence for the cue change condition (e.g., 51 ms of SI
effect). Their results supported their idea that backward inhibition affect the
task-set application stage rather than the retrieval stage as they
hypothesised that there are two stages of processing that are critical during
changes of task configurations and thus for the emergence of switch costs.
135
Arguably, Arburthnott (2005) questioned that if backward inhibition
occurs during this phrase, then alternating switch cost should not be
directly influenced by factors that affect the efficiency of task set retrieval.
In line with the evidence from her previous study (Arbuthnott & Woodward,
2002) which the size of switch cost was influenced by the strength of
association between cues and tasks, alternating switch cost was not, she
still suggested that cue might also have a more subtle influence on
activation of the retrieved set (e.g., category-response rules or stimulus-
response association), especially if cue processing differed substantially
from the target processing (e.g., spatial vs. object processing).
She believed that these aspects could potentially influence alternating-
switch cost independent of set retrieval. In order to answer these
questions, she used three digit-judgment tasks: digits were judged for
magnitude (greater or less than 5), parity (odd or even), and prime status
(prime number or multiple). For the cues, there were verbal cues named
the relevant response options for each judgement (i.e., Odd/Even,
less/More, or Prime/Multiple) as well as spatial cues indicated the
appropriate task by the position of the stimulus on the screen.
The results replicated the finding of her previous study (Arbuthnott &
Woodward, 2002) by showing that backward inhibition effect was
eliminated when spatial location was used as a cue. Precisely, backward
inhibition effect (a.k.a. alternating switch costs) was only found in the
verbal cue condition (e.g., 85ms of BI effect) not in the spatial cue
condition (e.g., -73 ms of reversed BI effect or facilitation effect). However,
switch cost was larger for spatial cues (276ms vs. 500ms for verbal and
spatial cues respectively) thus, this data supported the idea that switch cost
and alternating switch cost are separable processes, at least with respect to
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cue processing (Arbuthnott, 2005). Furthermore, she suggested that
spatially isolated tasks may shift the relative balance of activation in favour
of the relevant task set, reducing the need for inhibition of competing set,
resulting in the facilitation 1 for alternating tasks in this condition which
means that competing sets were not inhibited due to the absence of
backward inhibition (sequential inhibition).
However, if this difference between spatial localization of the task and
verbal cues cannot be entirely due to greater activation accruing with verbal
cue during the cue-target-interval because of easier retrieval, as alternating
switch cost has also been observed for weakly associated shape cues
(Arbuthnott & Woodward, 2002). Thus, Arbuthnott (2005) reasoned that
some aspect of the different alternating switch costs between cues must
relate to the retrieved set itself, such as discriminable location-category-
response representations for spatially isolated tasks versus less
discriminable category-response representations for verbal cues.
Furthermore, if including verbal cues in retrieval path might influence the
characteristics of a retrieved set in a way that increase the relative
activation of competitors. She speculated that including a verbal task
representation by naming during set retrieval might increase backward
inhibition despite the spatial discrimination. If verbal retrieval supports
greater activation of competing task sets, alternating switch costs would be
observed even when tasks are spatially isolated. In order to explore this
possibility, participants had to vocally name the upcoming task following
IAlternating switch costs in the spatial cuecondition in her all three experiments
were -72ms (experiment I), -44ms (experiment 2), -B8ms(experiment3),
suggestingthat when participantshad benefits of recentlyabandonedtasks in the
alternating switch trials (e.g. task A- a-A).
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the presentation of the cue in her experiment 3 because this manipulation
would add the process in both spatial and verbal cues for the retrieval of
the task name as well as retrieval of the task set itself.
Judging from her recent study about the influence of cue type on backward
inhibition (Arbuthnott, 2005), it seems that cue manipulation, in other
words, having all verbal cue in the present study might produce the
backward inhibition.
On the other hand, the verbal cue might reduce the size of switch cost
according to the previous studies (Arbuthontt & Woodward, 2002, Miyake et
al., 2004)'s strong cue-task association argument.
Moreover, in some of the cases when no backward inhibition (alternating
switch cost) was observed, a non-verbal cue (i.e., non-text based
information for the task) was used (see Table 5). Table 5 summarises
previous studies on backward inhibition and its observation depending on
the type of cues they used.
Literature Cue type Backward inhibition
(Task-set inhibition)
Arbuthnott (2005) Spatial No
Verbal Yes
Arbuthnott & Woodward (2002) Spatial No
Verbal Yes
Symbolic Yes
Gade and Koch (2005) Form Yes
Hubner et al. (2003) Colour Yes
Colour No
None No
Lien et al. (2006) Task sequence No
Mayr and Keele (2000) Verbal Yes
Mayr & Kliegl (2003) Symbolic No
Schoch & Koch (2003) Form No
Table 5. A summary of backward inhibition studies showing what type of cue was
used and whether backward inhibition (task-set inhibition) was observed.
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In the previous experiment, the verbal cue was used only for the word task
as it was mainly designed for the task-associated feature, e.g., the two-
sided painted horizontal arrow for the arrow task and two separate squares
for the location task for that reason. Therefore, having the verbal cues for
the all three tasks in this experiment might give the evidence if the verbal
cue is another important factor to have BI effect and the strength of the
cue-task association is essential for task switching.
I predict that backward inhibition measured by alternating switch costs
might be observed in all tasks whereas switch costs would be decreased in
the arrow and location task because the verbal cue for the arrow and
location task is directly giving the information about the task and this
strong cue-task association will help participants perform the task
switching. For the congruency effect, it is not clear if the verbal cue is
crucial to change the size of the effect. However, it is hypothesised that the
congruency effect would be occurred regardless of the cue change because
the congruency is more related to the stimulus itself.
The purpose of the present study was to examine the verbal cue influence
on the size of switch costs and alternating switch costs by comparing the





Twenty participants (11 women) were recruited from the University of
Nottingham through advert and 12 of them were undergraduates and the
rest of them were postgraduate in the psychology department. The
participants ranged age from 18 and 32 years (M= 25.4, 50=7), reported
normal and corrected-to-normal vision and were all right-handed except
two participants. They received £4 as an inconvenience allowance after
completion of the experiment. The study took approximately 50 min to
complete including the instruction and practice session.
Stimuli and Procedures
The task, stimuli and study procedures were identical to the previous
experiment 1 (ref. chapter 3) except for the cue type. The cue for the word
task was the same as before but the cue for the location and arrow task
was verbally presented in the centre of the screen (Aria I font with capital
letter, size 20): ARROWfor the arrow task, LOCATIONfor the location task,
and WORD for the word task In all other respects the procedures was
identical to that of Experiment 2.
The cue for each task was presented first and then it was visually displayed
directly either above or below the arrow target until a response was made.




1) Effect of task switching
Four research questions for the effect of task switching were raised.
They are as follows.
a. Is there any switch cost?
b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
c. Does congruency interact with switch/repeat trials (trial type)?
d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
On Reaction Time (RT)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors CTI (lOO,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrows, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) revealed two significant 3-way interaction (trial type, task and
congruency), [F (4, 81) =2.6, p =.04], rcn, trial type and task), [F (1,
30) =4.6, p =.03] and a marginally significant 3-way interaction (CTI, task
and congruency), [F (4, 88) =2.2, p =.07] (see the Appendix, page 399
table la). This interaction was explored by conducting three separate 3-way
(factors Cf'l, trial type, and congruency) repeated measures ANOVAs for
each task. These are reported below.
On Errors (0/0)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors CTI (100,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrow, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
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incongruent) revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction: [F (4, 77) = 1.0,
P =.38] (see the Appendix, page 399 table lb). There were only a
significant 3-way interaction (eTI, trial type and congruency), [F (2, 44)
=3.4, p=.04]. In order to interpret this 3-way interaction involving task, 3
separate figures by each task were presented with the reaction time CRT)
figures. Each figure is reported below.
Arrow task
a. RT (ms)
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Figure 12. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 12 a) and percent error scores
(figure 12 b) in congruency and trial type in two Cf'I conditions for the arrow task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at CT!
=100, [F (1, 20) = 30, P <.001] (107ms of switch cost, switch M = 989
[SE: 44J vs. repeat M= 882 [SE: 34J: vs.) but not at CT!=1200, [F (1,20)
=.40, P =.53] (See figure 12a).
There was a significant 2-way interaction between trial type and congruency
at the CTI= lOO, [F (2, 42) = 4.1, p=.02] but not the CTI= 1200, [F (3,
54) = .40, p= .73]. As is clear from an examination of Figure 4, this was as
a result of dramatic RT increase from congruent to single incongruent 1
during the repeat trials, resulting in no switch cost in the single incongruent
1 condition at CTI=100.
When congruency was examined by each trials to see if the interaction
between trial type and congruency at the CTI= 100 was caused by the
different congruency effect on the trial type or not, it shows that
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Congruency effect was significant at both switch, [F (2, 45)= 6.5,
p=.002] (68ms congruency effect, congruent M= 937 [SE: 39J, single
incongruent 1 M= 991 [SE: 43J, single incongruent 2 M= 954 [SE: 43J,
double incongruent M= 1070 [SE: 45]) and repeat trials, [F (2, 44)= 5.3,
p=.007] (8lms congruency effect, M= 821 [SE: 41J, M= 987 [SE: 58J, M=
842 [SE: 32J, M= 878 [SE: 41J) during the CTI=100.
In both CTI conditions, the effect of congruency was significant at the
CTI=100, [F (2, 48) = 7, P <.001] (78ms of congruency effect, M= 879
[SE: 38J vs. M= 989 [SE: 44J vs. M= 898 [SE: 33J vs. M= 974 [SE: 39J:
congruent vs. single incongruent 1 vs. single incongruent 2. vs. double
incongruent) and at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 45) =8.5, P <.001] (57ms of
congruency effect, M= 664 [SE: 39] vs. M= 679 [SE: 50] vs. M= 674 [SE:
35J vs. M= 809 [SE: 53]).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= 2.6, p =.015
but not on the switch trials, t (20)= 1.2, p=.26.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was not significant either on the repeat trials, t (20)= .52, p
< .61 or on the switch trials, t (20)= -.78, p=.44.
Error (O/o)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found, [F (1,
19) = 7.3, p=.014], indicating that switch trials made more errors than
repeat trials (switch M= 6 % vs. repeat M= 3 %). A significant effect of
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congruency was also found, [F (1, 30) = 19. p<.OOl]. The rest of 3-way
ANOVAresult will be shown in the Appendix.
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= -.63, p
=.53 and on the switch trials, t (19)= .18, p=.86.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= .38, p
=.70 and on the switch trials, t (19)= -.85, p=.40.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the arrow task only occurred at the
short preparation interval condition for reaction time whereas there
was a main effect of switch costs in both short and long preparation
interval condition on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed for
reaction time and error consistently for both short and long
preparation interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was only significant during the short preparation interval on
reaction time.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task was only
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Figure 13. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 13 a) and percent error scores
(figure 13 b) in congruency and trial type in two CT! conditions for the location task.
146
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
CTI= 100, [F (1, 20)= 10, p =.005] (62msof switch cost, switch M = 877
[SE: 30J vs. repeat M= 815 [SE: 38J.) but not at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 20)
= 1.8, p ~.19] (see Figure 13a).
A 2-way interaction between trial type and congruency was non-significant
at the CTI=100, [F (2, 43) = .52, p =.61] and at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 53)
= 1.3, P =.26].
The effect of congruency was only marginally significant at the CTI=1200,
[F (3, 52) = 2.6, p=.07] (55ms of congruency effect, M= 586 [SE: 47J vs.
M= 631 [SE: 47J vs. M= 586 [SE: 52J vs. M= 640 [SE: 56]) not at
CTI=100, [F (2, 41) =2, p=.17].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= -.65, p =.52
and on the switch trials, t (20)= .54, p=.59.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (20)= 2, p=.05 but not
on the repeat trials, t (20)= .59, p =.56.
Error (010)
A significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) was found, [F
(2, 45)= 5, p=.008]. When this interaction was examined separately by
CTI, it reveals that interaction in trial type and congruency was only
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significant at the CTI=100, [F (2, 41)= 7, p=.002] not the CT!=1200 [ F
(1, 30) =.96, p =.38].
A difference between switch and repeat trials was non- significant both at
the CTI=100, [F (1, 19) = 77, p =.39] and at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 19)
=.42, p =.52].
A significant congruency effect was found at the CT!= 100, [F (2, 43) =
11.3, P <.001] and at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 38) =17, P <.001].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non- significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= -.82,
p =.42 and on the switch trials, t (19)= -.73, p=.47.
At the CT!= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (19)= -2.4,
p=.025 but not on the repeat trials, t (19)= -.17, p =.86.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the location task only occurred at
the short preparation interval condition for reaction time whereas
there was no main effect of switch costs on the error in both short
and long preparation intervals.
b. The effect of congruency for the location task was marginally
significant for reaction time during the long preparation interval and
it was significant on error during the both preparation interval.
c. An interaction between congruency and trial type only occurred for
errors during the short preparation interval.
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d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task was only
both reaction time and error.
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Figure 14. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 14 a) and percent error scores
(figure 14b) in congruency and trial type in two eTI conditions for the word task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
CTI= lOO,[F (1, 20)= 47, P <.001] (91ms of switch cost, switch M :;;:997
[SE: 30J vs. repeat M= 906 [SE: 31J) and a marginally significant
difference at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 20) = 3.3, P =.08] (22ms of switch
cost, switch M = 808 [SE: 34J vs. repeat M = 786 [SE: 38)) (see Figure 14a
).
A 2-way interaction in trial type and congruency was non-significant both at
the CTI=100, [F (3, 57) =.10 P =.95] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 39) =.63, p
=.53].
For both CTI conditions, the effect of congruency was significant at
CTI=100, [F (2, 36)= 14, p<.001] (85ms of congruency effect, congruent
M= 885 [5E:32J vs. single incongruent lM= 890 [SE: 28] vs. single
incongruent 2 M= 1020 [SE: 39J vs. double incongruent M= 1000 [SE:34])
and CTI= 1200, [F(2, 51)= 22, P <.001] (40ms of congruency effect, M=
767 [SE:44J vs. M= 707 [SE: 34] vs. M= 848 [SE: 33J vs. M= 867 [SE:
40)).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= -2.5, p =.02
and on the switch trials, t (20)= -4.3, p <.001.
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At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= -3.1, p = .007
and on the switch trials, t (20)= -6.9, p<.OOl.
Errors (0/0)
A significant 3 way interaction (CTI, trial type and congruency), [F (2,
32)= 3.7, p=.04] was examined by two separate 2-way interaction for
each CTI. At the CTI= lOO, the interaction in trial type and congruency was
not significant, [F (2, 35)= 1.7, p=.20]. A difference in switch and repeat
trials was not significant, [F (1, 19)= .34, p=.56] during the CTI=100
whereas it was significant during the CTI=1200, [F (1, 19)= 7.3, p=.02].
A significant effect of congruency was found at both CTI=100, [F (2, 39)
=5.6, p=.007] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 35)= 17, P <.001].
At CTI=1200, switch and repeat trials were equally and significantly affected
by the factor congruency, [F (2, 39) = 16, P <.001] (switch trials) and [F
(2, 32)= 13, P <.001] (repeat trials).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= 1.4, p
=.16 and on the switch trials, t (19)= 1.1, p=.28.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (19)= 3.2,
p=.005 but on the repeat trials, t (19)= 2.7, p =.014.
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Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the word task only occurred at the
short preparation interval and was marginally significant the long
preparation interval for reaction time whereas there was a main
effect of switch costs in the long preparation interval on error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the word task was observed on
reaction time and error consistently for both short and long
preparation interval.
c. The interaction between trial type and congruency was not observed
for both reaction time and error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task was observed for
both switch and repeat trials during the both preparation interval for
reaction time. It was only significant for the switch trials during the
long preparation interval for errors.
2) Effect of alternating task
Four research questions for the effect of alternating tasks were
as follows.
a. Is there any main effect of alternating switch cost?
b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
c. Does congruency interact with alternating switch/double switch trials
(switch type)?
d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
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On Reaction Time (ms)
The repeated measures ANOVAwith the factors CTI, switch type, task, and
congruency revealed a significant 4-way interaction, [F (4, 92) =3.5, p
=.007] (see the Appendix, page 400 table 2a). This interaction was
explored by conducting three separate 3-way repeated measures ANOVA for
each task. Each of these is reported below.
On Errors (0/0)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors cn, switch
type, task and congruency revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction, [F
(4, 75)= .37, p=.82] (see the Appendix, page 400 table 2b). There was
only a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, switch type and congruency), [F
(2, 45)= 3.1, p=.OS]and a marginally significant 3-way interaction (CTI,
task, congruency), [F (3, 63)= 23, p=.08]. This marginal 3-way
interaction was explored by presenting three separate figures by each task
as these figures were previously presented on the reaction time (RT).
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Figure 15. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure lSa) and percent error scores
(figure lSb) in congruency and switch type in two eTI conditions for the arrow task.
RT (ms)
There was a significant 3-way interaction between cn, switch type and
congruency, [F (2, 41) = 7.9, p =.001]. The simple effects of this
interaction were explored by examining each of the CTls separately.
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The effect of alternating switch was non-significant, [F (I, 20) =1.4, p
=.24] (30ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch M= 1039 [SE:
43] vs. double switch M= 1009 [SE: 40]) both at the eTI= 100 and at the
CTI=1200, [F (I, 20) =.00, p=.99] (1ms of alternating switch cost,
alternating switch M= 739 [SE: 37] vs. double switch M= 738 [SE: 48])
(see Figure 7). However, there a big alternating switch cost in the second
single incongruent condition in the CTI= 100 (136ms of alternating switch
cost, alternating switch M=1133 [SE: 61] vs. double switch M= 997 [SE:
67]) and this difference was confirmed as significant by a Paired-SamplesT-
test: t (20) = 2.3, P =.05.
A 2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was only
significant at the CTI=1200, [F (3, 58) = 3.8, p=.015] but not at
CTI=100, [F (2, 50) =1.6, p=.20]. As is clear from an examination of Figure
15a, this was a result of a large difference in RT between alternating and
double switch comparison in the single incongruent 2 condition only (-
122ms of alternating switch cost, M= 684 [SE: 30] vs. M= 806 [SE: 49])
which was confirmed by a Paired-SamplesT-test: t (20)= -3.05, p=.006.
During the CTI=1200, alternating switch and double switch trials were
equally and significantly affected by the factor congruency: a significant
congruency effect was found at the alternating switch trials, [F (2, 48)=
14, P <.001] (103ms of congruency effect, M= 662 [SE: 47], M= 689 [SE:
44], M= 684 [SE: 30], M= 921 [SE: 60)) and at the double switch trials, [F
(3, 53)= 7, p=.OOl] (116ms of congruency effect, M= 52 [SE: 49], M=
677 [SE: 62], M= 806 [SE: 49], M= 820 [SE: 60)).
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CT!=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was not significant either on the alternating switch trials, t
(20)= -1.2, p =.23 or on the double switch trials, t (20)= -.19, p=.85.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the double switch trials, t (20)= -2.4,
p=.03 but not on the alternating switch trials, t (20)=.12, p = .90.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 3-way interaction (CTI, switch type and
congruency) for the arrow task, [F (2, 48)= .72, p=.52]. The interaction
between switch type and congruency was non-significant at CTI= 100, [F (2,
43) = .52, p=.62] and at CTI=1200, [F (2,40)= 1.1, p=.35].
A difference in alternating switch and double switch trials was not significant
either at CTI=100, [F (1, 19) =.43, p=.52] and CTI=1200, [F (1,19)= .43,
p=.52]. A significant effect of congruency was found in both CTI=100, [F
(2,40) = 10.3, p <.001] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 32) = 10, P <.001].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was not significant either on the alternating switch
trials, t (19)= 1.5, p =.16 or on the double switch trials, t (19)= .28, p=.78.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was marginally significant on the alternating switch




a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the arrow task was non-
significant on the reaction time and on the error. However, there was
a big alternating switch cost (136ms; see Page 154, Figure15a) at
the single incongruent 2 condition which was significant.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time and for
short preparation interval and on error for both preparation intervals,
showing that congruency affected both alternating switch and double
switching trials.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) only occurred on reaction time for the
long preparation interval but not on error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task did not occur on
reaction time whereas it occurred on error only during the












































Figure 16. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 16a) and percent error scores
(figure 16 b) in congruency and switch type in two eTI conditions for the location
task.
RT (ms)
The effect of alternating tasks was non-significant, [F (1, 20) = .78, p =.39]
at the eTI= 100 and at CTI = 1200, [F (1, 20) =2.8 p= .11] (See the figure
16). As can be seen in Figure 16, there was substantial alternating switch
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costs at the congruent condition (71ms alternating switch cost, alternating
switch M= 631 [SE: 54] vs. double switch M= 560 [SE: 55]) and at the
single incongruent condition (69ms alternating switch cost, alternating
switch M= 662 [SE: 67] vs. double switch M= 594 [SE: 223]) during the
CTI=1200. However, Paired-Samples T-test shows that these alternating
switch costs were non-significant: t (20) = 1.4, p= .16 at the congruent and
t (20)= 1.6, p=.13 at the single incongruent 2 condition.
There was a significant 3-way interaction between CTI, switch type and
congruency, [F (3, 56) = 3.5, P =.03]. The simple effects of this
interaction were explored by examining each of the CTIs separately.
A significant 2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was
only significant at CTI= 100, [F (2, 48)= 4.5, p=.Oll] not at CTI= 1200,
[F (2, 48) = .87, p=.44].
The interaction between switch type and congruency at CTI=lOO was
caused by a significant congruency effect at the alternating switch trials, [F
(3, 55) =8.4, p<.OOl] (142ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 766
[SE: 39], single incongruent 1 M= 932 [SE: 43], single incongruent 2 M=
868 [SE: 39], double incongruent M= 926 [SE: 34]) and a non-significant
congruency effect at the double switch trials, [F (3, 58)= 1.4, p=.2s].
The effect of congruency was only significant at CTI=lOO, [F (2, 53) = 5.5,
p =.003] (96ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 810 [SE:34), single
incongruent 1 M= 915 [SE:37], single incongruent 2 M= 897 [5E:38],
double incongruent M= 908 [SE:29}) but not at CTI=1200, [F (2, SO)= .95,
p=.41] .
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During the CTI= lOO, alternating and double switch trials were equally and
significantly affected by the factor congruency, [F (2, 48) = 4.5, p=.Ol].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (20)=
1.7, p =.098 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= .71, p=.49.
At the eTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(20)=.31, p = .76 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= 1.3, p=.22.
Error (0/0)
There was a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, switch type and congruency)
for the location task, [F (2, 38)= 3.4, p=.04]. The interaction between
switch type and congruency was significant at CTI=100, [F (2, 36) = 7,
p=.003] but not at CTI=1200, [F (2, 33)= .43, p=.62].
A significant difference in alternating switch and double switch trials was
found at the CTI= lOO, [F (1, 19)= 7.2, p=.Ol] (which was reversed
alternating switch cost) but not at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 19)= .66, p=.43].
A significant effect of congruency was found at both CTI=100, [F (2, 32)=
24, P <.001] and CTI=1200, [ F (2,31)=12, P <.001].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19)=
3.9, p =.001 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= -2.1, p=.04.
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At the eTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19) =
-2.4, P =.03 but not on the double switch trials, t (19)= -1.7, p=.l1.
Summary
a. There was no main effect of alternating switch costs for the location
task for reaction time or errors.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time for short
preparation interval and on error for both preparation intervals.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) occurred on reaction time for the short
preparation interval not in error. This interaction was caused by the
big congruency effect on the alternating switch trials, not double
switch trials, suggesting that congruency only affected the
alternating switch trials.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task occurred on
error only during both the alternating switch trials for the short
preparation interval. There was a significant previous congruency
effect at the double switch trials for the short preparation interval
and at the alternating switch trials for the long preparation interval;
however, they were all reversed previous congruency effect. It was
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Figure 17. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 17 a) and percent error scores
(figure 17 b) in congruency and switch type in two CT! conditions for the word task.
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RT (ms)
There was a non-significant 3-way interaction (CTI, switch type and
congruency) for the word task, [F (2, 54) = 1.8, p=.15]. A significant
interaction (switch type and congruency), [F (2, SO) = 3.1, p=.04] was
found (see Figure 17a). This interaction was as a result from a significant
interaction in switch type and congruency at CTI=100, [F (3, 54) = 4.4,
p=.009] but not at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 45)= 1.0, p=.37].
The effect of alternating task was non-significant both at the CTI= 100, [F
(1, 20)= 1.6, P =.21] (32ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch M
= 1022 [SE: 40J vs. double switch M= 990 [SE: 32J) and at the CTI= 1200,
[F (1, 20) = .26, P = .61] (13ms of alternating switch cost, alternating
switch M = 858 [SE: 38J vs. double switch M = 846 [SE: 45]) (see Figure
9).
The effect of congruency was significant both at the CTI= 100, [F (2, 37)
= 9.9, p <.001] (95 ms of congruency effect, M= 935 [SE: 51J vs. M=
945 [SE: 47J vs. M= 1076 [SE: 73J vs. M= 1069 [SE: 52J) and at the
CTI=1200, [F (2, 50)= 18, P <.001] (lllms of congruency effect, M=
769 [SE: 40J vs. M= 766 [SE: 35J vs. M= 907 [SE: 47J vs. M= 966[SE:
53]). At CTI=100, congruency more strongly affected on the alternating
switch trials, [F (2, 51)= 12, p<.OOl] (167ms of congruency effect, M=
897 [SE: 42J, M= 990 [SE: 48J, M= 1119 [SE: 48J, M= 1083[SE: 50J)
than double SWitchtrials, [F (1, 31)= 4.6, p=.025] (22ms of congruency
effect, M= 769 [SE: 40J, M= 900 [SE:28J, M= 1032 [SE: 54J, M= 1055
[SE:45J).
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (20)= -2.7,
p =.01 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= -2.4, p=.024.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (20)= -2.5,
p = .02 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= .-5.1, p <.001.
Error (0/0)
The interaction in switch type and congruency was non-significant at
CTI=100, [F (2, 31) = .40, p= .63] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 44) = .37, p=
.73].
A difference in alternating switch and double switch trials was not
significant at CTI=100, [F (1, 19) = 1, P =.32] and CTI=1200, [F (I, 19) =
.004, P <.95]. A significant effect of congruency was found at both
CTI=100, [F (2, 36) = 36, p=.04] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 41) = 10, P
<.001].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(19)= 1.5, p =.15 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= 1.6, p=.13.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the double switch trials, t (19)=
3.0, p=.007 but not on the alternating switch trials, t (19)= 1.3, p =.19.
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Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the word task did not
occur on the reaction time and on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time and on
error for both short and long preparation interval, showing that
congruency affected both alternating switch and double switching
trials.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) occurred on the reaction time for the
short preparation interval but not on error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task occurred on
reaction time for both preparation intervals whereas it was only
occurred on error during the alternating switch trials for the long
preparation interval.
3) Effect of cues (comparing exp 1 vs. exp 3)
On Reaction Time (ms)
• For switch/ repeat trials
There was an interaction between group (exp 1, exp 3) CTI, trial type and
task, [F (2, 75)= 4.8, p =.01] and group effect by task and congruency,
[F (4, 17)= 2.8, p=.03] and in a group by trial type and task, [F (2,
76)= 3.2, p=.05] (see the Appendix, page 387-388, tab/e2). These group
effects were caused by the bigger switch costs in for the arrow task and
location task in the experiment 1 at CTI= 100 (148ms switch cost: switch
M= 1044 [SE: 52] vs. repeat M= 896 [SE: 41] for the arrow task and
168ms switch cost: switch M= 913 [SE: 40] vs. repeat M= 745 [SE: 36J for
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the location task) compared to their switch costs in the current experiment
at CT!=100 (106ms switch cost: switch M= 988 [SE: 52J vs. repeat M=
882 [SE: 41J for the arrow task and 62ms switch cost: switch M= 877 [SE:
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Figure18. Mean switch cost (and standard error) in three tasks with two
preparation intervals between experiment 1 (task-oriented cue) and experiment 3
(verbal cue)
The dramatic reduction of switch cost in the location task from the current
experiment (106ms of reduction) also caused the group effect in the trial
type and task. On the other hand, word task showed the smallest switch
cost among three tasks and had less benefit from long preparation interval
in experiment 1. In other words, the reduction of switch cost from CT! = 100
(65ms switch cost, switch M= 985 [SE: 37] vs. repeat M= 920 [SE: 43]) to
CT!=1200 (39ms switch cost, switch M= 791 [SE: 34J vs. repeat M= 763
[SE: 35]) was only 26ms in the experiment 1, resulting in group effect in
trial type, CT! and task. The group effect in task and congruency was
caused by the bigger congruency effect for the arrow task in the experiment
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1 compared to the current experiment (lOOms congruency effect in the
experiment 1 vs. 66ms congruency effect in the current experiment)
whereas the other two tasks showed the similar size of congruency effect in
both experiments (63ms congruency effect: exp 1 vs. 54ms congruency
effect: exp 3 for the location task, 50ms congruency effect: exp 1 vs. 64ms
congruency effect: exp 3 for the word task). Overall, there was no main
effect of group, [F (1,40)= .08, p=.78] (see the Appendix).
• For alternating and double switch trials
There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 40) = .08, p= .77] (see the
Appendix, page 387-388, table 2) and there was only an interaction
between group and eTI, [F (1, 40)= 5.5, p=.02], indicating that
participants had more benefit of having long preparation interval (302ms of
mean RT reduction, CTI=100 M= 1023 [SE: 43J vs. CTI=1200 M= 721 [SE:
41J) in the experiment 1 than in the current experiment (232ms of mean RT
reduction, CTI=100 M= 971 [SE: 43J vs. M= 739 [SE: 41J).
On Error (0/0)
• For switch and repeat trials
There was an interaction between group (exp 1, exp 3) in eTI, trial type and
congruency, [F (2, 89)= 3.7, p=.02]. The main effect of group was non-
significant, [F (1, 39)= .87, p=.36].
• For alternating and double switch trials
There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 39)= .64, p=.43] or any other
interaction with group for this analysis.
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DISCUSSION
The main aim of this experiment was to see whether having verbal
cues for all three tasks would cause the backward inhibition since the
experiment 1 (see chapter 3) demonstrated no backward inhibition apart
from the switch cost and congruency effect.
1) Effect of task switching
• Switch costs for the long preparation interval in all three tasks were
dramatically reduced in terms of reaction time compared with the short
preparation interval, suggesting that participants used long preparation
interval for advanced configuration process based on the hypothesis that
preparation effect indicates the time required to establish a task set. In
all three tasks, main effect of switch cost was only significant in the
short preparation interval for the reaction time whereas it was significant
for both preparation interval for the error except for the word task ( only
significant at the long eT! for the error), suggesting that participants still
made errors while making a fast response (cf. speed-accuracy trade-
off). This pattern was similar to the previous experiment 1.
• Congruency e"ect on the current trials shows how active the
other task sets remains. In all three tasks, they demonstrated big
congruency effect in reaction time and error, suggesting that
participants made slower response and more errors when it was
incongruent regardless of the preparation interval. Note that significant
congruency effects were observed in both switch and repeat trials.
Having congruency effects during the repeat trials for all three tasks
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suggests that the persistent activation of the irrelevant task set indeed
interfere with the current task set because there is no need to suppress
the irrelevant task set during the repeat trials, causing the other task
set to be persistently activated.
• The interaction between congruency and trial type
(switch/repeat) shows whether switch trials are more influenced by
the repeat trials. If so, the bigger congruency effect on the switch trials
suggests that switching different tasks are influenced by the level of
activation from the other task sets on the current trials. In the current
experiment, there was only significant interaction for the arrow task
during the short preparation interval which was as a result from the lack
of switch cost at the single incongruent 1 condition and the significant
switch cost at the rest of congruent condition (congruent, single
incongruent 2 and double incongruent). At this stage, it is not clear why
single incongruent 1 condition caused no switch cost during the short
preparation interval for the arrow task.
• Previous congruencyshows that the task set from the previous N-
1 trials remains in a state of residual activation. In other words, the
persisting activation of previous task set interfered with a subsequent
task switch, depending on whether it activates a response that is the
same as or different from the response by the new task set on the
current trials. In the arrow task, the repeat trials were only influenced
by the previous congruency during the short preparation interval on
reaction time. However, in the location task, the switch trials were only
influenced by the previous congruency during the long preparation
interval on reaction time and error. In the word task, both switch and
repeat trials in any preparation interval (short and long) were influenced
169
by previous congruency on reaction time. It is noteworthy that word
task in the experiment 1 (chapter 3) was only task that showed the
significant effect of previous congruency. In the current experiment, the
other two tasks also showed the previous congruency effect, yet it was
not consistently observed in any type of trials or preparation interval
unlike the word task.
2) Effect of alternating task
• Alternating switch costswas only observed in the arrow task
during the short preparation interval at the single incongruent 2
condition (136ms) whereas the rest of tasks did not show any significant
alternating switch cost on reaction time and error. Note that there were
G8ms alternating switch cost at the single incongruent 2 and 71ms
alternating switch cost at the congruent condition for the location task
during the long preparation interval.
• Congruency effect on the current trials shows how active the
other task sets remain. In all three tasks, they demonstrated big
congruency effect in reaction time and error, suggesting that
participants made slower response and more errors when it was
incongruent regardless of the preparation interval. Although the
congruency affected both alternating and double switch trials in all three
tasks, the size of effect on reaction time was different among tasks. For
example, the arrow task showed larger congruency effect on the
alternating switch trials (see Page 149) whereas the location task
showed larger congruency effect on the double switch trials (see Page
153). For the word task, it did not show any interaction between
alternating switch and double switch trials.
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• The interaction between congruency and switch type
(alternating switch/double switch) occurred only on reaction time
not on error in all three tasks. In the arrow task, the interaction was
only significant at the long preparation interval which was as a result
from a huge reversed alternating switch cost (-122ms) at the single
incongruent 2 condition. In the location task, the interaction was only
significant at the short preparation interval which was as a result from
the significant congruency effect on the alternating switch trials and a
non-significant congruency effect on the double switch trials. In the
word task, the interaction was significant in both preparation intervals as
the current congruency had more impact on the alternating switch trials
than double switch trials.
• Previous congruency marginally affected the alternating switch
trials during the long preparation interval on error for the arrow task. As
for the location task, it only occurred on error but the previous
congruency on the double switch trials at the short preparation interval
and on the alternating switch trials at the long preparation interval were
opposite direction. In other words, the error was larger on the current
location task when the previous trials were congruent compared to when
the previous trials were incongruent. This suggests that participants had
more difficulties performing the location task when it was congruent to
the previous task. The word task was also affected by the previous
congruency in both switch trials during the both preparation intervals on
reaction time. The significant previous congruency on error was only
observed in the alternating switch trials during the long preparation
interval.
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3) Effect of cues
The cue type effect between task-oriented cue and verbal cue was
examined by group comparison between exp 1 and exp 3 (current
experiment). The result demonstrated that having verbal cues in the
current experiment reduced the switch cost significantly compared to
having task-oriented cue in the experiment 1, however it did not change
the appearance of alternating switch cost in the current experiment. Note
that the cue for the word task was not changed in both experiments. The
results support the hypothesis that strong cue-target association helped
the switching performance. However, it did not affect the size of backward
inhibition in the tasks unlike the previous studies (see the Table 5, page
133 in the current chapter).
CONCLUSIONS
The present experiment in this chapter demonstrated the substantial
amount of switch costs and congruency effect on the current trials whereas
the alternating switch costs were not observed except the arrow task at the
single incongruent 2 condition during the short preparation interval.
The results showed that having verbal cues for all three tasks was not
influence the occurrence of backward inhibition unlike the previous
literature. Comparing the result with expl, the current experiment revealed
the smaller switch cost in the arrow and location task, indicating that strong
cue-target association which was instructed by verbal cues might reduce
the additional extra process for upcoming task set while switching task.
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Strong congruency effect in both expl and the current experiment suggest
that interference from the irrelevant task sets is immune to the strength of
the cue-target association. It suggests that the irrelevant task information
on the stimulus is highly activated and this high activation of the other task
sets are interfering with the current task. These results clearly demonstrate
that task set reconfiguration process is limited to overcome the passive
dissipation from the other tasks.
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Chapter 6
Experiment 4: The effect of arbitrary cues on
switch cost and backward inhibition
INTRODUCTION
Task switching performance is strongly influenced by whether the
imperative stimulus uniquely specifies which task to perform (Arbuthnott
and Woodward, 2002). Normally, the function of the cue is to set up the
cognitive system for the upcoming actions. It is already known that
switching takes more time compared to repeating a task because it involves
the additional process of changing the task set. The general idea of
switching costs is that they reflect an underlying process that 'reconfigures'
this cognitive system to perform one or the other task, and that this
reconfiguration can be achieved prior to the presentation of the stimulus
(Koch, 2003). The evidence for this notion is mainly based on studies that
vary task preparation time such as Cue-Target-Interval (CTI) or Response-
Cue-Interval (RTI).
Apart from the manipulation of changing the preparation interval to study
the concept of reconfiguration, presenting different types of cues (Merian,
1996) have been also a major method for studying task switching. The
rationale of this method is that task reconfiguration in the cuing paradigm is
triggered by an external task cue; otherwise, it is impossible for
participants to know which task to perform just based on the stimulus
(Koch, 2003). Hence, there has been ample amount of efforts on the role
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of the cues in task switching in order to see how effectively they aid task
switching as demonstrated by their influence on the size of the switch costs.
Despite the importance of cues in task switching, the study of the cue type
or the role of the cue was not the main interest until researchers discovered
that difference cue types influence the task switching performance
especially by giving the explicit cues (Arbuthnott, 2005).
This explicit-cuing paradigm was simply to present the cue before the
target so that participants had information in advance which task to
perform. However, there were different ways of giving information for the
task without presenting an explicit cue.
For example, in the alternating-runs paradigm, in which the task alternates
every N trials, where N is constant and predictable, so that one can
compare task-switch and task repetition within a block without an explicit
cue (Monsell, 2003). Alternatively, by using a prespecified task sequence
(e.g. colour-shape-colour) participants have the short sequence of trials
they can prepare for the upcoming task. However, these methods had
limitation as they only allowed us to understand the passive dissipation of
the previous task-set by varying the stimulus-response interval (SRI). In
order to overcome this limitation, an explicit task-cueing paradigm was
developed by Meiran (1996). Since then, this procedure has been widely
used as it enabled us to manipulate independently the cue-stimulus interval
(allowing active preparation) and the response-cue interval (allowing
passive dissipation) (Monsell, 2003). In the explicit task-cueing procedure,
the task is unpredictable and a task cue appears either with or before the
stimulus. Especially, the interval between the cue and the target is
manipulated to control the time at which the participants can begin to
reprogram their cognitive systems for the upcoming task before the target
175
appears (Meiran, 1996). The decrease in switch costs as the time available
for preparation between cue and stimulus has been taken to index a
process of endogenous task-set reconfiguration (Monsell & Mizon, 2006).
Moreover, they also found that the presence of contextual cues as to the
currently appropriate task set was an important factor: When Task A and B
are unambiguously associated with different stimuli, switch costs are much
smaller than when one stimulus type is associated with both tasks (Allport
et ai, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). For example, Rogers and Monsell
(1995) had a letter and digit task in crosstalk and no-crosstalk conditions.
In the crosstalk condition, the irrelevant character was drawn from the
neutral set on one third of the trials and this irrelevant character was
sometimes associated with the response for the currently inappropriate as
well as the appropriate task. In the no-crosstalk condition, the irrelevant
character (#,?, *, and %) was always drawn from a set of neutral, non-
alphabetic characters. When the stimulus display included both a letter and
digit character (i.e. bivalent stimuli), switch cost was 289 ms, as compared
with 161 ms for stimulus displays with a nonalphanumeric (e.g., #)
distractor (l.e., univalent stimuli; Rogers and Monsell, 1995). This is likely
because bivalent stimuli are associated with both task sets, and thus
encoding such stimuli would activate competing stimulus-response
associations in a bottom-up fashion (Allport & Wylie, 1999). Arbuthnott and
Woodward (2002) proposed that greater switch cost with bivalent stimuli
would thus reflect the time necessary to select between competing
processing options, which presumably requires the executive control.
Conversely, univalent stimuli would activate only the relevant stimulus-
response assoctatton, resulting in much less switch costs because the need
176
to recruit executive processes to resolve competition would be reduced
(Arbuthnott andWoodward, 2002).
In the context of bivalent stimuli, Meiran (1996, 2000) included the cues to
indicate the relevant task (Arbuthnott, 2002). The presence of such cues
could potentially reduce the time necessary to select between competing
response options by providing an additional source of biased activation for
the relevant task set, especially when the association between the cue and
the relevant task was well established (Arbuthnott, 2002).
In the current experiment, the stimulus had three task-set information as
the target is the always the same regardless of the task. This trivalent
stimulus had to be directly guided which task participants had to perform.
Thus, without giving an explicit cue for the each task, it was not simply
possible to make a response. For the pilot experiment (chapter 3), cues
which represent key characteristics of the task were selected. For the
experiment 3, verbal cues to the task were presented. In both experiments,
the information for the task was straightforward without any ambiguity.
In particular, semantic and associative relations between the cues and
tasks were strong by using the verbal cues for the tasks in the experiment
3. The result from the experiment 3 supported the idea that strong
association between the cue and task reduced the switch cost.' However, it
remains unclear why backward inhibition was not observed in the previous
chapters except for the arrow task only when it was single incongruent 2
condition (e.g, exp 1: 310ms alternating switch cost, exp 3: 136ms
I Switch costs for the arrow and location tasks from the exp 3 was decreased
compared to the arrow and location tasks from the exp 1. Note that the cue for the
word task in exp 1 and 3 was the same (verbal cue: WORD). See the page166 in
the chapter 5.
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alternating switch cost). Presumably, it is possible to interpret that the
presence of a pair of arrows pointing up and down would bias the
appropriate response options to a greater degree than the location and
word task as the arrow has a long-standing association with direction.
According to the result from the experiment 3, it is unlikely to conclude that
verbal cue is an important factor to obtain the backward inhibition despite
the previous studies showed BI effect by using the verbal cues (ref. see the
table 5, page 133 in the chapter 5). In order to distinguish any cue type
effect on switch cost and backward inhibition, the present experiment was
developed. By using the arbitrary cues for all tasks, the cue-task
association is now weak and furthermore, the working memory demand is
crucial to learn the meaning of the cue in order to perform the task. It is
also possible that using the random symbol cues were sufficiently resource-
demanding to require some task-set reconfiguration, whereas the verbal
cues of the experiment 3, there is no need to learn and interpret the
meaning of the cue, causing the less effort for the task-set reconfiguration.
The core assumption lies that the requirement to interpret the symbolic
cues may cause the task more difficult, resulting in slower performance
overall and the magnitude of the switch costs would be increased due to the
weak cue-task association. However, it is not certain whether the weak
cue-task association by having the arbitrary cues would result in the
appearance of backward inhibition.
The goal of the present experiment was to test the hypothesis that
the strength of the cue-task association is crucial to change the size of the
switch cost and alternating switch cost. By using the arbitrary cues, it is
possible to eliminate the hypothesis from the previous literature (see the
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page 138, chapter 5 page) that the verbal cue is the important factor for
backward inhibition depending on the presence and magnitude of the
alternating switch costs. Additionally, another goal for this experiment was
to examine the congruency effect whether the congruency effect is found
regardless of the cue type. If so, it would give the strong evidence that
interference from the irrelevant task sets remains dominant and
congruency effect occurs on the level of stimulus representation, indicating
that the cue information for the task would not help to reduce the
interference from the irrelevant task sets.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty participants (9 women) were recruited from the University of
Nottingham through the advert and 12 of them were undergraduates and
the rest of them were postgraduate in the psychology department. The
participants ranged age from 19 and 30 years (M= 25, 50=7), reported
normal and corrected-to-normal vision and were all right-handed except
two participants. They received £4 as an inconvenience allowance after
completion of the experiment. The study took approximately SO min to
complete including the instruction and practice session.
Stimuli and Procedures
The task, stimuli and study procedures were identical to the previous
experiment 1 (ref. chapter 3) except for the fact that the cues in this
experiment were all arbitrary: the cue for the arrow task was &&&&&, the
cue for the location task was %%%%%, and the cue for the word task was
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# # # # #. These cues were chosen from the keyboard symbol in order to
replace the letters for the verbal cues from experiment 3. The reason why I
chose the random symbols in the keyboard rather than the object image
was to remove the possibility that participants could use the visual
representation of the cue. For example, imagine if the arrow cue was the
shape of a clock, then they would learn the meaning that 'the clock is the
arrow cue' quickly and this meaning of the clock would strengthen the cue-
task association because the visual representation of the clock would be
easily retrieved from the Long-Term Memory (LTM) once the new meaning
of the clock as an arrow task cue is translated. On the other hand, the
series of the symbol & (&&&&&&) from the task does not have any meaning
itself nor any typical visual representation that participants would come
across. In this case, they have to develop their own strategy to interpret
the symbols into the meaning of the cues. Therefore, the working memory
load of the participants is high and it is now demanding to interpret the
meaning of the cue itself because the meaning of the cue is neither pre-
existed nor context-based. The cues were presented in the centre of the
screen (Arial font, size 20).
In all other respects the procedures was identical to that of Experiment 1.
However, the practice session for the task was lengthened as the
participants found it harder to learn which task they had to perform. Thus,
the trials for the each task was 24 trials (cf. originally, the trials for the
each task was 16 trials) and then 48 trials for the switch trials (cf. the trials
for the switching between tasks was 36 trials in the experiment 1) during









Note> The procedure for cue-target-
interval and response-cue-interval is the
same as the previous experiments.
Time
Figure 19. shows an example of the time course of task presentation in Experiment 4.
Tasks were described here were three tasks: arrow, location and word task.
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RESULTS
1) Effect of task switching
Four research questions for the effect of task switching were raised.
They are as follows.
a. Is there any switch cost?
b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
c. Does congruency interact with switch/repeat trials (trial type)?
d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
On Reaction Time CRT)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors CTI (100,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrows, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) revealed a significant 4-way interaction (CTI, trial type, task
and congruency), [F (3, 65) =3.9, p =.008]. (see the Appendix, page
401 table la). This interaction was explored by conducting three separate
3-way (factors CTI, trial type, and congruency) repeated measures ANOVAs
for each task. These are reported below.
On Errors (0/0)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA revealed a non-significant
4-way interaction: [F (4, 66)= 1.3, p=.29] (see the Appendix, page 402
table lb). There was only a significant 3-way interaction: [F (2, 32)= 3.1,
p=.06]. This 3-way interaction was explored by presenting three separate
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figures by each task as these figures were previously presented on the
reaction time (RT). Each figure is reported below.
Arrow task
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at CTI
=100, [F (1, 18) = 13, P =.002] (159ms of switch cost, switch M = 1255
[SE: 79] vs. repeat M= 1096 [SE: 51]) and at CTI=1200, [F (1, 18) = 4.4,
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Figure 20. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 20 a) and mean percentage
(figure 20 b) in congruency and trial type in two eTI conditions for the arrow task.
RT (ms)
There was a significant 3-way interaction (CTl. trial type and congruency)
for the arrow task, [F (2, 38)= 6.3, p=.004] which resulted from two
effect which impacted cn = 100, [F (2, 39) = 134, P <.001] but not
CTI= 1200, [F (2, 42) = .32, p= .76]. Both of these effects can be clearly
seen in Figure 20 and were confirmed by an analysis of the simple effect
(the factors trial type and congruency were examined at each CTI
separately).
As is clear from an examination of Figure 20 a, this was as a result of
dramatic RT increase from congruent to single incongruent 1 during the
repeat trials, resulting in no switch cost in the single incongruent 1 condition
at CTI=100. The interaction between trial type and congruency at CTI=100
was caused by a significant congruency effect on the repeat trials, [F (2,
42) = 11, P <.001] (211ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 937 [SE:
59J, single incongruent 1 M= 1289 [SE: 89J, single incongruent 2 M= 997
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[SE: 55J, double incongruent 2 M= 1159 [SE: 54J,) and a reversed
congruency effect on the switch trials which was marginally significant, [F
(2, 30)= 2.S, p=.OS] (-101ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 1331
[SE: 92J, single incongruent 1 M= 1152 [SE: 69J, single incongruent 2 M=
1284 [SE: 116J, double incongruent M= 1253 [SE: 65J).
In both cn conditions, the effect of congruency was only significant at the
CTI=1200, [F (2, 4S)= 4.S, p= .OOS] (64ms of congruency effect,
congruent M= 729 [SE: 64J, single incongruent 1 M= 735 [SE: 78J, single
incongruent 2 M= 768 [SE: 49J, double incongruent, M= 875[SE: 79J) but
not at the CTI=100, [F (2, 40) = 1.8, p =.17].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (1S)= 3.6, p =.002
but not on the switch trials, t (18)= -1.5, p=.15.
At the eTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (lS)= -2.S, p=.02 but
noton the repeat trials, t (18)= -1.2, p = .25.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) at
both CTI=lOO, [F (2, 30)= .34, p=.68] and CTI=1200, [ F (2, 37) =1.3,
p=.28].
A significant difference in error percentage between switch and repeat trials
for the arrow task was found only at the CTI=100, [F (1, lS)= 6.9,
p=.02] but not at the CTI=1200, [ F (1, 18)= 1.2, p=.29].
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The effect of congruency was non-significant for both the CTI= 100, [F (1,
19)= 1.3, p=.28] and the CTI=1200, [ F (1,21)= 2.6, p=.12].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the crI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= -9.4, P
=.36 and on the switch trials, t (18)= -.34, p=.74.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= -.55, p
=.59 but it was significant on the switch trials, t (18)= -.33, p=.02.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the arrow task occurred on reaction
time for both preparation interval condition whereas only for short
preparation interval condition on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed on
reaction for both short and long preparation interval but it was not
observed on error.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was only significant on reaction time for the short preparation
interval and it was caused by the significant congruency effect on the
repeat trials and reversed effect on the switch trials. There was no
significant interaction on error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task was only
occurred during the repeat trials for the short preparation interval
and during the switch trials for the long preparation interval on
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reaction time. It was also observed on error during the switch trials
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Figure 21. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 21 a) and mean percentage
(figure 21 b) in congruency and trial type in two CT! conditions for the location task.
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RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
CTI= 100, [F (1, 18)= 39, P <.001] (210ms of switch cost, switch M =
1107 [SE: 69] vs. repeat M= 897 [SE: 56]) but not at the CTI=1200, [F (1,
18) = .19, P =.66] (see Figure 21).
There was a non-significant 3-way interaction (CTI, trial type and
congruency) for the location task, [F (2, 39)= .78, p=.47].
However, a marginally significant effect of congruency for both switch and
repeat trials was found at the CTI=100, [F (3, 52) = 2.6, p=.07] (59ms of
congruency effect, M= 958 [SE: 63] vs. M= 979 [SE: 57] vs. M= 1007 [SE:
64] vs. M= 1065 [SE: 70]) and a significant effect of congruency for both
switch and repeat trials at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 40)= 6.5, p=.003] (45ms
of congruency effect, M= 582 [SE: 64], M= 663 [SE: 38], M= 531 [SE: 31],
M= 686 [SE: 47]).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was marginally significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= -1.9,
p =.06 but not on the switch trials, t (18)= 1.S, p=.14.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= 2.2, p = .04 and
on the switch trials, t (18)= 3.4, p=.003.
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Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CTI=lOO, [F (1,27)=.75, p=.45] and CTI=1200, [ F (1, 24)= 1.0,
p=.34]. A significant difference in error percentage between switch and
repeat trials for the location task was not found either at the CTI= 100, [F
(1, 18)= 2.4, p=.14] or at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 18)=.005, p=.94].
The significant effect of congruency was found at both CT!= 100, [F (2,
32)= 13, P <.001] and CT!= 1200, [F (2, 35)=5.4, p=.009].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (18)= -2.3,
p=.03 but not on the repeat trials, t (18)= -1, p =.33.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (18)= -2.4,
p=.024 but not on the repeat trials, t (18)= -.49, p =.63.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the location task occurred for
reaction time only at the short preparation interval and there were
no significant switch costs in the error data in either short or long
preparation interval.
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed on the
reaction time and error conslstentlv for both short and long
preparation interval.
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c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was non-significant on reaction time and error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task only occurred
on reaction time during both switch and repeat trials for the long
preparation interval and on error for during the switch trials for short
and long preparation interval. This previous congruency effect was
opposite direction. In other words, the single incongruent 2 condition
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Figure 22. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 22 a) and mean percentage
(figure 22 b) in congruency and trial type in two CFl conditions for the word task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
eTI= lOO, [F (1, 18)= 22, P <.001] (112ms of switch cost, switch M =
1218 [SE: 64J vs, repeat M= 1106 [SE: 59J) and at the eTI=1200, [F (l,
20) = 7.5, P =.02] (64ms of switch cost, switch M = 874 [SE: 57J,vs.
repeat M = 810 [SE: 41J) (see Figure 22 a).
A 2-way interaction in trial type and congruency was marginally significant
at the err- lOO, [F (2, 43) = 26, P =.07] but not at the CTI=1200, [F (2,
36) =2.3, p =.11]. This marginal interaction between trial type and
congruency at the CFl= 100 was resulted from a significant effect of
congruency at the switch trials, [F (2, 42) = 6.2, p=.003] {48ms of
congruency effect, congruent M= 1182 [SE: 75J, single incongruent 1 M=
1162 [SE: 67J, single incongruent 2 M= 1315 [SE: 76J, double incongruent
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M=1214 [SE: 53]) and a non-significant effect of congruency at the repeat
trials, [F (2, 42)= .98, p=.39].
In both CT! conditions, the effect of congruency was marginally significant
at the CT!=100, [F (2, 46)=2.7, p=.06] (59ms of congruency effect,
congruent M= 1118 [SE: 70J, single incongruent 1 M= 1141 [SE: 76J,
single incongruent 2 M= 1209 [SE: 59J, double incongruent M= 1181
[5E:49]) and it was significant at the CTI= 1200, [F(2, 51)= 22, P <.001]
(40ms of congruency effect, M= 767 [5E:44J vs. M= 707 [SE: 34) vs. M=
848 [SE: 33J vs. M= 867 [SE: 40)).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (18)= -3.2, p=.004
but not on the repeat trials, t (18)= .26, p =.80.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= -4.2, p = .001
and on the switch trials, t (18)= -2.5, p=.02.
Error (0/0)
There was a significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) at
CTI=100, [F (2, 35)= 4.2, p=.02] but not at the CTI=1200, [ F (2, 36)=
.50, p=.61]. This interaction was as a result from a marginally significant
effect of congruency at the repeat trials, [F (1, 21)= 3.8, p =.06] but not
at the switch trials, [F (1, 21)= 1.8, p=.20).
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A significant difference in error percentage between switch and repeat trials
for the word task was found only at the CTI= 100, [F (1, 18)= 6.5, p=.02]
but not at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 18)=.034, p=.85].
The significant effect of congruency was not only found at the CTI= 1200, [F
(1,20)= 4.2, p=.Os] but not at the CTI=100, [F (1,20)= 2.6, P =.12].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= 2.1, p
=.05 but not on the switch trials, t (18)= .64, p=.53.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= 2.1, p
=.05 and it was marginally significant on the switch trials, t (18)= 1.9,
p=.07.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the word task only occurred on
reaction time for both preparation interval whereas for the long
preparation interval on error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the word task was observed on
reaction time for both short (marginal) and long preparation interval
and it was only significant for the long preparation interval on error.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was only marginal on reaction time and error for short
preparation interval.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task only occurred
during the switch trials for the short preparation interval and both
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switch and repeat trials for the long preparation interval on reaction
time. It was also observed during the repeat trials for the short
preparation interval and both switch (marginal) and repeat trials for
the long preparation interval.
2)Effect of alternating task
Four research questions for the effect of alternating tasks were
as follows.
a. Is there any main effect of alternating switch cost?
b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
c. Does congruency interact with alternating switch/double switch trials
(switch type)?
d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
On Reaction Time (msl
The repeated measures ANOVAwith the factors eTI, switch type, task, and
congruency revealed a significant 2-way interaction between task and
congruency, [F (3, 50) = 6.1, P =.002] and between CTI and task, [F (2,
31)= 4.9, p=.02]. There was a main effect of all the factors except for the
switch type which was marginally significant, [F (1, 18)= 3.8, p=.07].
(see the Appendix, page 402 table 2a). This interaction was explored by
conducting three separate 2-way repeated measures ANOVA for each task.
Each of these is reported below.
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On Error (0/0)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors CTI, switch
type, task and congruency revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction, [F
(4, 75)= .37, p=.82] (see the Appendix, page 402 table 2b). There was
only a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, switch type, congruency), [F (2,
42)= 3.4, p=.03]. This marginal 3-way interaction was explored by










































Figure 23. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 23a) and mean error
percentage (figure 23 b) in congruency and switch type in two CT! conditions for the
location task.
RT (ms)
The effect of alternating switch was non-significant, [F (1, 18) = 2.3, P
=.15] (84ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch M= 1329 [SE:
74J vs. double switch M= 1245 [SE: 99J) both at the CTI= 100 and at the
CTI=1200, [F (1, 18) = 2.7, p=.ll] (87ms of alternating switch cost,
alternating switch M= 904 [SE: 90J vs. double switch M= 817 [SE: 53])
(see Figure 23 a).
2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was only significant
at the CTI=100, [F {3, 48} = 4.9, p=.007] but not at the CTI=1200, [F
(1, 27) = .31, p=.67]. This interaction between switch type and congruency
at the CTI= 100 was resulted from a significant effect of congruency at the
alternating switch trials, [F {2, 36}= 7.3, p=.002] (72ms of congruency
effect, congruent M = 1275 [SE: 97J, single incongruent 1 M=1103 [SE:
60J, single incongruent 2 M= 1559 [SE: 114J, double incongruent M= 1368
[SE: 106J) and no significant effect of congruency at the double switch
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trials, [F (2, 35)= .23, p=.79]. In addition, this interaction was also caused
by the huge alternating switch cost (385ms alternating switch cost,
alternating switch M= 1568 [SE: 114] vs. double switch M= 1184 [SE:
157]) only at the single incongruent 2 condition, which was confirmed as
significant by a Paired-Samples T-test: t (18)= 3.4, p=.003. During the
CTI=100, big alternating switch cost (113ms alternating switch cost, M=
1368 [SE: 105] vs. M= 1255 [SE: 78]) also occurred at the double
incongruent condition, however, Paired-Samples T-test revealed that it was
non-significant: t (18)= 1.5, p=.14.
The effect of congruency was only significant at CTI=1200, [F (2, 46) =
8.6, p <.001] (73ms of congruency effect, M= 806 [SE: 78], M= 761 [SE:
72], M= 825 [SE: 75], M= 1050 [SE: 89]) but not at the CTI= 100, [F (2,
31)= 1.5, p=.23].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (18)= -4.1,
p =.001 but not on the double switch trials, t (18)= .57, p=.s7.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was marginally significant on the double switch trials, t
(l8)= -2.0, p=.06 but not on the alternating switch trials, t (18)= -.09, p
= .92.
Error (0/0)
There was a significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency) at
the CTI=100, [F (2, 38)= 5.5, p=.007] but not at the CTI=1200, [F (2,
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36)= 1.6, p=.21]. The interaction in switch type and congruency at the
CTI=100 was as a result from a significant difference between alternating
switch and double switch trials at the single incongruent 2: t (18)= -3.2,
p=.005 and at the double incongruent: t (18)=-2.7, p=.015. A difference
in alternating switch and double switch trials was significant at CTI= 100, [F
(l, 18) = 9.1, p=.007] but not at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 18)= .49, p=.49].
The effect of congruency was marginally significant at the CTI=1200, [F (1,
25)= 3.3, p =.07] but not at the CTI=100, [F (1, 21)= 1.5, p=.24].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= .39, p =.70 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= -1.3, p=.20.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= -.39, p =.70 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= .61, p=.sS.
Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the arrow task did not
occur on reaction time but on error only for the short preparation
interval. However, there was a huge alternating switch cost (for RT:
38sms) only at the single incongruent condition during the short
preparation interval. Although the size of mean reaction time for the
alternating switch costs was quite big in both preparation interval
(i.e., 84ms at the CTI=100 and 87ms at the CTI=1200), the lack of
statistical power might cause the non-significant main effect on
reaction time.
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b. A main effect of congruency occurred on reaction time and on error
only for the long preparation interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) occurred on reaction time and on error
for the short preparation interval.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task occurred on
reaction time during the alternating switch trials for the short
preparation interval and during the double switch trials (marginal)






























Figure 24. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 24 a) and mean error
percentage (figure 24 b) in congruency and switch type in two cn conditions for the
location task.
RT (ms)
The effect of alternating switch was non-significant, [F (1, 18) =.02, p
=.89] both at the CT!= 100 and at the CTI= 1200, [F (1, 20) =.00,
p=.99] (see Figure 24 a).
2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was non- significant
at the CTI=lOO, [F (1, 25) = .87, p=.40] and at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 35)
=.55, p=.58].
The effect of congruency was only significant at CTI=1200, [F (2, 44) =
5.4, p =.005] (55ms of congruency effect, M= 614 [SE: 61J, M= 771 [SE:
58], M= 609 [SE: 42], M= 627 [SE: 45]) but not at the CTI=100, [ F (1,
27)=.58, p=.52].
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (18)=
1.6, P = .12 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= .22, p= .82.
At the eT!= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (18)= 3.1,
p = .006 but not on the double switch trials, t (18)= 1.7, p=.09.
Error (0/0)
A difference in alternating switch and double switch trials was non-
significant at CTI=100, [F (1, 18) = 39, p=.54] and at the eTI=1200, [F (1,
18)=.04, p=.84]. The effect of congruency was significant at the CTI=100
[F (2, 31)= 6.3, p =.007] and at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 38)= 4.5,
p=.02].
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
at the CTI=100, [F (2, 41)= 1, p=.38] and at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 38)=
.35, p=.72].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the double switch trials, t (18)= -
2.5, p=.02 but not on the alternating switch trials, t (18)= -.87, p =.39.
At the eTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= -1.4, p =.17 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= -1.8, p=.09.
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Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the location task did not
occur on the reaction time and on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time for the
long preparation interval and on error in both short and long
preparation interval, showing that congruency affected both
alternating switch and double switching trials.
c. The interaction ,between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) did not occur on the reaction time and on
error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task occurred on
reaction time during the alternating switch trials for the short
preparation interval. There was also significant previous congruency
on error during the double switch trials for the short preparation








































Figure 25. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 25 a) and mean error




A significant 2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was
non-significant at CTI=100, [F (1, 25)= 1.7, p=.20] and at CTI=1200, [F
(2, 39) = .24, p=.82].
The effect of alternating task was non-significant both at the CTI= lOO, [F
(1, 18)= .01, p =.92] (4ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch M
= 1263 [SE: 85J vs. double switch M= 1259 [SE: 92]) and at the
CTI=1200, [F (1, 18) = 1.3, p =.26] (58ms of alternating switch cost,
alternating switch M = 1953 [SE: 63J vs. double switch M = 895 [SE: 42])
(see Figure 25 a).
The effect of congruency was significant at CTI=lOO, [F (2, 36) = 5.6, p
=.007] (120ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 1170 [SE: 79J, single
incongruent 1 M= 1210 [SE: 88J, single incongruent 2 M= 1340 [SE: 88J,
double incongruent M= 1322 [SE: 110}) and at CTI=1200, [F (2, 43) = 5,
p =.007] (91ms of congruency effect, M= 855 [SE: 69J, M= 842 [SE: 44),
M= 987 [SE: 66J, M= 1009 [SE: 49}).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (18)= -2.9,
p =.01 but not on the double switch trials, t (18)= -1.5, p=.15.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the double switch trials, t (18)= -2.6,
p=.02 but not on the alternating switch trials, t (18)= -1.2, p = .22.
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Error (010)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
at the CTI= 100; [F (2, 38)=.56, p=.58] and at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 41)=
.26, p=.80].
A difference in alternating switch and double switch trials was non-
significant at CTI=100, [F (1, 18) = .32, p=.58] and at the CTI=1200, [F
(1, 18)= .39, p=.54]. The effect of congruency was significant at the
CTI=1200 [F (1, 23)= 4.7, p =.03] but not at the CTI=100, [F (1, 20)=
1.7, p=.20].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= 1.1, P =.29 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= .44, p=.66.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (18)=
2.3, P =.03 and it was marginally significant on the double switch trials, t
(18)= 1.9, p=.07.
Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the word task did not
occur on the reaction time and on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time for both
short and long preparation interval and on error for the long
preparation interval, showing that congruency affected both
alternating switch and double switching trials.
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c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) did not occur on the reaction time and on
error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task occurred on
reaction time during the alternating switch trials for the short
preparation interval and during the double switch trials for long
preparation interval. It was also occurred on error during the
alternating and double switch trials for the long preparation interval.
3)Effect of cues (exp 3 vs. exp 4)
On Reaction Time (ms)
• For switch and repeat trials
There was an interaction between group (exp 3 vs. exp 4) in eTI, trial type
and task and congruency, [F (4, 163)= 2.5, p =.04] , group effect in CTI,
trial type and task, [F (2, 66)= 6.4, p=.004], groupeffect in trial type,





















Figure 26. Mean switch cost (and standard error) in three tasks with two
preparation intervals between experiment 3 (verbal cue) and experiment 4
(arbitrarycue)
As can be seen in Figure 26, the current experiment with arbitrary cues
demonstrated significantly bigger switch costs in all three tasks for both
preparation intervals, causing the group interaction in trial type, [F (1,
38)= 7.5, p=.009]. In other words, the current experiment showed
significantly bigger switch costs (101ms switch cost, switch M= 975 [SE:
47) vs. repeat M= 878 [SE: 40}) than the experiment 3 with verbal cue
(48ms switch cost, M= 831 [SE: 45) vs. M= 783 [SE: 38]). The group effect
in CTI, trial type and task resulted from the lack of switch cost difference in
the location task during the long CTI= 1200 and the reversed switch cost in
the arrow task during the long CTI= 1200 for the experiment 3. On the other
hands, the other two tasks showed the significant switch cost difference
between two experiments.
Overall, the mean RT in the current experiment (M= 929 [SE: 44]) was
much slower (122ms of RT increase) than experiment 3 with verbal cues
(M= 807 [SE: 41}) resulted in a main effect of group, [F (I, 38)= 4.1,
p=.os].
• For alternating and double switch trials
There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 40)]= .08, p= .77] and there was
only group difference in eTI, [F (1, 40)= 5.5, p=.02], indicating that
participants had more benefit of having long preparation interval (302ms of
mean RT reduction, CTI=100 M= 1023 [SE: 43) vs. CTI=1200 M= 721 [SE:
41]) in the experiment 1 than in the current experiment (232ms of mean RT
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reduction, CTI=100 M= 971 [SE: 43J vs. M= 739 [SE: 41J) (see the
Appendix, page 388 table 4).
On Error (0/0)
• For switch and repeat trials
There was a group effect in eTI, trial type and congruency, [F (2, 89)=
3.7, p=.02]. The main 'effect of group was non-significant, [F (1', 39)=
.87, p=.36] .
• For alternating and double switch trials
There was no main effect of group, [F (1, 39);;;;; .64, p;;;;;.43] and no any
other group effect in this analysis.
DISCUSSION
The main aim of this experiment was to examine the arbitrary cue
effect for all three tasks and see if the arbitrary cues change the size of
switch cost and alternating switch cost. In order to see the cue type effect
between verbal cues and arbitrary cues, the result from the current
experiment was compared with the result from the experiment 3.
1) Effect of task switching
• Switch costs for the crI= 100 ms condition in all three tasks were
dramatically reduced in terms of reaction time, suggesting that
participants used long preparation interval for advanced configuration
process based on the hypothesis that preparation effect indicates the
time required to establish a task set. Arrow and word task showed the
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main effect of switch cost during the both preparation intervals for the
reaction time whereas the location showed the main effect of switch cost
only during the short preparation interval. For the error, arrow task
showed the main effect of switch cost only in the short preparation
interval but the word task showed the main effect of switch cost only in
the long preparation interval. On the other hand, the location task
showed no main effect of switch cost for the error. It remains unclear
why three tasks showed the different task switching effect.
• Congruency effect on the current trials shows how active the
other task sets are. More precisely, it is shown that persisting activation
of the irrelevant task set really affected the switching performance,
depending on whether it activates a response that is the same
(congruent) as or different (incongruent) from the response activated
by the new upcoming task set (current task set). In other word, task
switching performance was not only depended on the currently relevant
task-set, but was also influenced by the set of temporary irrelevant task.
In all three tasks, they demonstrated the significant congruency effect in
reaction time, suggesting that participants made slower response when
it was incongruent regardless of the preparation interval. Tentatively, it
is regarded that congruency effect indexes the degree to switch the
competing task set when it is not suppressed. One might expect that
long preparation interval will be effective for reducing congruency effect
as much as for the switch costs. However, the results from the previous
experiments so far showed the occurrence of congruency effect in both
preparation intervals, suggesting that proactive control of interference is
an optional extra process, perhaps requiring the recruitment of an
additional inhibitory mechanism (Monsell & Mizon, 2006).
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• The interaction between congruency and trial type
(switch/repeat) shows whether switch trials are more influenced by
the repeat trials. If so, the bigger congruency effect on the switch trials
suggests that switching different tasks are influenced by the level of
activation from the other task sets on the current trials. The arrow task
showed the significant congruency effect (211ms) during the repeat
trials and reversed congruency effect (-lOlms) during the switch trials
at the CTI= 100, causing the significant interaction. Having congruency
effects during the repeat trials in the arrow task suggests that the
persistent activation of the irrelevant task set indeed interfered with the
current task set because there was no need to suppress the irrelevant
task set during the repeat trials, causing the other task set to be
persistently activated. Interestingly, the reversed congruency effect in
the arrow task shows that switching to the arrow task when it was
congruent, the RT was slower than switching to the arrow task when it
was incongruent, suggesting that participants might have suppressed
strongly the irrelevant task sets which were location and word task sets
for the incongruent trials whereas they might have not suppressed the
irrelevant task sets or their effort to suppress the irrelevant task sets
might be small because it was congruent trials during switching tasks.
As a result, there was a reversed congruency effect in the arrow task
during the switching trials at the eTI= 100. On the other hand, location
task did not show any interaction between trial type and congruency for
reaction time and error and the word task showed the marginal
interaction at the CTI= 100, caused by the significant congruency effect
(48ms) during the switch trials. Note that word task showed the
congruency effect during the switch trials not the repeat trials. In
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summary, there were different impacts on the switch and repeat trials
depending on the task and it suggests that task behaves differently on
the congruency effect.
• Previous congruency shows that the task set from the previous
trials persisted in a state of residual activation and that previous task set
interfered with a subsequent task switch, depending on whether it
activates a response that is the same as or different from the response
by the new task set on the current trials. In the current experiment,
single incongruent 1 and single incongruent 2 were compared because
when the current task is incongruent to the previous trials (single
incongruent 2), the RT and/or error is slower/larger than when the
current task is congruent to the previous trials (single incongruent 1).
All three tasks demonstrated a significant previous congruency effect on
reaction time and error. However, location task showed the reversed
previous congruency effect on reaction time and error, which means that
single incongruent 2 (the current location task is incongruent to the
previous task) was less difficult than single incongruent 1 (the current
location task is congruent to the previous task). This indicates that task
set from the previous trials persisted in a state of residual activation and
that previous task set facilitated with the current location task. On the
other hand, word task showed the significant previous congruency effect
during the switch trials for the short preparation interval and it also
occurred during the repeat and switch trials for the long preparation
interval on reaction time. It also showed the previous congruency effect
in the repeat trials for the short and long preparation interval on error.
This strong impact on the word task was previously found in the exp 1
and 3, suggesting that task set from the previous trials persisted in a
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state of residual activation and that previous task set interfered with the
current word task, especially when the previous task set was
incongruent to the current word task. At this stage, the only speculation
is that the visually-displayed word information for the word task causing
the conflict with other task set information. Thus, when the word task is
on the current trials, it would be harder to suppress the irrelevant task
set information from the other task set when the previous N-l trials was
incongruent to the current word task.
2) Effect of alternating task
• Alternating switch costswas not observed on reaction time and
error in the location and word task, suggesting that participants might
not use the backward inhibition or they used another type of inhibition
mechanism such as dimensional inhibition (Goschke, 2002) in order to
overcome the conflict irrelevant stimulus dimension (e.g., word in the
word task). Although the main effect of alternating switch costs was
non-significant in all three tasks on reaction time and error, it is
interesting to note that arrow task demonstrated the huge alternating
switch cost (385ms) during the short preparation interval at the single
incongruent 2 condition. Previously, the arrow task showed the huge
alternating switch costs in the experiment 1 (310ms) and experiment 3
(136ms) during the CTI=100 when it was only single incongruent 2
condition. Additionally, arrow task also showed the significant
alternating switch costs on error: it only occurred at the CTI=100 when
the current trials were single incongruent and double Incongruent.
It is unclear why the arrow task was sensitive to the single incongruent
2 condition for the short preparation interval, causing the backward
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inhibition. Presumably, BI was present only when there was sufficient
interference from the previous trials (single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) and it was necessary to reduce the interference from the
previous task set if the current task is the arrow task. However, it is
uncertain why the location and word task did not show any alternating
switch cost in the experiment.
• Congruency effect on' the current trials shows how active the
other task sets remain. In all three tasks, the congruency impacted on
the alternating switch and double switch trials and different preparation
intervals. However, word task demonstrated a bigger congruency effect
(120ms, 90ms: CTI=100, CTI=1200 respectively) compared to the other
tasks (73ms for the arrow task, SSmsfor the location task) in terms of
reaction time, suggesting that word task sets are more influenced by the
current level of activation from the other two task sets.
• The interaction between congruency lind switch type
(alternating switch/double switch) demonstrates if backward
inhibition is interacting with the interference of the irrelevant task sets,
depending on the strength of the activation from the irrelevant task
sets. For example, arrow task showed the significant congruency effect
on the alternating switch trials (72ms congruency effect) not on the
double switch trials (-14ms congruency effect) only for the short
preparation interval. In addition, the arrow task demonstrated a huge
alternating switch cost (38Sms alternating switch cost) when it was
single incongruent 2 condition during the short preparation interval,
resulting in the significant interaction between congruency and switch
type at the CTI=100. However, the location and word task did not show
any significant interaction between switch type and congruency or any
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significant main effect of alternating switch cost, suggesting that these
two tasks might use another type of inhibitory control mechanism which
is not measured by alternating switch cost.
• Previous congruency significantly affected the alternating switch
trials in the short preparation interval for the arrow task (only RT). The
word task was also affected by the previous congruency during the
alternating switch trials in the short preparation interval and double
.switch trials in the long preparation interval on reaction time. Word task
also showed the previous congruency effect in the alternating switch
trials for the long preparation interval on error. This previous
congruency effect in the word task was previously observed in the effect
of task switching analysis, indicating that word information is indeed the
most conflicting information with the other task features and
participants had struggled to suppress the irrelevant task sets when
their response was incongruent to the response of the word task on the
current trials.
On the other hand, location task only showed the previous congruency
effect for the alternating switch trials in the long preparation interval on
reaction time, whereas it showed the reversed previous congruency
effect for the double switch trials in the short preparation interval on
error. It is assumed that the persistent activation from the previous task
sets on N-l trials showed the different impact on each tasks.
3) Effect of cues
The switch cost in the current experiment was significantly bigger than the
experiment 3 with verbal cue, supporting the hypothesis that strength of
the cue-target association was important factor for task switching. In other
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words, the weak cue by using the arbitrary cues required the extra task set
reconfiguration process to learn and interpret the meaning of the cues,
causing the high working memory load for switching tasks. One could argue
that participants might use the inner speech to remind themselves of which
task they had to perform. This inner speech is associated with the
phonological loop system from the work memory model proposed by
Baddeley (1986) and Baddeley & Logie (1999), which is considered to be a
peripheral, independent component (or 'slave' system) of working memory.
According to this traditional working memory model, this phonological loop
specializes for the short term storage and processing of verbal-phonological
information, including maintenance rehearsal. In particular, one of its
subcomponents, called the articulatory control (or articulatory rehearsal)
process, is assumed to underlie the generation of inner speech or internal
subvocalisaion (Baddeley & Logie, 1992). Although this phonological loop is
not directly related to the executive control processes according to the
model, it is likely to assume that inner speech during the preparation
interval helped participants to interpret the meaning of arbitrary cues and
perform the task correctly. Goshke (2000) actually showed that switch cost
was substantially smaller among participants who said the task name than
among those who verbalized an irrelevant word. His finding suggests that
the opportunity to verbally remind oneself which task to perform next may
indeed be an effective strategy to prepare for the forthcoming switch.
Although the inner speech which might be self-cuing device that helps
participants keep track of which task is to be performed on the upcoming
trials (Baddeley et al., 2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003), the current result
suggests that the effort for retrieving and activating the task goal for the
forthcoming task set would cause the increased switch costs compared to
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the exp 3 with verbal cues. In other words, participants had no need to use
the inner speech to remind themselves when the verbally-instructed cues
were presented for all three tasks.
The lack of alternating switch costs in both experiments except the arrow
task when it was single incongruent 2 condition at the eTI= 100 suggests
that strength of cue-task association is not crucial factor to cause the
backward inhibition, however, it still remains unclear why the cue changes
did not influence on the occurrence of backward inhibition.
Lastly, the congruency effect occurred in both experiments (e.g., 61ms in
the exp 3, 44ms in the current exp), suggesting that the persistent
activation of the irrelevant tasks sets interfered with the level of activation
of the current task set regardless of the cue changes as well as the
preparation intervals. These results strongly support the idea that
congruency effect occurs on the representation of the target-response
mapping because there was no pre-instructed information for the
congruency and the persistent activation among three tasks had to win the
competition to overcome the interference which are dominant on the target
information.
CONCLUSION
The present experiment in this chapter demonstrated that a substantial
amount of switch costs and strong congruency effects throughout all three
tasks whereas alternating switch costs only occurred in the arrow task when
it was single incongruent 2 condition during the short preparation Interval.
Incongruent trials were slower and more error prone than congruent trials
regardless of the trial type (repeat, switch, alternating switch or double
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switch trials). The previous congruency effect indicates that the task set
from the previous trials persisted in a state of residual activation especially
when the task set is competing with the other two tasks and that previous
task set interfered with a current task set. In the current experiment, word
task only demonstrated the significant effect of previous congruency,
suggesting that word task set is more prone to be influenced by previous
incongruent trials. On the other hand, the location task showed the
facilitation from the previous incongruent trials.
Group comparison between verbal cues and arbitrary cues demonstrated
larger switch costs for the arbitrary cues compared to the verbal cues,
suggesting that participants might use the inner speech for self-cuing
device and extra effort for task-set reconfiguration in order to understand
the meaning of the arbitrary cues and prepare for the forthcoming task.
There was no group difference in alternating switch costs and congruency
effect between two experiments.
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Chapter 7
Experiment 5: The role of the target features
on switch cost and backward inhibition
INTRODUCTION
Previous evidence (Hubner et ai, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003;
Arbuthnott, 2008) has indicated that sequential inhibition - a lateral
inhibition during the sequential selection of low-level perceptual and motor
code- occurs after the target stimulus has appeared, rather than during the
preparation interval suggesting that it may be the target, rather than the
cue, that is relevant to produce backward inhibition. Furthermore, switching
cues even without switching tasks increases switch cost (Logan &
Bundesen, 2003) but does not influence backward inhibition (Gade & Koch,
2008; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). Giving these findings, distinct targets may
influence backward inhibition more than do distinct cues.
Since Arbuthnott (2005) argued that the different cue type influenced the
effect of switch cost as well as backward inhibition, cue manipulation for the
backward inhibition in the previous experiments was the main purpose.
However, the results so far demonstrated that different cue type is more
influential to switch costs than alternating switch costs. In addition, each
task showed the different size of alternating switch costs, yet it was not
clear if the backward inhibition depended on the type of task, rather than
the cue. In order to find the reason why the tasks behaved differently in
the previous experiments, there was an assumption that three tasks have
different response selection processing, especially for the word task. For
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instance, the response selection for the word task is based on reading the
word 'up/down' inside the arrow, whereas for the arrow and location the
response selection is not based on verbal information inside the arrow but
the shape or location of the stimulus. Thus, the shape or location of the
'arrow' stimulus on the screen might struggle to compete with the verbal
features in the stimulus in terms of response selection. Furthermore, there
is a perceptual filtering process to perform the arrow task. For example, the
correct response for the arrow task has to made by looking at the point of
the arrow where the word information can be interfering. This fundamental
difference would apply for the task-specific effect considering the size of
backward inhibition. In contrast, there is no need for perceptual processing
during the word task but only need for the reading the word which might
lead this linguistic process to overpower the perceptual process for the
arrow and location task.
In summary, the characteristics of the work task must be based on the
linguistic information and the other two tasks are based on the perceptual
information of the target features. In this respect, two different information
would get confounded as three tasks are singularly embedded in one
stimulus. Consequently, these different task set information and response
selection processes might influence the task set reconfiguration processing
when participants were about to make a correct response for which task
they performed. This idea is much similar to the dual-code theorv' (Paivio,
1986; Clark & Paivio, 1991) that both visual and verbal information are
processed differently by using distinct channels and creating separate
I For example, verbal codesare stored as linear sequencesof words and visual
codesas pictures.
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representations for information processed in each channel; 1) a non-verbal
representation to handle objects and events, and 2) a verbal imagery
system to perceive and generate language. According to the dual-code
theory, dual coding increases the likelihood of recall because of dual
retrieval routes-on for each code. At this point, one would simply question
whether the role of the target features, such as verbal features and visual
features is another important factor to influence the task switching
performance and cause the different sizes in switch cost and backward
inhibition.
In order to answer this question, the current experiment aimed to
distinguish two types of different information on target deliberately while
having the same task set for three tasks and see whether this manipulation
of the target would change the size of the switch costs and alternating
switch costs in all three tasks. According to the previous experiments, there
was task-specific effect on switch cost, previous congruency effect and
alternating switch cost. For example, word task showed the robust previous
congruency effect whereas it was the arrow task that demonstrated only
backward inhibition when it was single incongruent 2 condition at the
CTI=100. Based on the hypothesis that the different task set information
has different level of activation and thus different impact on the switch cost,
previous congruency, alternating switch cost, it was reasonable to argue
that different task set information on the target is an important factor to
influence the task switching performance.
By teasing apart the word 'up/down' information inside the target and
putting this 'up/down' outside of the arrowhead containing the features
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relevant to the other tasks, it was now possible to see whether the effect of
separate information between linguistic and visual (perceptual) on the
target would change the size of switch costs and alternating switch costs.
However, the location and arrow task still share the single visual
information and the degree of the perceptual and visual processing in those
two is not quite separable. Thus, it is uncertain whether the location and
the arrow task would show any difference from the previous experiments in
terms of switch cost, previous congruency and the alternating switch cost.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty participants (11 women) were recruited from the University of
Nottingham through the advert and seven of them were undergraduates
and the rest of them were postgraduate in the psychology department. The
participants ranged age from 18 and 31 years (M= 24.4, sD=7), reported
normal and corrected-ta-normal vision and were all right-handed except
two participants. They received £4 as an inconvenience allowance after
completion of the experiment. The study took approximately SO min to
complete including the instruction and practice session.
Stimulus and Design
The task, stimuli and study procedures were identical to the previous
experiment 3 (ref. chapter 5) except that the word information inside the
arrow target was removed and shown to the right side of the target stimuli.
The task cues were all verbal cues as in Experiment 3 (chapter 5).
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The reason for the verbal cues in this experiment was to give the direct
information for the task in order to minimise the time for the cue
processing and maximise it for the target processing. Figure 27 shows the
example of the tasks in the current experiment.
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Time *
Figure 27. An example of the time course of task presentation in Experiment 5.
* The procedure for the CTI and RCI is the same as the previous Exps.
223
RESULTS
1) Effect of task switching
Four research questions for the effect of task switching were raised.
They are as follows.
a. Is there any switch cost?
b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
c. Does congruency interact with switch/repeat trials (trial type)?
d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
On Reaction Time (RT)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors CTI (lOO,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrows, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) revealed a significant 4-way interaction (trial type, task and
congruency), [F (4, 83) =2.8, p =.03] (see the Appendix, page 403 table
la). This interaction was explored by conducting three separate 3-way
(factors CTI, trial type, and congruency) repeated measures ANOVAs for
each task. These are reported below.
On Error (0/0)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors CTI (lOO,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrow, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction: [F (4, 77)= .59,
224
p= .68J (see the Appendix, page 403 table lb) and a significant 3-way
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Figure 28. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 28 a) and percent error scores
(figure 28 b) in congruency and trial type in two Cl I conditions for the arrow task.
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RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at CTI
=100, [F (1, 18) = 33, P <.001] (99ms switch cost, switch M = 906 [SE:
46J vs. repeat M= 807 [SE: 43J) but not at CTI=1200, [F (1, 18) =.55, p
=.47] (See figure 28 a).
In both CTI conditions, the effect of congruency was marginally significant
at the CTI=100, [F (2, 43) = 2.5, P =.08] (46ms of congruency effect,
M= 822 [SE: 43J vs. M= 904 [SE: 47J vs. M= 857 [SE: 54J vs. M= 844
[SE: 45J: congruent vs. single incongruent 1 vs. single incongruent 2. vs.
double incongruent) and it was significant at the CTI=1200, [F (3, 48)
=4.4, p =.01] (lOOms of congruency effect, M= 600 [SE: 47J vs. M= 694
[SE: 64J vs. M= 717 [SE: 70J vs. M= 688 [SE: 51J).
The interaction in trial type and congruency was non-significant at both
CTI=100, [F (2,42)= .86, p=.45] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 40)= 1.1, p=.33].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= 1.5, p =.16
and on the switch trials, t (18)= .82, p=.42.
At the CT!= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (lS)= -S.l, p = .43
and on the switch trials, t (lS)= .13, p=.90.
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Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CTI=100, [F (2, 38)= 1.1, p=.36] and at the CTI=1200, [F (2,
42)=.79, p=.47].
RTdifference between switch and repeat trials in error percentage was non-
significant at the CTI=100 [F (1, 18)= .21, p= .65] and at the CTI=1200, [
F (1, 18) =1.1, p=.30].
The effect of congruency was significant both at CTI=100, [F (2, 30)= 6.3,
p=.OOS] and at the CTI=1200, [F (3, 49) = 7.2, p=.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= .84, P
=.41 and on the switch trials, t (18)= -.67, p=.51.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (lS)= 2.6, p
=.02 but not on the switch trials, t (18)= -.11, p=.91.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the arrow task only occurred on
reaction time for the short preparation interval and not on error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed on
reaction time and error for both short and long preparation interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was non-significant on reaction time and error.
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d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task only occurred




































Figure 29. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 29 a) and percent error scores
(figure 29 b) in congruency and trial type in two CT! conditions for the location task.
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RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
CTI= 100, [F (1, 18)= 10, p =.004] (62ms switch cost, switch M = 834
[SE: 33J, repeat M= 769 [SE: 35]) but not at the CT!= 1200, [F (1, 18) =
1.8, P =.19] (see Figure 29 a).
A 2-way interaction between trial type and congruency was significant at
the CTI=100, [F (2, 44) = 3.S, P =. 02] but not at the CTI=1200, [F (2,
44) = 1.9, p =.15]. This interaction was caused by the significant
congruency effect on the switch trials, [F (3, 4S)= 6.7, p=.OOl] (lllms
of congruency effect, congruent M= 767 [SE: 35J, single incongruent 1 M=
866 [SE: 35J, single incongruent 2 M= 819 [SE: 35J, double incongruent
M= 883 [SE: 43]) and the marginal congruency effect on the repeat trials,
[F (3, 50)= 2.4, p=.OS] (43ms of congruency effect, M= 736 [SE: 41J,
M= 724 [SE: 39], M= 821 [SE: 55J, M= 793 [SE: 38J).
The effect of congruency was significant at the CT!= 100, [F (2, 40) = 3.6,
p=.03] (76ms of congruency effect, M= 752 [SE: 35J, M= 795 [SE: 32J,
M= 820 [SE: 42J, M= 838 [SE: 37]) and at CTI=1200, [F (3, 47) =7.0,
p=.OOl] (63 ms congruency effect, M= 515 [SE: 36J, M= 564 [SE: 40J,
M= 538 [SE: 46], M= 631 [SE: 50J).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=lOO, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was marginally significant on the repeat trials, t (lS)= -2.0,
p =.06 but not on the switch trials, t (18)= 1.7, p=.l1.
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At the eT!= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= 1.2, p = .25
and on the switch trials, t (18) = .76, p= .46.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CTI=100, [F (2,41)= .57, p=.59] and CTI=1200, [F (1,25)=.19,
p=.75].
RTdifference between switch and repeat trials in error percentage was non-
significant at the CTI=100 [F (1, 18)= 2.3, p= .14] and at the eTI=1200,
[F (1, 18) =1.4, p=.26].
The effect of congruency was significant both at CTI=100, [F (1, 27) 10,
p=.OOl] and at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 24) = 15, p<.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= 1, P
=.33 and on the switch trials, t (18)= .81, p=.43.
At the eT!= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (18)= 2.0,
p=.OS but not on the repeat trials, t (18)= 1.4, p =.16.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the location task only occurred on
reaction time for the long preparation interval but not on error.
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b. A main effect of congruency for the location task was observed on
reaction time and error for both short and long preparation interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was only significant on reaction time during the short
preparation interval but not on error. This interaction was caused by
the significant congruency effect on the switch trials and marginal
effect on the repeat trials.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task only occurred

































Figure 30. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 30 a) and percent error scores
(figure 30 b) in congruency and trial type in two en conditions for the word task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
CTI= 100, [F (1, 18)= 10, P =.004] (117ms switch cost, switch M = 1001
[SE: 46J vs. repeat M= 884 [SE: 38J) and it was non-significant at the
CTI=1200, [F (1,18) = 1.4, p =.24] (see Figure 30 a).
There was a marginally significant 3-way interaction (CTI, trial type and
congruency) for the arrow task, [F (2, 42)= 2.8, p=.06] which resulted
from two effects which impacted CTI=100 but not CTI=1200. Both of these
effects can be clearly seen in Figure 30 and were confirmed an analysis of
each CTI separately).
the simple effects (the factors trial type and congruency were examined at
A 2-way interaction in trial type and congruency was significant both at the
CTI=100, [F (2, 46) = 3.9 p =.02] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 44) = 3.1, P
=.05]. The interaction in trial type and congruency at the CTI=100 was as
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a result from a big switch cost (187ms, switch M= 1095 [SE: 54], repeat
M= 907 [SE: 48]) at the single incongruent 2 condition which was
confirmed by Paired- SamplesT-test: t (19) = -6.7, P <.001.
The interaction in trial type and congruency at the eTI= 1200 was as a
result from a significant effect of congruency on the switch trials, [F (2,
34)= 10, p<.OOl] (62ms congruency effect, M= 661 [SE: 32J, M= 728
[SE: 50], M= 814 [SE: 59J, M= 826 [SE: 52J) but a non-significant effect of
congruency on the repeat trials, [F (1, 26)= 1.5, p=.23].
In both eTI conditions, the effect of congruency was significant at the
CTI=100, [F (2, 33)= 9.3, p=.OOl] (72ms of congruency effect,
congruent M= 875 [5E:40], single incongruent 1M= 926 [SE: 43), single
incongruent 2 M= 1001[SE: 49], double incongruent M= 968 [SE:43}) and
CTI= 1200, [F(l, 24}= 4.2, p =.04] (64ms of congruency effect, M= 696
[SE:43), M= 699 [SE: 45}, M= 782 [SE: 48J, M= 807 [SE: 55]).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (18)= -3.3, p=.004
but not on the repeat trials, t (18)= -.57, p =.58.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= -2.6, P = .02
and on the switch trials, t (18)= -3.3, p=.004.
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Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CTI=100, [F (2,42)= .45, p=.67] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 33)= 2.1,
p=.14].
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials in error percentage
was found at the CTI=100 [F (1, 18)=7.6, p=.013] and at the CTI=1200,
[ F (1, 18) =6.7, p=.02].
The effect of congruency was non-significant at CTI= lOO, [F (2, 33)= 2.5,
p=.10] and it was significant at CTI=1200, [F (2,31) = 6.6, p=.006].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= .19, p
=.85 and on the switch trials, t (18)= 1.1, p=.28.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (18)= 3.8,
p=.OOl but not on the repeat trials, t (18)= 1.4, p =.19.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the word task only occurred on
reaction time for the short preparation interval and for the both
preparation interval on error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the word task was observed on
reaction time for both preparation interval and on error for the short
preparation interval.
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c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was only observed on reaction time for both preparation
interval. The interaction was caused by the big switch cost (187ms)
at the single incongruent 2 condition during the short preparation. It
was also caused by the significant congruency effect on the switch
trials and non-significant effect on the repeat trials during the long
preparation interval.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task occurred on
reaction time during the switch trials for the short preparation
interval and during the switch and repeat trials for the long
preparation interval. It only occurred on error during the switch trials
for the long preparation interval.
2) Effect of alternating task
Four research questions for the effect of alternating tasks were as follows.
a. Is there any main effect of alternating switch cost?
b. Is there a main effect of congruency?
c. Does congruency interact with alternating switch/double switch trials
(switch type)?
d. Is there any previous congruency effect?
On Reaction Tiroe (roS)
The repeated measures ANOVAwith the factors eTI, switch type, task, and
congruency revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction, [F (3, 61) = 1.1, p
=.34] (see the Appendix, page 404 table 2a). There was a significant 2-way
interactions in task and congruency, [F (3, 58)= 3.3, p=.04] and a
marginally significant 2-way interaction in CTI and task, [F (2, 34)= 2.8,
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p=.07]. The effect of alternating task for each task was presented
separately in order to compare with the previous results. Each of these is
reported below.
On Errors (0/0)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors cn (100,
1200), switch type (alternating switch, double switch), task (arrow,
location, word), and congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single
incongruent 2, double incongruent) revealed a non-significant 4-way
interaction: [F (4,69)= .74, p= .56] (see the Appendix, page 404 table 2b)
but a marginally significant 3-way interaction (CTI, switch type and task): [
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Figure 31. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 31 a) and percent error scores
(figure 32 b) in congruency and switch type in two CTI conditions for the arrow task.
RT (ms)
The effect of alternating switch was non-significant, [F (1, 19) =2.6, p
=.12] (34ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch M= 970 [SE: 55J
vs. double switch M= 936 [SE: 53J) both at the CTI= 100 and at the
CTI=1200, [F (1, 19) = 1.7, p=.21] (26ms of alternating switch cost,
alternating switch M= 690[5E: 60] vs. double switch M= 654 [SE: 41]) (see
Figure 7).
A 2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was non-
significant at the CTI=100, [F (2, 37) = .51, p=.60] and at CTI=1200, [F
(1, 27) = .88, p=.38]. The effect of congruency was significant at the
CTI=100 [F (2, 46)= 4.4, p =.01] (110ms of congruency effect, M= 871
[SE: 48], M= 990 [SE: 64], M= 1012 [SE: 72], M= 940 [SE: 48J) and at
the CTI=1200, [F (2, 41)= 3.3, p=.04] (94ms of congruency effect, M=
602 [SE: 35J, M= 692 [SE: 68J, M= 706 [SE: 64], M= 689 [SE: 42]).
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the eT!= 100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19) = -
.13, P =.90 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= -.50, p=.62.
At the eTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19) = -
.60, P = .55 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= .-.08, p=.93.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
both at CTI=100, [F (2,44)= 1.7, p=.18] and CTI=1200, [F (1,27)=.77,
p=.44].
A difference between alternating switch and double switch trials in error
percentage was significant at the CTI=100 [F (I, 18) = 6.4, p= . 02] but
not at the CTI=1200, [ F (1,18) =2.8, p=.l1].
The effect of congruency was non-significant at eTI=100, [F (2, 40)= 1.7,
p=.19] but it was significant at CTI=1200, [F (2, 30) = 9, p=.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= .39, p =.70 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= -1.77, p=.l1.
At the eTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= .90, p =.38 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= -1.1, p=.30.
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Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the arrow task was non-
significant for reaction time. However, it was observed on error for
the short preparation interval.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time for both
short and long preparation interval and on error for the long
preparation interval, showing that congruency affected both
alternating switch and double switching trials.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) on reaction time and error was non-
significant.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task on reaction time
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Figure 32. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 32 a) and percent error scores
(figure 32 b) in congruency and switch type in two eT! conditions for the location
task.
RT (ms)
The effect of alternating tasks at the eTI= 100 was non-significant, [F (1,
19) = .58, p =.46] (8ms alternating switch cost, alternating minus double
switch, alternating switch M = 841 [SE: 35] vs. double switch M= 833 [SE:
33]). It was also non-significant at eTI =1200, [F (1, 19) =2, p=.17].
(32ms alternating switch cost, M = 570 [SE: 39] vs. M = 538 [SE: 40]) (see
Figure 32 a).
There was a marginally significant 2-way interaction between switch type
and congruency at eTI= lOO, [F (2, 46)= 2.5, p=.08] not at eT!= 1200, [F
(2, 43) = 1.2, p=.30]. The marginal interaction between switch type and
congruency at the eT!= 100 resulted from a significant effect of congruency
on the alternating switch trials, [F (3, 47)= 7.9, p <.001] (172ms
congruency effect, M= 719 [SE: 43], M= 902 [SE: 46], M= 836 [SE: 41],
M= 936 [SE: 54]) compared to the marginal effect of congruency effect on
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the double switch trials, [F (3, 54)= 2.5, p=.06] (58ms congruency effect,
M= 794 [SE: 41), M= 884 [SE: 39), M= 825 [SE: 40), M= 846 [SE: 38)).
The effect of congruency was only significant at CTI= 100, [F (3, 51) = 9.4,
P <.001] (114ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 752 [SE: 36J, single
incongruent 1 M= 884 [SE: 37), single incongruent 2 M= 826 [SE: 37),
double incongruent M= 887 [SE: 42J) not at CTI= 1200, [F (2, 44 = 1.8,
p=.16].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (18)=
1.5, p =.14 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= 1.7, p=.l1.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (18)=
.22, p = .83 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= .22, p=.83.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
in both at CTI=100, [F (2, 36)= 1, p= .34] and CTI=1200, [F (2,38)=1.7,
p= .19].
A difference between alternating switch and double switch trials in error
percentage was non-significant at the CTI= 100 [F (1, 18)= .52, p= . 48]
and it was significant at CTI=1200, [F (1, 18) =5.5, p=.03].
The effect of congruency was significant at CTI= 100, [F (2, 37)= 12,
p<.OOl] and at CTI=1200, [F (1, 24) = 6.2, p=.013].
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CT!= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= 1.6, p =.13 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= -.85, p=.41.
At the en= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= -.09, p =.93 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= -.97, p=.34.
Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the location task on
reaction time and error was non-significant.
b. A main effect of congruency on reaction time was significant only for
the short preparation interval whereas it was significant on error for
both short and long preparation interval, showing that congruency
affected both alternating switch and double switching trials.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) on reaction time was marginally
significant for the short preparation interval and this was as a result
from the bigger congruency effect on the alternating switch trials
compared to the double switch trials. The interaction on error was
not observed.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task was not










































Figure 33. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 33 a) and percent error scores
(figure 33 b) in congruency and switch type in two eT! conditions for the word task.
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RT (ms)
The effect of alternating task was non-significant at the CTI= lOO, [F (1,
19)= 1.4, p =.25] and it was marginally significant at the CTI= 1200, [F (1,
19) = 3.5, P =.07] (62ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch M
= 831 [SE: 63] vs. double switch M = 769 [SE: 41]) (see Figure 33 a).
A significant 2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was
non-significant at CTI=100, [F (2, 37)= .70, p=.50] and at CTI=1200, [F
(2, 47) = .51, p=.64].
The effect of congruency was significant at CTI=100, [F (2, 37) = 7.4, P
=.002] (87ms congruency effect, congruent M= 968 [SE: 50], single
incongruent 1 M= 985 [SE: 55], single incongruent 2 M= 11130 [SE: 74],
double incongruent M= 1049 [SE: 47]) and at CTI=1200, [F (2, 41) = 13,
P <.001] (158 ms congruency effect, M= 682 [SE: 34], M= 778 [SE: 64],
M= 844 [SE: 59], M= 897 [SE: 60]).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19)= -2.8,
p =.01 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= -2.3, p=.03.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the double switch trials, t (19)= .-2.3,
p=.04 but not on the alternating switch trials, t (19)= -1.1, p = .27.
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Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
in both at CTI=100, [F (2, 45)= .39, p=.72] and CTI=1200, [F (3,
48)=.02, p=.99].
A difference between alternating switch and double switch trials in error
percentage was non-significant at the en= 100 [F (1, 18)= 1.1, p= . 30]
and at CTI=1200, [ F (1, 18) =.20, p=.66].
The effect of congruency was only significant at eTI=1200, [F (2, 42) =
4.7, p=.Ol] but not at CTI=100, [F (2,41)= 2.0, p=.14].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the crI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= -.22, p =.83 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= .99, p=.33.
At the eTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= 1.2, p =.24 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= 1.2, p=.26.
Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the word task was only
marginal on reaction time during the long preparation interval
occurred and it did not occur on error.
b. A main effect of congruency on reaction time was significant for both
preparation interval and on error only for the long preparation
interval.
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c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) was non-significant on reaction time and
error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task was significant
during both alternating and double switch trials for the short
preparation interval and during the double switch trials for the long
preparation interval. It was non-significant on error.
2)Effect of two different target information (exp
3 vs. expS)
On Reaction Time CRT)
• For switch and repeat trials
There was an interaction between group (exp 3 vs. exp 5) and trial type, [F
(1, 38)= 5.9, p =.02] which was caused by the significantly bigger switch
cost in the experiment 3 (48ms switch cost, switch M= 831 [SE: 34J vs.
repeat M= 783 [SE: 36J) than the current experiment (24ms switch cost,
switch M= 738 [SE: 30J vs. repeat M= 714 [SE: 30]). There was an
interaction between group (exp 3 vs. exp 5) In task, [F (2, 71)= 4.1,
p=.02] (see the Figure 34). As can be seen in figure 34, the significant
group interaction in task was as a result from the significant RTdifference in
location task (p <.001) and arrow task (p <.001) but not in the word task.
In other words, arrow and location task in the current experiment were
much faster than those of the experiment 3, suggesting that the separate
information between visual/perceptual code and verbal code was beneficial
for the target processing. On the other hand, it also suggests that the
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linguistic information for the target was not influenced by the separate














Figure 34. Mean reaction time (and standard error) in three tasks between
experiment 3 and 5
Overall the mean RT in the current experiment was significantly faster (M=
726 [SE: 30) than experiment 3 with verbal cues (M= 807 [SE: 30})
resulted in a marginal main effect of group, [F (1, 38)= 3.8, p=.06] (see
the Appendix, page 389 table 5).
• For alternating and double switch trials
There was an interaction between group (exp 3 vs. expS) in CTI, switch
type, task and congruency, [F (4, 164)]= 2.5, p= .04] which was caused
by a significant 4-way interaction in CTI, switch type, task and congruency
for the exp3, [F (4, 92)= 3.5, p=.007] and a non-significant 4-way
interaction for the current experiment, [F (3, 61)= 1.1, p=.34]. There was
an interaction between group in task and congruency, [F (4, 155)= 3.0,





















Figure 35. Mean reaction time (and standard error) for congruency and task
between exp 3 and exp 5
The group interaction in congruency and task was caused by the mean RT
at the double incongruent condition between two experiments (see the
Figure 35) although the size of congruency effect in all three tasks are not
significantly different between two experiments (arrow: location: word =
!l8ms: 70ms: lOlms for the exp 3 and arrow: location: word= l03ms:
98ms: 127ms for the exp 5).
The marginal interaction between group in cn and task was caused by the
word task between two experiments because the word in the current
experiment showed the largest benefit from the long preparation interval
(235ms mean RT decrease, CT/=100 M= 1029 [SE: 46J vs. CT/=1200
M=794 [SE: 47J) compared to the word task in the exp 3 (154ms mean RT
decrease, CTI=100 M= 1006 [SE: 44J vs. CT/=1200 M= 852 [SE: 45J). On
the other hand, the arrow (285ms RT decrease, CT/=100, M=1024 [SE: 38J
vs. M= 1200, M=739 [SE: 42J in the exp 3: 286ms RT decrease, CT/= lOO,
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M=956 [SE: 31}, CTI=1200 M= 670 [SE: 36} in the exp 5) and location
task (255ms RT decrease, CTI=100 M= 882 [SE: 43) vs. CTI= 1200 M=
627 [SE: 47} in the exp 3: CTI= 100 M= 844 [SE: 52J vs. CTI=1200 M=
561 [SE: 36J in the exp 5) in both experiments showed the similar size of





















Figure 36. Mean reaction time (and standard error) in task and CFl between
experiment 3 and 5
The current experiment revealed the faster mean reaction time (M =809
[SE: 41] than experiment 3 (M=855 [SE: 39]) but the main effect of group
was non-significant, [F (1, 38)= .67, p=.47] (see the Appendix, page 389,
table 5).
On Error (0/0)
• For switch and repeat trials
There was an interaction between group in trial type and congruency, [F (3,
lOS)= 4, p=.Ol] and in err and congruency, [F (2, 95)= 20, P <.001].
The main effect of group was non-significant, [F (1, 37) = .32, p=.57].
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• For alternating and double switch trials
There was an marginal interaction between group in CTI, congruency, [F
(2, 84)= 2.7, p=.07]. The main effect of group was non-significant, [F (1,
37)= .53, p=.47].
DISCUSSION
The main aim of this experiment was to understand if the feature of
the target would be another important factor to influence the size of switch
cost and alternating switch cost. In order to disentangle the combined
information in the target (word information and perceptual information), the
word 'Up'/'Down' inside the arrow stimulus was removed and positioned
next to the target. The present results have shown that the overall size of
switch cost and congruency effect was reduced but the manipulation of
target features did not influence the occurrence of the alternating switch
cost.
1) Effect of task switching
• Switch costs for reaction time in all three tasks were dramatically
reduced during the long preparation interval, thus all three tasks showed
the main effect of switch cost for the short preparation interval,
suggesting that participants used long preparation interval for advanced
reconfiguration. Switch costs for error was non-significant in the arrow
and location task but it was significant in the word task during the both
preparation intervals, indicating that target features between
visual/perceptual code and verbal code might have separate processing
and visually separate display for the target features might help to
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reconfigure the upcoming task sets. Note that the size of mean RT
switch costs in the arrow and location tasks from the current experiment
(arrow task: 99ms, location task: 62ms) were similar the experiment 3
(arrow task: l07ms, location task: 62ms) but the difference was that
the arrow task in the current experiment did not show any error switch
costs compared to the experiment 3, suggesting that arrow task had
benefit from this manipulation.
• Congruency effect on the current trials shows how active the
other task sets remain. More precisely, it is shown that the current level
of activation are still interfered from the other tasks even when
participants are given a long time to prepare to switch the task and even
repeat the same task. The effect was depending on whether it activates
a response that is the same (congruent) as or different (incongruent)
from the response activated by the new upcoming task set (current task
set). In other word, task switching performance was not only depended
on the currently relevant task-set, but was also influenced by the set of
temporary irrelevant task. In all three tasks, they demonstrated big
congruency effect in reaction time and error, suggesting that
participants made slower response and more errors when it was
incongruent regardless of the preparation interval. It was interesting to
note that congruency effect in task switching was not influenced by the
manipulation of the target in the current experiment. One could assume
that separate display of target information might reduce the interference
from the temporary irrelevant task sets, which are still in an activated
state. However, the current results suggest that the source of the
congruency effect might be from the abstract task set rules, which could
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be restored in the Long-Term Memory, rather than from the visually
presented target information that is changing constantly while switching
tasks. These issues will be further discussed in the chapter 9.
• The interaction between congruency and trial type
(switch/repeat) shows whether switch trials are more influenced by
the repeat trials. If so, the bigger congruency effect on the switch trials
suggests that switching different tasks are influenced by the level of
activation from the other task sets on the current trials.
Arrow task did not show any interaction between congruency and trial
type whereas the location and word task showed the interaction
between congruency and trial type. Interestingly, the interaction in the
word task was as a result from the big switch cost (187ms) at the single
incongruent 2 condition during the short preparation interval. Word task
also showed the interaction during the long preparation interval which
was caused by the significant congruency effect on the switch trtals not
on the repeat trials. Location task also showed the interaction only
during the short preparation interval which was caused by the significant
congruency effect on the switch trials and marginal effect on the repeat
trials. It is noteworthy that most of previous experiments demonstrated
the significant congruency effect on the repeat trials. However, the
current experiment showed the lack of congruency effect on the repeat
trials in all three tasks, indicating that the manipulation of the target
might weaken the current level of activation from the irrelevant task
sets which still remains. Lastly, it is suggested that the lack of
interaction between congruency and trial type in the arrow task might
be due to the manipulation of the target. In other words, the arrow
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shape without any other task set information might help participants to
resolve the competition with other task sets. However, this suggestion is
contradictory to the follow results on the previous congruency, thus it is
not certain why arrow task did not show any interaction in the present
experiment.
• Previous congruency shows that the task set from the previous N-
i trials remains in a state of residual activation. In other words, the
persisting activation of previous task set interfered with a subsequent
task switch, depending on whether it activates a response that is the
same as or different from the response by the new task set on the
current trials. Arrow task did not show any previous congruency effect
on reaction time but there was a previous congruency effect on error for
the repeat trials during the short preparation interval. One could argue
that separate arrow target might reduce the interference from the
irrelevant task sets as the target information is visually separate from
the word information for the word task set. However, this is not simply
true according to the result from the previous exp 3. In both
experiments, cues for all three tasks are verbally presented, thus the
difference between two experiments was whether the target information
is embedded in one single target (exp 3) or separately displayed
(current exp). In both experiments, arrow task showed the same
results; previous congruency effect occurred only on error when it was
repeat trials during the short preparation interval. Location task also
showed the similar results between two experiments. It has more
facilitation from the previous trials rather than interference. On the
other hand, both experiments showed that word task was significantly
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influenced by the previous incongruent trials during switch tasks as well
as repeating the same task, suggesting that separate word information
from the current target manipulation was not beneficial to reduce the
interference from the other tasks (arrow and location). The
interpretation for the strong previous congruency effect in the exp 3
(chapter 5)- the word information is the most conflicting information
among the other task set information- is not valid. Note that the robust
previous congruency effect in the word task was also observed in the
exp 1 (chapter 3) and exp 4 (chapter 6). Therefore, it is possible to
speculate that the competition from the other task sets is high when the
current task is the word task, yet the nature of word task does not allow
requiring the recruitment of an additional inhibitory mechanism based
on the assumption that proactive control of inference is an optional extra
process (Mansell & Mizon, 2006).
2) Effect of alternating task
Alternating switch costs were not observed on reaction time in all
three tasks! and they were observed on error in the arrow task for the
short preparation interval. It is noteworthy that arrow task at the single
incongruent 2 condition for the short preparation demonstrated a huge
RTalternating switch costs from the previous experiments. However, the
arrow task in the current experiment did not have any significant RT
alternating switch cost at the single Incongruent 2 condition and it has to
be careful to interpret why backward inhibition in the arrow task
disappeared. Note that previous congruency effect in the arrow task in
2 Word task only showedthe marginal effect of RTalternating switch cost for the
longpreparationinterval.
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the current experiment was non-significant in any cases. Thus, it might
be due to the fact that less interference from the previous trials might
result in the lack of backward inhibition in the arrow task. However, if
so, if the other tasks showed the significant previous congruency effect,
there might be backward inhibition on the current trials. This issue will
be discussed in the next paragraph for the previous congruency effect.
• Congruency effect on the current trials shows how active the
other task sets remain. In all three tasks, they demonstrated big
congruency effect on reaction time and error in both preparation
intervals, suggesting that participants made slower response and more
errors when the activation of current task sets are competing with the
activation of the irrelevant task sets. Congruency of the current task
affected both alternating and double switch trials.
• The Interaction between congruency lind switch type
(alternating switch/double switch) demonstrates that the
interference of the irrelevant task sets could occur the backward
inhibition. In other words, it shows if the alternating and double switch
trials are influenced by the congruency differently and thus if there is
any alternating switch cost. In the experiment 3, there was a significant
interaction between switch type and congruency (p=.Ol) during
CTI= 100 in the arrow task and it was as a result of a huge alternating
switch cost (136ms) at the single incongruent 2 condition. Note that
single incongruent 2 condition is when the current task is incongruent to
the previous trials, suggesting that participants indeed used the
backward inhibition to reduce the interference from previous trials for
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the arrow task. However, in the current experiment, there was no RT
alternating switch cost at the single incongruent 2 condition during the
short preparation interval but there was only interaction on error during
the short preparation interval. For the location task, the current
experiment showed the marginal interaction on reaction time which was
caused by the bigger congruency effect on the alternating switch trials
and this was previous found in the experiment 3. Word task in the
current experiment did not show any significant interaction on reaction
time and error whereas it showed the interaction in both preparation
intervals on reaction time in the experiment 3.
• Previous congruency shows if the residual activation of the task set
from the previous N-l trials affect the performance of the forthcoming
task which is different from N-l trials. If there is an alternating switch
cost when the effect of previous congruency was significant, it is
possible to argue that the interference from the previous trials affect the
backward inhibition. In the current experiment, arrow task did not show
any previous congruency effect on reaction time and error. Word task in
the current experiment was significantly influenced by the previous
congruency in both experiments, however location task did not show any
previous congruency effect in the current task and it showed the
reversed congruency effect (facilitation from the previous incongruent
trials) in the experiment 3. The consistent effect of previous congruency
in the word task indicates that word information processing on the
target presentation is not the source of the competition with the other
task sets. Instead, the response selection of the word task set might be
the source of the competition with that of the other task sets. Allport &
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Wylie (2000) suggested that during task switching stimulus-response
associations are 'constantly modified. Thus, when a stimulus is
presented, previous response-related information of that stimulus is
retrieved. In case of inconsistent information, there is interference that
slow down the response selection. When a response selection is made,
the relevant response-selection rules are activated and the irrelevant
response translation rules are inhibited (Verbruggen et al., 2005). This
implies that the rules that were relevant on the previous trials are
activated to some degree until the next response selection is done.
3) Effect of separate target information
The main interest of the target manipulation in the current task was to see
if the separate display of the task set information on the task would
influence the size of switch cost and alternating switch cost. In order to
answer this, experiment 3 and the current experiment were compared as
they shared the same type of cues (verbal cues). The current experiment
demonstrated the significantly reduced switch cost (24ms switch cost) than
experiment 3 (48ms switch cost), suggesting that the target manipulation of
the current task indeed changed the size of switch cost. Moreover, the
overall RT in the arrow and location task was also dramatically reduced (see
the Figure 34, page 247) whereas the overall RT in the word task between
two experiments had no significant difference. It is assumed that the target
processing between visual/perceptual and verbal information was separately
encoded and the target in the current experiment might help to retrieve the
task rule for arrow and location task. Although there was no change in
alternating switch costs and congruency effect in both experiments, word
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task showed the largest benefit from the long preparation interval in the
current task compared to the experiment 3 while switching tasks, causing
the group effect in CT! and task. This suggests that the word task set from
the current experiment required additional process to overcome the
competition with the other two tasks.
CONCLUSION
The present experiment in this chapter demonstrated reduced switch costs
and no backward inhibition in all three tasks; however, congruency effect
occurred regardless of the target manipulation.
Unlike the previous experiments, arrow task in the current task did not
show any alternating switch cost at the single incongruent 2 condition,
suggesting that the absence of word information inside the arrow stimulus
might reduce the interference from the irrelevant task sets and thus cause
the lack of backward inhibition.
The consistent effect of previous congruency in the word task Indicates that
word information processing on the target presentation Is not the source of
the competition with the other task sets. Instead, the response selection of




Experiment 6: The role of the Cue-target joint
and separate display in switch cost and
backward inhibition
- 6a) with verbal cues, 6b) with arbitrary cues
INTRODUCTION
In the task-switching procedures for studying cognitive control,
participants are indicated by a cue of some kind, either presented explicitly
or coded in memory .In this respect, researchers aim to exercise the control
processes that select the correct task for the current trial in a context in
which task-related processing is simple enough that effects of control-
related processing show through behaviourally (Altmann, 2007).
During the last decade, task switching researches have mainly focused on
the interpretation of the switch cost in order to understand the cognitive
control processes. As a result, there has been ample evidence for switch
cost- - a kind of mental effort - by-products from performing the new
upcoming task when participants have to switch different tasks. However,
there has been another attempt to explain that the switch cost as a side
effect of mental processes is not directly relevant to cognitive control (e.g.,
Allport & Wylie, 2000; Altmann & Gray, 2002; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Wazak,
Hommel, & Allport, 2003).
One alternative that has drawn considerable attention is the
compound-cue model (Arrington & Logan, 2004; Logan & Bundesnen, 2003,
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2004; Logan & Schneider, 2006; Schneider & Logan, 2005, 2007). The
model specifies three function processing stages: task cue encoding, trial
stimulus encoding, and use of the two encoded percepts as a compound cue
for retrieving a response from memory. According to this model, the switch
cost is attributed to repetition priming's facilitation of the encoding of a
repeated task cue (Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; Sohn & Anderson,
2001). The model's innovative premise is that task representations apart
from cues are not necessary for explaining task-switching performance.
This model implies that other effects linked to switching tasks- beyond just
switch cost- should be linked to switching cues (Altmann, 2007). Since the
compound-cue model has been introduced, the role of the cue became the
independent subject for understanding the switch cost. By comparison, the
role of the cue in backward inhibition was overlooked until Arbuthnott
(2005) found the result that the presence of the backward inhibition was
influenced by the verbal cue (ref. chapter 5).
Apart from the role of the cue itself in task switching, the interval between
the cue and the target has been another interest as it allows the
preparation time for the task-set reconfiguration. During the cue-target-
interval (CTI), as the notion of the advance reconfiguration suggests, task
specific preparation involves more than just the characterisation or
preparation of a motor response (Meiran, 1996).
By presenting the cue and target separately, it will allow participants to
prepare all the relative importance of perceptual dimension and changing
response selection criteria, which means that participants will use their
working memory when the cue appears. More interestingly, a closer look at
the recent studies on backward inhibition (Mayr and Keele, 2000;
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Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Dreher & Berman, 2002; Dreher, Kahn &
Berman, 2001; Gade & Koch, 2005; Mayr and Kliegl, 2003; Schuch & Koch,
2003) revealed that the cue remained present during the target
presentation in all studies reporting BI effect (alternating switch costs).
This suggests that cues and their temporal relation to the target play a
crucial role for backward inhibition. In order to examine whether presenting
cues and targets temporally overlapping is indeed important for obtaining
backward inhibition effect, Druey & Hubner (2007) recently conducted
experiments whether participants had to judge either parity (odd/even),
magnitude (less/greater than 5) or position on the number line from 1 to 9
(central [3, 4, 6, 7] /peripheral [1, 2, 8, 9]) of the target digit when there
were only task switch trials. There were only task switch trials and
participants had to press with the index and middle fingers of the right
hand, respectively, served as response keys. 'Even, less, and central' were
mapped to the left button, and 'odd, greater, and peripheral' to the right
button. In their experiment 1, one block had the centrally- appeared- cue
on the screen for 400 ms and disappeared lOOms before target onset,
whereas another block had the centrally- appeared- cue and remained
present until a response was made. Furthermore, they also examined which
task-sequence position was essential regarding the effect of temporal cue-
target overlap on the lag-2 repetition costs by varying the temporal cue-
target overlap across trials in their experiment 2. The results showed that a
reliable BI effect 1 (23ms in their experiment 1 and 40ms in their
experiment 2) occurred for temporally overlapping cues and targets,
whereas no such cost was found for the temporally separated cue. The
I In their article, they used the term lag-2 repetition cost.
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overall RTs were faster in conditions with the temporally separated cues
and targets than in conditions with the temporally overlapping cues and
targets. In order to interpret the result, they suggested that several
mechanisms could be responsible for this effect. For instance, the
forewarning of stimulus onset could be more precise in the no-overlap
condition. Furthermore, in this condition, there was also no need to divide
attention between the cue and target, which could have been advantage.
Finally, if the cue remained present during target presentation, this could
have induced additional rechecking processes in order to select the correct
task set. In any case, they argued that the performance difference between
two blocked overlap conditions in their experiment 1 could not seriously be
interpreted in terms of task-set inhibition. In contrast, they argued that a
cue-target overlap on trial n-2 produced costs for A-B-A sequence relative
to C-B-A sequence could easily be interpreted as indicating backward
inhibition: The task set for task A was inhibited on n-l trial in this case.
Therefore, if the participants had to return to task A on n trial in A-B-A
sequences, they had to overcome the residual inhibition associated with this
task, which produced costs. In summary, their experiments demonstrated
the cue-target joint display is only crucial if the cue-target overlapping
presentation was on n-2 trial. On the other hand, there were some previous
speculations on cue-target joint display and its role in task switching.
For example, the cue-target joint display could affect the retrieval of the
relevant task set when a cue has a strong prior association with a to-be-
performed task and remains visible while the task is performed according to
Mayr & Kliegl (2000).
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Arbuthnott (2005) also suggested that this cue-target joint display would
provide facilitation priming of the relevant response options in a similar
manner to that associated with univalent stimuli. In her previous study
(Arbuthnott and Woodward, 2002), they claimed that when a cue has a
strong prior association with a to-be-performed task, and remains visible
while the task is performed, this compound stimulus display could possibly
aid retrieval of the relevant task set (Mayr & Kliegel, 2000) or provide
facilitory priming of the relevant response options in a manner similar to
that associated with univalent stimuli. If so, this information may reduce
the need for executive control processes to resolve response competition
created by the presentation of bivalent stimuli.
Therefore, it is important to pay attention to the role of the cue
independently and distinguish its encoding process between the cue and the
task stimulus separately in the task switching procedure. In the previous
experimental design, the cue was presented first and then the target joined
without the cue disappearing from the screen. Since the cue-target
remained together, it was not necessary for participants to learn the cue-
target association and remember which task they had to perform. In other
words, participants might not have been using CsI (CTI) to prepare for the
upcoming task-set in advance and they would have been using the cue
presentation for a break between trials rather than for the task information,
thus the purpose of the preparation interval might have been misused.
Furthermore, the cue encoding stage must have been confounded with trial
stimulus encoding once the cue is joint with target and remains together till
the response.
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In order to maximise the effect of CSI (CT!) as an advanced preparation
interval and disentangle the cue encoding and trial encoding processes
separately, cue-target joint screen was changed in the present
experiments. In all the previous experiments, cues appeared on the screen
first and these cues joined with the target when it was displayed on the
screen. In contrast, cues in the current experiment will be separated from
the target when it was on the screen. In other words, cues are only on
screen during the cue-target-interval and it disappears when the target
comes on the next screen. Without encoding the cue and preparing for the
task actively, it is now difficult to perform the task as there is no
information remains after the cue display.
Consequently, if the cue and target are now separately presented, lOOms
and l200ms as an short/ long preparation interval in my paradigm might
cause more contrast effect; participants might struggle to remember which
task they have to perform during the short CT!, causing slower responses
whereas they might get more benefit of having the preparation interval for
the long crt. By using the preparation interval more actively, they might be
more goal-directed to perform the task. More importantly, their task-set
reconfiguration entirely depends on the cue during the CTI because the
stimulus display itself does not include any information.
The purpose of the current experiments was to investigate the role of cue-
target joint and cue-target separate display in switch cost and backward
inhibition if the manipulation of the cue-target separate display influences
the magnitude of the switch cost and alternating switch cost. It is also
interesting to see if the congruency effect would be found regardless of this
cue-target separate manipulation. Experiment 6a used the same verbal cue
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as experiment 3and experiment 6b used the same arbitrary cue as
experiment 4 in order to examine any differences on switch cost and
alternating switch cost by presenting the cue and target separately.
Simultaneously, the results between 6a and 6b were compared by group
analysis to see the cue type effect because it is now possible to disentangle
the cue processing from the target, thus the contrast between the strong




For experiment 6a, twenty participants (8 women) were recruited from the
University of Nottingham through advert, 12 of them were undergraduates
and the rest of them were postgraduate in the psychology department. For
the experiment 6b, twenty participants (14 women) were recruited from the
University of Nottingham through the advert and 12 of them were
undergraduates and the rest of them were postgraduate in the psychology
department. The participants ranged age from 18 to 29 years (M= 22.4,
50=6) in the experiment 6a and age from 20 to 34 (M=26.5, 50=7) in the
experiment 6b. They all reported normal and corrected-to-normal vision
and were all right-handed by self-report except two participants. They
received £4 as an inconvenience after completion of the experiment. The
study took approximately 50 min to complete for each experiment including
the instruction and practice session.
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Stimuli and Procedures
The task, stimuli and study procedures were identical to the previous
experiment 1 (ref. chapter 3) except the fact that separate cue-target
display. The cue for the experiment 6a was the same as for the experiment
3 (all verbal cue) and the cue for the experiment Gb was the same as the
experiment 4 (all arbitrary cue). The cues were presented in the centre of
the screen (Arial font with capital letter, size 20) and disappeared when the
target was presented. In all other respects the procedures was identical to
that of Experiment 1. However, the number of blocks during the
experimental session was reduced from 12 to 9 as I had some feedback
from the participants that it was rather lengthy and tiring to concentrate
during the previous experiments. The example of the experiment sa and 6b
were shown in the figure 37 and 38 respectively.
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Example of experiment 6a
* N-3 (location taskj-s N-2
(arrow task) ~ N-l (word
task) ~ N trials (arrow task)
Time
Figure 37. An example of the time course of task presentation in Experiment
6a. Tasks were described here were three tasks: arrow, location and
word task. The Cue-target-interval (CTI) and Response-Cue-Interval
(RCI) procedure is the same as the previous Exps (see the chapter 2
General method)
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Example of experiment 6b
* N-3 (location task)-7 N-2
(arrow task) -7 N-l (word
task) -7 N trials (arrow task)
Time
Figure 38. An example of the time course of task presentation in Experiment
6b. Tasks were described here were three tasks: arrow, location and
word task. The difference between Exp 6 a and 6 b is to manipulate
the cue. Arbitrary cues are made in order to compare the verbal cue
in Exp 6a. The CT! and RC! procedure is the same as Exp 6a.
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RESULTS
EXD6 a (verbal cues)
1) Effect of task switching
On Reaction Time CRT)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors CTI (100,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrows, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) revealed a significant 3-way interaction (trial type, task and
congruency), [F (4, 74) =2.4, p =.05], and a marginally significant 3-
way interaction (CTI, task and congruency), [F (4, 74) =2.4, p =.06] (see
the Appendix, page 405 table la). This interaction was explored by
conducting three separate 3-way (factors CTI, trial type, and congruency)
repeated measures ANOVAsfor each task. These are reported below.
On Error (010)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors CTI (100,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrow, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction: [F (3, 64)= 1.9,
p = .12] and a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, task and congruency): [
F (3, 58)= 14, p<.OOl] and a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, trial type




































Figure 39. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 39 a) and percent error scores
(figure 39 b) in congruency and trial type in two CT! conditions for the arrow task.
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RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at CTI
=100, [F (1, 19) = 13, P =.002] (77ms of switch cost, switch M = 867
[SE: 36] vs. repeat M= 790 [SE: 28]) but not at CTI=1200, [F (1, 19) =.35,
p =.56] (See Figure 39 a).
There was a significant 2-way interaction between trial type and congruency
at the CTI= 100, [F (2, 50) = 3.9, p=.02] but not the CTI= 1200, [F (2,
44) = .70, p= .52]. The interaction between trial type and congruency at
the CTI= 100 was as a result from the congruency effect at the repeat
trials, [F (2, 46)= 3, p=.05] (78ms of congruency effect, congruent M=
731[SE:37], single incongruent 1 M= 848 [SE: 41], single incongruent 2 M=
766 [SE: 36], double incongruent M= 813 [SE: 39]) and a lack of
congruency effect at the switch trials, [ F (2, 43)= 4.9, p=.l1]. As is clear
from an examination of Figure 39 a, this was as a result of dramatic RT
increase from congruent to single incongruent 1 during the repeat trials,
resulting in no switch cost in the single incongruent 1 condition at CTI= 100.
In both CTI conditions, the effect of congruency was significant at the
CTI=100, [F (2, 36) = 3.5, p =.04] (38ms of congruency effect,
congruent M= 803 [SE: 37], single incongruent 1 M= 838 [SE: 31] vs.
single incongruent 2 M= 800 [SE: 34], double incongruent M= 872 [SE:
36]) and at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 46) =7.3, p =.001] (60ms of
congruency effect, M= 583 [SE: 19], M= 598 [SE: 37], M= 638 [SE: 30] ,
M= 692 [SE: 35]).
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= 2.5, p =.02 but
it was non-significant on the switch trials, t (19)= -.17, p=.87.
At the eT!= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= -1.5, p = .15
and it was also non-significant on the switch trials, t (19)= -.68, p=.sl.
Error (0/0)
A significant difference in error percentage was found at the CTI= 100, [F
(1, 19) = 7.9, P =.01] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 19) = 16, P <.001].
There was a significant 2-way interaction between trial type and
congruency at the CTI=100, [F (2, 44) = 14, P <.001] and CTI=1200, [F
(2, 31)= 3.7, p=.04].
A significant effect of congruency was found at both CTI= 100, [F (2, 50) =
4.1, p=.OlS] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 32) = 8.7, p=.002].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non- significant on the repeat trials, t (16) = 1.1, P
=.30 but it was marginally significant on the switch trials, t (20)= 1.9,
p=.08.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (16)= .64, p
=.53 and on the switch trials, t (16)= 1.8, p=.09.
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Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the arrow task only occurred at the
short preparation interval condition for reaction time whereas there
was a main effect of switch costs in both short and long preparation
interval condition on the error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed on
reaction time and error consistently for both short and long
preparation interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was significant on reaction time for the short preparation
interval and it was caused by the congruency effect on the repeat
trials. The interaction on error was significant for the both
preparation interval.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task occurred on
reaction time during the repeat trials for the short preparation
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Figure 40. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure40 a) and percent error scores
(figure 40 b) in congruency and trial type in two CT! conditions for the location task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
CTI= 100, [F (1, 19)= 21, P <.001] (67ms of switch cost, switch M = 770
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[SE: 3~) vs. repeat M= 703 [SE: 28J) but not at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 19) =
1.8, P =.19] (see Figure 40 a).
A 2-way interaction between trial type and congruency was significant at
the CTI=100, [F (2, 43) = 4, p =.02] but not at the CTI=1200, [F (2, 48)
= 1, p =.38]. The interaction in trial type and congruency was as a result
from more significant congruency effect on the switch trials, [F (2, 42)=8,
p=.OOl] (64ms congruency effect, congruent M= 722 [SE: 28), single
incongruent 1 M= 809 [SE: 32J, single incongruent 2 M= 763 [SE: 38J,
double incongruent M= 785 [SE: 3D)) than on the repeat trials, [F (3,
51)= 4.7, p =.008] (40ms congruency effect, congruent M= 698 [SE: 37J,
single incongruent 1 M= 709 [SE: 31J, single incongruent 2 M= 647 [SE:
28), double incongruent M= 758 [SE: 37]).
The effect of congruency was significant at the CTI=100, [F (3, 51) = 7,
p=.001] (35ms congruency effect, congruent M= 710 [SE: 29), single
incongruent 1 M= 759 [SE: 3D], single incongruent 2 M= 705 [SE: 31J,
double incongruent M= 772 [SE: 33J) and at CTI=1200, [F (2, 47) =5,
p=.007] (46ms congruency effect, congruent M= 492 [SE: 271, single
incongruent 1M= 574 [SE: 291, double incongruent M= 497 [SE: 221, M=
543 [SE: 32]).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= 2.2, P =.04 and
on the switch trials, t (19)= 2.8, p=.Ol.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= 2.7, p = .015
but not on the switch trials, t (19)= 1.6, p=.13.
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Error (0/0)
There was a marginally significant difference in error percentage between
switch and repeat trials at the CTI=100, [F (1, 19)= 4.1, p=.06] and
CTI=1200, [F (1, 19)= 5.2, p=.03].
The interaction between trial type and congruency was not significant at the
CTI=100, [F (1, 30)= 2.5, p=.l1] but it was significant at the CTI=1200,
[F (2, 47)= 3.4, p=.03].
A significant effect of congruency was found at both CTI=100, [F (2, 39)=
15, P <.001] and CTI=1200, [F (2,45)= 7.7, p=.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (16)= -.044,
p =.97 and on the switch trials, t (16)= - .25, p=.81.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (16)= .03, p
=.98 and on the switch trials, t (16)= -.41, p=.68.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the location task occurred on
reaction time for the short preparation interval and it occurred on
error for the short preparation Interval (marginal) and long
preparation interval.
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed on
reaction time and error consistently for both short and long
preparation interval.
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c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was significant on reaction time for the short preparation
interval and it was caused by more congruency effect on switch trials
than repeat trials and it was also significant on error for the long
preparation interval.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task occurred on
reaction time during the repeat trials and switch trials for the short
preparation interval and during the repeat trials for the long
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Figure 41. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 41 a) and percent error scores
(figure 41 b) in congruency and trial type in two CTI conditions for the word task.
RT ems)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
CTI= 100, [F (1, 19)= 7, p =.01] (49ms of switch cost, switch M = 955
[SE: 33J vs. repeat M= 906 [SE: 35J) but not at the CTI= 1200, [F (1, 28) =
.14, P =.71] (see Figure 41 a).
A 2-way interaction in trial type and congruency was non-significant both at
the CTI=100, [F (2, 39) = 1, p =.38] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 38) =.10, p
=.91].
In both CTI conditions, the effect of congruency was significant at the
CTI=100, [F (2, 40)= 23, p<.OOl] (94ms congruency effect, congruent
M= 860 [5E:35J vs. single incongruent 1M= 880 [SE: 41J vs. single
incongruent 2 M= 1014[5£: 33J vs. double incongruent M= 969[5E:31])
and CTI= 1200, [F(2, 44)= 21, p <.01] (72ms of congruency effect, M=
702 [SE: 33J, M= 668 [5E:20J, M= 829 [SE: 38J, M= 825 [SE: 27J).
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= -2.4, p
=.03 but it was significant on the switch trials, t (19)= -4.1, p=.OOl.
At the CT!= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= -4.7, p< .001
and on the switch trials, t (19)= -5.8, p<.OOl.
Error (Olo)
The difference in error percentage between switch and repeat trials was not
significant at the CTI=lOO, [F (1, 19)= .94, p=.34] and CTI=1200, [F (1,
19)= 1.6, p=.22]. There was non-significant 2-way interaction between trial
type and congruency at the CT!=lOO, [F (2, 43)=1, p=.35] and CTI=1200,
[F (2, 37)= 1.4, p=.25].
A significant effect of congruency was found at the CTI= 100, [F (2, 35)=
26, p <.001] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 38)= 20, p <.001].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (16)= 2.2, p
=.04 but not on the switch trials, t (16)= 1.1, p=.30.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (16)= 1.1, p
=.30 and on the switch trials, t (20)= .10, p=.33.
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Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the word task occurred on reaction
time only for the short preparation interval and not on error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the word task was observed on
reaction time and error consistently for both short and long
preparation interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was non-significant on reaction time and error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task occurred on
error during the switch and repeat trials for both preparation interval
and it was occurred on error during the repeat trials for the short
preparation interval.
2) Effect of alternating task
On Reaction Time (ms)
The repeated measures ANOVAwith the factors eTI, switch type, task, and
congruency revealed a significant 4-way interaction, [F (4, 79) =2.6, p
=.04] (see the Appendix, page 406 table 2a). This interaction was explored
by conducting three separate 3-way repeated measures ANOVA for each
task. Eachof these is reported below.
On Errors (0/0)
4-way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors CTI (100, 1200), switch type
(alternating switch, double switch), task (arrow, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
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incongruent) revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction: [F (4,70)= .99,
p= .41] and a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, task and congruency): [F
(4, 71)= 2.8, p=.03] and another significant 3-way interaction (CTI,
switch type and congruency): [F (2, 41)= 4.4, p=.01] (see the Appendix,








































Figure 42. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 42 a) and percent error scores
(figure 42 b) in congruency and switch type in two CT! conditions for the arrow task.
RT (ms)
The effect of alternating switch was non-significant, [F (1, 19) =.71, p =.
41] (19ms alternating switch cost, alternating switch M= 896 [SE: 43] vs.
double switch M= 875 [SE: 34]) both at the CTI= 100 and at the CTI=1200,
[F (1, 19) = 1.7, p=.21] (34ms alternating switch cost, alternating switch
M= 649 [SE: 25] vs. double switch M= 683 [SE: 33]) (see Figure 42 a).
A 2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was significant at
the CTI=100, [F (2, 47) = 5.4, p=.004] and marginally significant at
CTI=1200, [F (2, 46) =2.8, p=.06]. As is clear from an examination of
Figure 42 a the interaction in switch type and congruency at the CTI= 100
was as a result of a large RT difference in alternating and double switch
trials at the single incongruent 2 condition only (184ms of alternating switch
cost, M= 976 [SE: 48] vs. M= 792 [SE: 52]) which was confirmed by a
paired-samples T-test: t (19)= 3.5, p=.002. The marginal interaction in
switch type and congruency at the CTI=1200 was as a result from a
marginally significant RTdifference in alternating and double switch trials at
the double incongruent condition only (-137ms of alternating switch cost,
M= 753 [SE: 41] vs. M= 890 [SE: 73]) which was confirmed by a paired-
samples T-test: t (19)= -1.9, p=.07.
During the en= 100, the effect of congruency was non-significant, [F (2,
38)= 1.5, p=.22] whereas it was significant during the CTI=1200, [F (2,
40) =19, P <.001] (91ms congruency effect, congruent M= 598 [SE: 23],
single incongruent 1 M= 614 [SE: 35], single incongruent 2 M= 632
[SE:21], double incongruent M= 821 [SE: 47]).
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was marginally significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(19)= -1.9, p =.06 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= 1.9, p=.07.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19)= .
.68, p = .51 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= -1.4, p=.19.
Error (0/0)
There was a marginally significant 2-way interaction (switch type and
congruency) at CTI=100, [F (1, 26)= 3, p=.08] and a non-significant 2-
way interaction at CTI=1200, [F (2, 32)=.49, p=.63].
The difference between alternating switch and double switch trials in error
percentage was non-significant at the CTI=100, [F (1, 18)= .25, p= .62]
and CTI=1200, [ F (1, 18) =1.1, p=.30].
The effect of congruency was significant both at CTI=100, [F (2, 43) 5.3,
p=.006] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 42) = 9.2, p=.002].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= .39, p =.70 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= -1.7, p=.10.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= .90, p =.38 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= -1.1, p=.30.
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Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch cost on reaction time and error
did not occur for the arrow task.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time only for
the long preparation interval and on error for both short and long
preparation interval, showing that congruency affected both
alternating switch and double switching trials.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) on reaction time was significant for the
short preparation interval and it was caused by the big alternating
switch cost (184ms) at the single incongruent 2 condition and
reversed alternating switch cost (-137ms) at the double incongruent
condition. It was non-significant on error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task on reaction time
was marginally significant during the alternating and double switch















































Figure 43. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 43 a) and percent error scores





The effect of alternating tasks at the CT!= 100 was non-significant, [F (1,
19) = 1.7, P = .21] (25ms alternating switch cost, alternating minus double
switch, alternating switch M = 813 [SE: 33J vs. double switch M= 788 [SE:
35]). It was also non-significant at CTI =1200, [F (1, 19) =.78, p=.39] (23
ms alternating switch cost, M = 547 [SE: 35J vs. M = 524 [SE: 26J) (see
Figure 43 a).
There was a non-significant 3-way interaction between CTI, switch type and
congruency, [F (3, 52) = 1.7, P =.19]. A 2-way interaction between switch
type and congruency was non-significant at CTI=100, [F (3, 52)= 1, p=.39]
and at CTI=1200, [F (3, 52) = .65, p=.57].
The effect of congruency was significant at CTI=100, [F (3, 50) = 3.5, P
=.025] (67ms congruency effect, congruent M= 750 [SE: 30J, single
incongruent 1 M= 841 [SE: 34J, single incongruent 2 M= 797[SE: 45J,
double incongruent M= 814 [SE: 381) and at CTI=1200, [F (3, 53) = 5.1,
p=.004] (71ms of congruency effect, M= 482 [SE: 351, M= 568 [SE: 321,
M= 522 [SE: 291, M= 570 [SE: 33}).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19)=
.73, p =.47 but it was marginally significant on the double switch trials, t
(19)= 1.8, p=.08.
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At the eTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19)= 1,
P = .33 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= 1.4, p=.16.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
at CTI=100, [F (2, 33)= .50, p=.60] and a non-significant 2-way
interaction at CTI=1200, [F (1, 28)= 1.2, p=.31].
The difference between alternating switch and double switch trials in error
percentage was non-significant at the CTI=100, [F (1, 18)= .78, p= .39]
and CTI=1200, [ F (1,18) =1.1, p=.30].
The effect of congruency was significant both at CTI=100, [F (2, 36)= 16,
p<.OOl] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 37) = 11, p<.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= 1.5, p =.13 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= .41, p=.85.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= -.09, p =.93 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= -.97, p=.34.
Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the location task did not
occur on reaction time and on error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time for both
short and long preparation interval and on error for the long
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preparation interval, showing that congruency affected both
alternating switch and double switching trials.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) on reaction time and error was non-
significant.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task on reaction
time was only marginally significant during the double switch trials
for the short preparation interval but it was non-significant on error.
Word task
a. RT (ms)
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Figure 44. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figurer 44 a) and percent error scores
(figure 44 b) in congruency and switch type in two CTI conditions for the word task.
RT (ms)
The effect of alternating task was non-significant both at the Cf'I> lOO, [F
(1, 19)= .55, p =.46] (16ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch M
= 976 [SE: 38J vs. double switch M= 960[5E: 38J) and at the eT!= 1200, [F
(1, 19) = .001, p =.97] (Oms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch
M = 782 [SE: 30J vs. double switch M = 782 [SE: 29J) (see Figure 44 a).
There was a non-significant 3-way interaction (eTI, switch type and
congruency) for the word task, [F (3,50) = .48, p=.69].
A 2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was non-
significant at eTI= 100, [F (2, 41) = 1.6, p=.20] and at eT!= 1200, [F (3,
54) = .14, p=.93].
The effect of congruency was significant at cri- 100, [F (2, 39) = 16, P
<.001] (82ms of congruency effect, congruent M= 906 [SE: 39J, single
incongruent 1 M= 889 [SE: 42J, single incongruent 2 M= 1062 [SE: 45],
double incongruent M= 1014 [SE: 37]) and at eT!=1200, [F (2, 43) = 14,
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p <.001] (lOOms of congruency effect, M= 712 [SE: 36J, M= 706 [SE: 32],
M= 859 [SE: 36J, M; 852 [SE: 33]).
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19)= -4.7,
p <.001 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= -2.3, p=.03.
At the eT!= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (19)= -3.2,
p = .005 and on the double switch trials, t (19)= -4.5, p<.OOl.
Error (010)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (switch type and congruency)
at eT!= 100, [F (2, 39)= 1.6, p=.22] and a marginally significant 2-way
interaction at CTI=1200, [F (2, 36)= 2.6, p=.08].
The difference between alternating switch and double switch trials in error
percentage was non-significant at the CTI=100, [F (1, 18)= .05, p= .82]
and CTI=1200, [ F (1, 18) =.65, p=.43].
The effect of congruency was significant both at CTI=100, [F (2, 44)= 9,
p<.OOl] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 39) = 11, p<.OOl].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)= .82, p = -.22 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= .99, p=.33.
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At the eT!= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(18)=1.2, p =.24 and on the double switch trials, t (18)= 1.2, p=.25.
Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the word task did not
occur on reaction time and on error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time for both
short and long preparation interval and on error for the long
preparation interval, showing that congruency affected both
alternating switch and double switching trials.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) on reaction time was non-significant and
on error it was only marginally significant during the long
preparation interval.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task on reaction time
was significant during the alternating and double switch trials for
both preparation intervals but it did not occur on error.
Exp 6 b (arbitrary cues)
1) Effect of Task switching
On Reaction Iime CRIl
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors CTI (100,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrow, location, word), and
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congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 22, double
incongruent) revealed a significant 4-way interaction (CTI, trial type, task
and congruency), [F (4, 57) =3.8, p =.007] (see the Appendix, page 407
table la). This interaction was explored by conducting three separate 3-way
(factors CTI, trial type, and congruency) repeated measures ANOVAs for
each task. These are reported below.
On Error COlo)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVA with factors CTI (100,
1200), trial type (switch, repeat), task (arrow, location, word), and
congruency (congruent, single incongruent 1, single incongruent 2, double
incongruent) revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction: [F (4, 63)= 1.6,
p = .19] and a significant 2-way interaction (CTI and task): [ F (2, 28)=
3.3, p=.05] and a marginally significant 2-way interaction (CTI and








































Figure 45. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 45 a) and percent error scores
(figure 45 b) in congruency and trial type in two CT! conditions for the arrow task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at CTI
=100, [F (1, 17) = 16, P =.001] (58ms switch cost, switch M = 1033
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[SE: 63] vs. repeat M= 875 [SE: 55]) but not at CTI=1200, [F (I, 17) =.18,
p =.67] (See Figure 45 a).
There was a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, trial type and congruency),
[F (3, 45) =7.4, P <.001] which resulted from two effects which impacted
CTI=100 but not CTI=1200. Thus, there was a significant 2-way interaction
between trial type and congruency at the CTI= lOO, [F (2, 41) = S.S,
p<.OOl] but not the CTI=1200, [F (2, 38) = 2.0, p= .14].
As is clear from an examination of Figure 45 a, this was as a result of
dramatic RT differences between switch and repeat trials at the congruent
and single incongruent 2 condition. These are confirmed by Paired-Samples
T- test between switch and repeat trials for each congruent condition at the
CTI=100: A significant RT difference between switch and repeat trials
occurred at the congruent condition, t (20)= = 6.4 , p<.OOl (292ms
switch cost, switch M= 112 [SE: 92] vs. repeat M= 815 [SE: 58]) and single
incongruent 2 condition, t (20)= -5.1, p <.001 (277ms switch cost, M=
1122 [SE: 75] vs. M= 835 [SE: 83]) but not at the single incongruent 1,
t(20)= -4.6, p=.65 (64ms switch cost, M= 1011 [SE: 72] vs. M= 943 [SE:
72]) and double incongruent condition, t (17)= .11, p=.91 (39ms switch
cost, M= 1034 [SE: 83] vs. M= 995 [SE: 103]).
In both CTI conditions, the effect of congruency was non- significant at the
CTI=100, [F (2, 39) = 1.4, p =.24] but it was significant at the CTI=1200,
[F (2, 41) =5.6, p =.005] (105ms of congruency effect, M= 614 [SE: 35],
M= 643 [SE: 41], M= 736 [SE: 49], M= 778 [SE: 66]).
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was marginally significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= 108,
p =008 and it was significant on the switch trials, t (20)= -300, p=0007.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (18)= -1. 7, P = .11
but it was significant on the switch trials, t (20)= -206, p=0017.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CTI=100, [F (2, 26)= .15, p=.82] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 31)=.92,
p=.41].
The difference between switch and repeat trials in error percentage was
non-significant at the CTI=100 [F (1, 16)= .003, p= .96] and it was
marginally significant CTI=1200, [ F (1, 16) =305, p=o08).
The effect of congruency was significant both at eTI= 100, [F (2, 31) =
506, p=o008] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 25) = 408, p=o02].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= .66, p
=.52 and on the switch trials, t (20)= .33, p=.74.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= .51, p
=.62 and on the switch trials, t (20)= .74, p=.47.
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Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the arrow task only occurred on
reaction time for the short preparation interval and it was only
marginally significant on error for the short preparation interval.
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed on
reaction time only for the long preparation interval and it was
observed on error for both preparation intervals.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) on reaction time was only significant for the short preparation
interval and it was caused by the big switch cost at the congruent
condition (292ms) and at the single incongruent 2 condition
(277ms). It was non-significant on error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task on reaction time
was marginally significant during the repeat trials and it was
significant during the switch trials for the short preparation interval.
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Figure 46. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 46 a) and percent error scores
(figure 46 b) in congruency and trial type in two eT! conditions for the location task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
eT!= 100, [F (1, 16)= 20, p =.005] (132ms of switch cost, switch M =
972 [SE: 65J vs. repeat M= 840 [SE: 53J) but not at the eT!= 1200, [F (1,
18) = .03, p =.86] (see Figure 46 a).
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A 2-way interaction between trial type and congruency was non-significant
at the CTI=100, [F (2,38) = 1.8, P =.17] and at the CTI=1200, [F (2,35)
= 1.1, P =.35].
The effect of congruency was marginally significant at the CTI=100, [F (2,
37) = 2.9, p=.06] (75ms of congruency effect, M= 849 [SE: 59], M= 955
[SE: 63], M= 908 [SE: 62], M= 910 [SE: 61]) and it was significant at
CTI=1200, [F (2, 41) =5.6, p=.005] (56ms congruency effect, M=562
[SE: 41], M= 652 [SE: 43], M= 553 [SE: 45], M= 648 [SE: 57]).
The E"ect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (20)= 3.9, p=.OOl but
not on the repeat trials, t (18)= .06, p =.95.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= 3.2, p = .005
but not on the switch trials, t (20)= 1.7, p=.10.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CTI=100, [F (2, 36)= 1.0, p=.38] and CTI=1200, [F (2,27)= 1.1,
p=.32].
The difference between switch and repeat trials in error percentage was
non-significant at the CTI=100 [F (1,16)= 2.3, p= .15] and CTI=1200, [ F
(1, 16) =.03, p=.86].
The effect of congruency was significant both at CTI=100, [F (1, 23)= 7.5,
p=.006] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 21) = 4.3, p=.04).
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was marginally significant on the repeat trials, t (20)=
.32, P =.75 but not on the switch trials, t (20)= -.44, p=.66.
At the eT!= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= -6.3, p
<.001 and it was marginally significant on the switch trials, t (20)= 1.9,
p=.07.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the location task on reaction time
was only significant for the sort preparation interval whereas it was
non-significant on error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed on
reaction time and error consistently for both short and long
preparation interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was non-significant on reaction time and error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task was only
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Figure 47. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 47 a) and percent error scores
(figure 47 b) in congruency and trial type in two CT! conditions for the word task.
RT (ms)
A significant difference between switch and repeat trials was found at the
CTI= 100, [F (1, 19)= 9, p =.007] (BOms of switch cost, switch M = 1074
[SE: 46) vs. repeat M= 994 [SE: 50)) and at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 18) =
300
7.7, P =~012] (30ms of switch cost, switch M = 771 [SE: 35] vs. repeat M
= 741 [SE: 34]) (see Figure 47 a).
A 2-way interaction in trial type and congruency was non-significant both at
the CTI=100, [F (2, 43) =.15, p =.88] and CTI=1200, [F (3, 51) =.81, p
=.50].
In both CT! conditions, the effect of congruency was significant at the
CTI=100, [F (2, 36)= 14, p<.OOl] (122ms of congruency effect,
congruent M= 942 [5E:43], single incongruent 1 M= 965 [SE: 54], single
incongruent 2 M= 1129 [SE: 54], double incongruent M= 1098 [5E:52])
and CTI= 1200, [F(2, 51)= 22, p <.001] (81ms of congruency effect, M=
695 [5E:33], M= 690 [SE: 36], M= 807 [SE: 41], M= 832 [SE: 36]).
The E"ect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the switch trials, t (20)= -3.7, p=.OOl
but not on the repeat trials, t (20)= -1.S, p =.15.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (19)= -4.1, p = .001
and on the switch trials, t (20)= -4.9, p<.OOl.
Error (0/0)
There was a non-significant 2-way interaction (trial type and congruency) in
both at CTI=100, [F (2,38)= 1.1, p=.36] and CTI=1200, [F (2,42)=.79,
p=.47].
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The difference between switch and repeat trials in error percentage was
non-significant at the CTI:;::100[F (1, 16) :;::.96,p:;::.34] and CTI=1200, [F
(1, 16) :;::1.6,p=.22].
The effect of congruency was significant both at CTI:;::100,[F (2, 31)= 7.5,
p=.002] and CTI:;::1200,[F (2, 26) = 4.5, p=.03].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI:;::100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= 3.0, p
=.007 and it was marginally significant on the switch trials, t (20)= 1.8,
p=.08.
At the eTI:;:: 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was significant on the repeat trials, t (20)= 2.0, p
=.05 and on the switch trials, t (20)= 2.9, p=.008.
Summary
a. A main effect of switch costs for the word task on reaction time
occurred for both preparation intervals but not on error.
b. A main effect of congruency for the arrow task was observed on
reaction time and error consistently for both short and long
preparation interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and trial type (switch/repeat
trials) was non-significant on reaction time and error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task on reaction time
was significant during the switch trials for the short preparation
interval and during the switch and repeat trials for the long
preparation interval. It was significant on error during the repeat
trials and it was marginally significant during the switch trials for the
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short preparation interval. It was also significant during the switch
and repeat trials for the long preparation interval.
2) Effect of alternating task
On Reaction Time (ms)
The repeated measures ANOVAwith the factors eTI, switch type, task, and
congruency revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction, [F (3, 45) =.96, p
=.42] and a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, task and congruency), [F (4,
61) = 1.7, p=.16] (see the Appendix, page 408 table 2a). This interaction
was explored by conducting three separate 3-way repeated measures
ANOVAfor each task. Each of these is reported below.
On Error (0/0)
Analysis of the 4-way repeated measured ANOVAwith factors CTI, switch
type, task and congruency revealed a non-significant 4-way interaction, [F
(2, 41) = .40, p=.72], a significant 3-way interaction (CTI, switch type and
congruency), [F (2, 28)= 4.1, p=.03] and a significant 2-way interaction
(CTI and task) [F (2, 29)= 6.4, p=.006] (see the Appendix, page 408
table 2b). This 3-way interaction was explored by presenting three separate
figures by each task as these figures were previously presented on the














































Figure 48. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 48 a) and percent error scores
(figure 48 b) in congruency and switch type in two CT! conditions for the arrow task.
RT (rns)
The effect of alternating switch was non-significant, [F (1, 15) =.35, P
=.56] (25ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch M= 1183 [SE:
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94) vs. double switch M= 1009 [SE: 40)) both at the CTI= 100 and at the
CTI=1200, [F (1, 15) =.49, p;:::.49] (55ms of alternating switch cost,
alternating switch M= 711 [SE: 59) vs. double switch M= 656 [SE: 34])
(see Figure 48 a).
A 2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was non-
significant at the CTI=100, [F (2, 35)= .60, p=.57] and at CTI=1200, [F
(2,31)=1.4, p=.25].
The effect of congruency was marginally significant at the CTI=100, [F (2,
37)= 2.9, p=.06] (50ms congruency effect, M= 1133 [SE: 106), M=1075
[SE: 86), M= 1287 [SE: 99), M=1187 [SE: 103) and it was significant at
the CTI=1200, [F (2, 39)= 7.0, p=.OOl] (52ms congruency effect, M=
645 [SE: 38), M= 625 [SE: 41), M= 641 [SE: 25), M= 925 [SE: 55)).
At the CTI=100, alternating switch trials were marginally affected by the
factor congruency, [F (2, 35)= 2.5, p=.08] (111ms congruency effect, M=
1100 [SE: 127), M= 1095 [SE: 103), M= 1361 [SE: 115), M= 1176 [SE:
117]) whereas double switch trials were not affected by the congruency, [F
(2, 30)= .76, p=.48].
At the CTI;:::1200,double switch trials were only significantly affected by the
factor congruency, [F (2, 28)= 8.6, p=.OOl] (116ms congruency effect,
M= 569 [SE: 33), M= 576 [SE: 43), M= 647 [SE: 36), M= 832 [SE: 74])
whereas alternating switch trials were not affected by the congruency, [F
(2, 37)= 2, p=.14].
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (15)= -3.2,
p =.006 but not on the double switch trials, t (15)= -1.2, p=.23.
At the CTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t (15)=
.57, P = .57 and on the double switch trials, t (15)= -1.4, p=.18.
Error (0/0)
A difference in alternating switch and double switch trials was not significant
either at CTI=100, [F (1, 16) =.36, p=.56] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 16)=.70,
P=.41]. A significant effect of congruency was found in both CTI=100, [F
(2, 32)= 6.1, p=.006] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 35)= 13, p <.001]. The
interaction in switch type and congruency was non-significant at the
CTI=100, [F (2, 30)= 1.5, p=.24] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 33)= .77, p=.47].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(20)= 1.2, p =.25 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= .98, p=.34.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(20)= -.48, p =.64 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= .60, p=.56.
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Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the arrow task did not
occur on reaction time and error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time was
marginal for short preparation interval and significant for the long
preparation interval whereas it was significant for both preparation
intervals on error.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) on reaction time and error was non-
significant.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the arrow task was only
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Figure 49. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 49 a) and percent error scores
(figure 49 b) in congruency and switch type in two CT! conditions for the location
task.
RT (ms)
The effect of alternating tasks at the CTI= 100 was non-significant, [F (1,
15) = .00, p =.99] and at CT! =1200, [F (1, 15) =1.2, p=.29]. (76ms
alternating switch cost, M = 580[5E: 53] vs. M = 504 [SE: 26]) (see Figure
49 a).
A significant 2-way interaction between switch type and congruency was
non-significant at CT!=100, [F (3, 39)= 1.9, p=.lS] and at CTI=1200, [F
(2, 38) = .46, p=.68].
The effect of congruency was significant at CTI=1200, [F (2, 32) = 7.5,
p=.002] (76ms of congruency effect, M= 478 [SE: 22], M= 601 [SE: 33],
M= 507 [SE: 24], M= 583 [SE: 36]) but not at CTI= 100, [F (2, 31) = 2.1, P
=.14].
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The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the eTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was marginally significant on the double switch trials, t (15)=
2.0, p=.07 but not, t (15)= 1.7, P =.10.
At the eTI= 1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (15)= 3.0,
p = .008 but not on the double switch trials, t (15)= 1.6, p=.13.
Error (010)
There was no significant difference in error percentage between alternating
switch and double switch trials was found at the eTI= lOO, [F (1, 16)= 2.9,
p=.l1] and at the CTI=1200, [F (1, 16)= .00, p=.99]. A significant effect
of congruency was found at the CTI=100, [F (1, 24)= 7.0, p =.007] and
marginally significant effect of congruency at the CTI=1200, [ F (1,
24)=3.1, P =.07]. The interaction in switch type and congruency was non-
significant at the CTI=100, [F (2, 32)= .42, p=.66] and CTI=1200, [F (2,
29)= .69, p=.49].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= lOO, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(20)= 1.2, p =.25 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= .98, p=.34.
At the CTI= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(20)= -.48, p =.64 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= .60, p=.56.
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Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the location task did
occur neither on reaction time nor on error.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time for short
preparation interval and on error for both preparation intervals,
showing that congruency affected both alternating switch and double
switching trials.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) on reaction time and error was non-
significant.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the location task was
marginally significant during the alternating switch trials and it was































Figure 50. Mean RTs (and standard errors) (figure 50 a) and percent error scores
(figure 50 b) in congruency and switch type in two CTI conditions for the word task.
RT (ms)
The effect of alternating task was non-significant both at the eTI= lOO, [F
(1, 15)= .63, p =.44] (37ms of alternating switch cost, alternating switch M
= 1191 [SE: 74J vs. double switch M= 1154 [SE: 48J) and at the
eTI=1200, [F (1, 15) = 1.4, P =.26] (88ms of alternating switch cost,
alternating switch M = 848 [SE: 62J vs. double switch M = 760 [SE: 32J)
(see Figure 50 a).
The effect of congruency was significant both at the CTI=100, [F (2, 32)
= 5.5, P =.008] (106 ms congruency effect, M= 1093 [SE: 56J, M= 1087
[SE: 64J, M= 1308 [5E:83J, M= 1202 [SE: 74J) but not at the eTI= 1200,
[F (1, 22)= .80, p =.43]. The congruency effect at the CTI=100 was as a
result from the fact that alternating switch trials were marginally affected
by the congruency, [F (2, 3S)= 2.S, p=.08] (173ms of congruency effect,
M= 1061 [SE: 88J, M= 1094 [SE: 82], M= 1422 [SE: 134], M= 1185 [SE:
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108]) whereas double switch trials were not affected by the congruency, [F
(2, 30)= .76, p=.48].
The interaction in switch type and congruency was non-significant both at
the CTI=100, [F (2, 34)= 1.6, p=.21] and CTI=1200, [F (1, 21)= 1.1, p=.
32].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI=100, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the alternating switch trials, t (15)= -2.7,
p =.02 but not on the double switch trials, t (15)= -1.5, p=.16.
At the CTI= .1200, RT difference between single incongruent 1 and single
incongruent 2 was significant on the double switch trials, t (20)= -4.9, p
<.001 but not on the alternating switch trials, t (15)= -.49, p = .63.
Error (010)
A difference in alternating switch and double switch trials was not
significant at CTI=100, [F (1, 16) = 1.1, p =.30] and CTI=1200, [F (1,
16)= .82, p =.38]. A significant effect of congruency was found at both
CTI=100, [F (2, 36) = 6.6, p=.003] and CTI=1200, [F (2, 30)= 4.2, p
=.025]. The interaction in switch type and congruency was significant at
the CTI= 1200, [F (2, 32)= 4.4, p=.02] but not at the CTI= 100, [F (2,
38)= 1, p=.38].
The Effect of Previous Congruency
At the CTI= 100, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(20)= 1.2, p =.25 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= .98, p=.34.
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At the en= 1200, mean error percentage between single incongruent 1 and
single incongruent 2 was non-significant on the alternating switch trials, t
(20)= -.48, p =.64 and on the double switch trials, t (20)= .60, p=.56.
Summary
a. A main effect of alternating switch costs for the word task did not
occur on reaction time. Note that there was 88ms of alternating
switch cost in the long preparation interval but it was not statistically
significant. It was observed on error for the short preparation
interval.
b. A main effect of congruency was observed on reaction time only for
the short preparation interval and on error for the long preparation
interval.
c. The interaction between congruency and switch type (alternating
switch/double switch trials) was non-significant on reaction time
error.
d. The effect of previous congruency for the word task on reaction time
was significant during the alternating switch trials for the short
preparation interval and during the double switch trials for the long
preparation interval. It was non-significant on error.
3) Effect of cues (exp 6a vs. exp 6b)
On Reaction Time (ms)
• For switchl repeat trials
There was a group effect in 4 way interaction (CTI, trial type task and,
congruency) [F (5, 145)= 2.9, p =.02] and group effect in CTI and trial
type, [F (1, 31)= 7.9, p=.009]. The group effect in 4-way interaction was
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as a result from a significant 4-way interaction in the experiment 6b with
arbitrary cues, [F (4, 57)= 3.8, p=.007] but not in the experiment 6a
with verbal cues, [F (4, 73)= 1.5, p=.22]. The group effect in CTI and trial
type was as a result from a big switch cost during the CTI= 100 in the
experiment 6b (139ms switch cost, switch M= 1054 [SE: 48J, repeat M=
915 [SE: 44J) compared to the experiment 6a (58ms switch cost, switch
M= 852 [SE: 41J, M= 794 [SE: 38J) whereas the switch costs in both
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Figure 51. Mean RT switch cost (and standard error) during the two preparation
intervals for experiment 6a and 6b.
Thus, there was a group effect of trial type, [F (1, 31)=7.1, p=.01]
because the experiment 6b (l19ms switch cost, switch M= 857 [SE: 39J,
repeat M= 738 [SE: 33J) demonstrated more switch costs than experiment
6a (77ms switch cost, switch M= 793ms [SE: 36J, repeat M= 738 [SE:
33J). The main effect of group was significant, [F (1, 31)= 4.1, p=.OS]
(exp 6a, M= 727 [SE: 32J vs. exp 6b M= 825 [SE: 37J) (see the Appendix,
page 392, table 8).
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• For alternating / double switch trials
There was only a main effect of group, [F (1, 33) = 8.6, p= .006] (exp 6a
M= 764 [SE: 32] vs. exp 6b M= 905 [SE: 35]) as the experiment 6b
demonstrated much slower RT than experiment 6b (see the Appendix, page
392, table 8).
On Error COlo)
• For switch/ repeat trials
There was a group effect in eTI, trial type, task and congruency, [F (4,
151)= 9.2, p<.OOl]. As the mean of error percentage for each experiment
has already been discussed previously by demonstrating the figures for each
task, The main effect of group was significant, [F (1, 36)= 4.2, p=.OS].
• For alternating switch/double switch trials
There was no group interaction with each factors, however, the main effect
of group was significant, [F (1, 34)= 5.3, p=.03] because the mean error
percentage of exp 6b was significantly bigger than exp 6 a (exp 6a: 5% vs.
exp 6b: 11%).
DISCUSSION
The main aim of this experiment was to see whether separate display
of the cue and target influence the size of switch cost and backward
inhibition as well as congruency effect. In addition, experiment 6a and 6 b
were compared to see the cue type effect between verbal and arbitrary cues
for all three tasks.
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1) Effect of task switching
• Switch costsfor the long preparation interval in all three tasks were
dramatically reduced in terms of reaction time compared with the short
preparation interval, suggesting that participants used long preparation
interval for advanced configuration process based on the hypothesis that
preparation effect indicates the time required to establish a task set. In
all three tasks, main effect of switch cost was only significant in the
short preparation interval for the reaction time whereas it was significant
for both preparation interval for the error except for the word task ( only
significant at the long eT! for the error), suggesting that participants still
made errors while making a fast response (cf. speed-accuracy trade-
off). This pattern was similar to the previous experiment 1.
• Congruency effect on the current trials shows how active the
other task sets remains. In all three tasks, they demonstrated big
congruency effect in reaction time and error, suggesting that
participants made slower response and more errors when it was
incongruent regardless of the preparation interval. Note that significant
congruency effects were observed in both switch and repeat trials.
Having congruency effects during the repeat trials for all three tasks
suggests that the persistent activation of the irrelevant task set indeed
interfere with the current task set because there is no need to suppress
the irrelevant task set during the repeat trials, causing the other task
set to be persistently activated.
• The interaction between congruency and tris! type
(switch/repeat) shows whether switch trials are more influenced by
the repeat trials. If so, the bigger congruency effect on the switch trials
suggests that switching different tasks are influenced by the level of
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activation from the other task sets on the current trials. In the current
experiment, there was only significant interaction for the arrow task
during the short preparation interval which was as a result from the lack
of switch cost at the single incongruent 1 condition and the significant
switch cost at the rest of congruent condition (congruent, single
incongruent 2 and double incongruent). At this stage, it is not clear why
single incongruent 1 condition caused no switch cost during the short
preparation interval for the arrow task.
• Previous congruencyshows that the task set from the previous N-
1 trials remains in a state of residual activation. In other words, the
perslstinq activation of previous task set interfered with a subsequent
task switch, depending on whether it activates a response that is the
same as or different from the response by the new task set on the
current trials. In the arrow task, the repeat trials were only influenced
by the previous congruency during the short preparation interval on
reaction time. However, in the location task, the switch trials were only
influenced by the previous congruency during the long preparation
interval on reaction time and error. In the word task, both switch and
repeat trials in any preparation interval (short and long) were influenced
by previous congruency on reaction time.
2) Effect of alternating task
• Alternating switch costswas only observed in the arrow task
during the short preparation interval at the single incongruent 2
condition (136ms) whereas the rest of tasks did not show any significant
alternating switch cost on reaction time and error. Note that there were
68ms of alternating switch cost at the single incongruent 2 and 71ms of
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alternating switch cost at the congruent condition for the location task
when the preparation interval was 1200ms.
• Congruency effect on the current trials shows how active the
other task sets remain. In all three tasks, they demonstrated big
congruency effect in reaction time and error, suggesting that
participants made slower response and more errors when it was
incongruent regardless of the preparation interval.
• The interaction between congruency and switch type
(alternating switch/double switch) occurred only on reaction time
not on error in all three tasks. In the arrow task, the interaction was
only significant at the long preparation interval which was as a result
from a huge reversed alternating switch cost (-122ms) at the single
incongruent 2 condition. In the location task, the interaction was only
significant at the short preparation interval which was as a result from
the significant congruency effect on the alternating switch trials and a
non-significant congruency effect on the double switch trials. In the
word task, the interaction was significant in both preparation intervals as
the current congruency had more impact on the alternating switch trials
than double switch trials.
• Previous congruencysignificantly affected the double switch trials
during the long preparation interval for the arrow task on reaction time
and it also marginally affected the alternating switch trials during the
long preparation interval on error. For the location task, it only occurred
on error but the previous congruency on the double switch trials at the
short preparation interval and on the alternating switch trials at the long
preparation interval were opposite direction. In other words, the error
was larger on the current location task when the previous trials were
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congruent compared to when the previous trials were incongruent. This
suggests that participants had more difficulties performing the location
task when it was congruent to the previous task. The word task was also
affected by the previous congruency in both switch trials during the both
preparation intervals on reaction time.
3) Effect of cues
Exp 6 b with arbitrary cues had a huge switch cost (139ms switch cost)
compared to exp 6 a with verbal cues (S8ms switch cost) during the short
preparation interval, suggesting that exp 6 b required a high working
memory load for learning the meaning of cues during the short eT!.
However, there was no group interaction in alternating switch cost. Overall,
the RT was slower in the exp 6b than in the exp 6 a resulted in a main
effect of group.
CONCLUSION
The present experiment in this chapter demonstrated the substantial
amount of switch costs and congruency effect on the current trials whereas
the alternating switch costs were not observed. Having a separate display
between cue and target indeed might require the extra time to overcome
the inhibition from the previous trials but the current result demonstrated
that this cue-target separate presentation did not cause backward
inhibition. One speculation is that there might be another inhibitory control
mechanism on the response selection level in task switching, yet alternating
switch costs might be not the right measurement in this particular
experiment paradigm. Further study is required to examine the separate
inhibitory mechanism apart from the backward inhibition.
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· Chapter 9
Cognitive model for backward inhibition
in task switching
Since the task switching paradigm has been introduced to understand
the cognitive control, various models of task switching have been proposed
to explain the consistent finding that even a simple switch between
different tasks causes participants to take extra time to complete the task
(known as 'switch cost'). In this chapter, some of earlier studies on
modelling in task switching will be discussed and a new backward inhibition
model based on parallel-distributed processing (PDP) model which I
developed for my experimental paradigm will be proposed.
A. Cognitive models in task switching
The basic and simple question among researchers who study task
switching must be to explain switch costs. In the past decade, two primary
account have emerged which I already introduced in the first chapter: task-
set reconfiguration and task set inertia (task set priming). Although the
current trend in task switching now accepts the idea that both accounts are
not mutually exclusive, there has been ample amount of work to develop
the cognitive model either to support one of two accounts or to combine
both while the classical debate on switch cost has become less dominant.
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For example, one class of early models suggests that switch costs reflect an
additional control reconfiguration needed to reconfigure the system for the
switch to a new task. This model has two variants, differing in the stage
where the control processes takes place.
Rubinstein et al. (2001) suggested that one of the switch-specific control
processes (e.g., rule activation) is inserted between the stimulus and
identification and response stages, causing a delay in the onset of response
selection on switch trials (Hiesh & Liu, 2005). According to Rubinstein et al.
(2001)'s model, performance during the successive-task procedure entails
two complementary sets of stages: executive control processes and task
processes. For the executive control processes, they included two distinct
stage, 1) goal shifting and 2) rule activation, which are accomplished
through executive production rules. Together, goal shifting and rule
activation respectively ensure that the contents of declarative and
procedural working memory are appropriately configured for the task at
hand. For the task processes, they assumed that task processes are used
for performing individual perceptual-motor and cognitive tasks under both
single-task and multiple-task conditions. In their model, they included three
principal stages, stimulus identification, response selection and movement
production, which operate on the basis of information in declarative and
procedural working memory (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b; Sternberg,
1969). In their four experiments, participants had to alternate between
different tasks or performed the same task repeatedly. The tasks for two of
the experiments required responding to geometric objects in terms of
alternative classification rules, and the tasks for the other two experiments
required solving arithmetic problems in terms of alternative numerical
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operations. Performance was measured as a function of whether the tasks
were familiar or unfamiliar, the rules were simple or complex, and visual
cues were present or absent about which tasks should be performed. Task
alternating yielded the switch costs that increased with rule complexity but
decreased with task cuing. They found that rule activation takes more time
for switching from familiar to unfamiliar tasks than for switching from
unfamiliar to familiar task.
On the other hand, Meiran (2000) suggested that the control processes
(e.g., Stimulus-Set Biasing) is inserted soon after the stimulus onset and
before the stimulus identification stage. His assumption was that when
stimuli and responses are bivalent, switching between stimulus
classification tasks entails a change in the interpretation of stimuli,
responses or both. In other words, the target stimuli as well as the
responses are bivalent. Specifically, a given target stimulus could be
classified both in up-down terms and in right-left terms. Similarly, a given
physical response could serve to indicate a nominal response to either task,
e.g., up, belonging to the up-down task, and left, belonging to the right-left
task. In his model, the important concept was the task sets which govern
how mental representations are formed. He suggested that there are three
task sets, a stimulus task set (S-Set), and two response task sets (R-sets)
and the role of the task sets is to deal with the bivalent aspects of the task.
He also argued that this would be done through the biasing of the mental
representation in favour of one dimension. For example, applying the
appropriate S-Set to the upper-left target stimulus results in a mental
representation where 'up' is emphasised relative to 'left'. His model
suggested that the preparatory switching cost reflects the duration of the S-
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Set biasing stage. S-Set biasing is required only when the stimulus are
bivalent, not when they are univalent.
The other class of models, however, suggests that both switch and repeat
trials entail the same set of processes, but that on switch trials, at least one
process is prolonged by a carry-over effect from the previous trials (Allport
et al., 1994; Allport &. Whylie, 2000; Sohn &. Anderson, 2001) . Despite
their emphasis on the priming/ carry-over effect, they also include the
possibility that endogenous executive processes do exist, which may
reconfigure task processing systems before or after stimulus onset. For
example, Sohn &. Carlson (2000) compared switch and repeat trials with
and without foreknowledge- a kind of pre-information about the task- about
whether to switch or repeat a task. The author (2000) suggested that an
example of executive control is the foreknowledge effect. In other words,
when a task goal is specified in advance, the task can benefit significantly
from the endogenous preparation on the basis of foreknowledge even if the
stimuli to be processes are not yet available (Carlson &. Ludy, 1992; Sohn &.
Carlson, 1998). They observed that the cost decreased with RSI and
practice regardless of foreknowledge. In other words, the amount of switch
cost did not depend on foreknowledge. The results clearly showed that no
interaction in task type (switch vs. repeat) and foreknowledge.
The reduction was greater with foreknowledge than without foreknowledge.
These results suggest that switch costs with foreknowledge may consist of
both inadequate preparation and repetition benefit but switch costs without
foreknowledge may reflect repetition benefit only.
The premise was that task preparation can be achieved by giving people
foreknowledge that they would perform a specific task; its effect reflects
endogenous executive control whereas task repetition could be achieved by
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having people perform the same task; its effects without foreknowledge of
repetition reflect exogenous automatic control. Their results supported the
view that switch costs represent an automatic carry-over effect that is
unaffected by advance reconfiguration. They suggested that although
foreknowledge allows preparation of both repeat and switch tasks, repeat
the same task has benefits over task switching regardless of
foreknowledge. In particular, Sohn & Anderson (2001) soon proposed ACT-
R (adaptive control of thought-rational) model accommodating both
preparation and priming effect with two independent processes: 1) conflict
resolution among productions - declarative component and 2) decay of
chunk activation - procedural component. Precisely, declarative component
will hold information such as the mapping of the colour onto task or the
mapping of categories (e.g., odd and even) and repetition of such
declarative components will provide the repetition priming benefit with or
without foreknowledge. The procedural component will be responsible for
setting the goal to do one task or another and then for the preparation for
the task switching during RSI.
On the other hand, Ruthruff et al. (2001) argued for the existence of a task
set configuration stage, but proposed that this stage is needed only when
the task is unexpected, not when it is task switch (Hiseh & liu, 2005). In
their experiments, they showed additive effect between task expectancy
(reconfiguration control process) and task recency (carry-over effect) and
surmised that task expectancy affects the time required to prepare
upcoming central mental operations (task set configuration), whereas task
switch (task recency) affects the duration of the response selection stage
which does not begin until a) the required input processing has been
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completed and b) the task set has been configured (see page 1408 in their
article, Ruthruff et ai, 2001). Their so-called 'configuration-execution model'
is in line with the computational models proposed by Gilbert & Shallice
(2002) as well as Yeung & Mansell (2003) in that it triggers the
reconfiguration process soon after stimulus onset that then operates in
parallel with stimulus identification. However, such a configuration is only
required on unexpected trials, not on switch trials. Computational models
from Gilbert & Shailice (2002) and Yeung & Mansell (2003) shares the same
characteristics in their serial stage-like cognitive architecture but the
differences lies in a postulation of where a reconfiguration control process
specific to switch trials occurs in the stream of task information processing
(Hsieh & Liu, 2005).
For example, Gilbert & Shallice (2002) presented a parallel distributed
processing (PDP) model that simulates the switch cost when participants
switch between word reading and colour naming in response to Stroop
stimuli. Reaction time on 'switch trials can be slowed by an extended
response selection process which result from a) persisting, inappropriate
states of activation and inhibition of task-controlling representations; and
b) associative learning, which allows stimuli to evoke task sets with which
they have recently been associated (as proposed by Allport & Wylie, 2000).
Their model provided a good fit to a large body of explanation of switch
costs, especially asymmetrical switch cost' in the Stroop task. According to
I Stroop (1935) demonstrated that it was easier to read the word than to name the
colour. Allport et al.(1994) proposed that the colour task requires strong
suppression of word reading, but not vice versa. As a result, the word task is
strongly suppressed following a switch from colour naming. This generates a large
switch cost in the word task, but there is a smaller cost for switches into the colour
task since it was not previously suppressed or was suppressed to a lesser degree
(Gilbert & Shallice, 2002).
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their model, a paradoxical asymmetry in switch costs can result from
differences in top-down inputs for the two tasks, regardless of their possible
differences in the requirement for competitor suppression between the two
tasks. Arguably, they concluded that switch costs reflect an interference
effect caused by a carry-over of task set and task switching paradigm might
have less relevance to executive control if the switch cost simply reflects an
interference effect caused by a carry-over of task set. However, they also
insisted that their model could still reflect states of executive control, i.e.,
the top-down control inputs that both tasks receive, thus they aimed to
study these top-down control inputs indirectly, using the model to infer top-
down input settings from behavioural data. They also pinpointed that the
role of the task switching paradigm in the study of cognitive control could
occur once the carry-over effect of task set and stimulus-driven retrieval of
task set are understood.
Later on, Yeung & Monsell (2003a) provided an analytical demonstration of
how the interaction the observed between switching, interference, and
relative task strength can emerge from an interaction between task priming
and control input. In their model, task sets are held to compete according
to their degree of activation, with competition between task sets dependent
on task strength, control input, and task priming effects as in previous task
priming accounts of the switch cost (e.g., Allport et al., 1994). They
assumed that a) asymmetrical priming: task priming effects are particularly
large following performance of a weak task like Allport et al. (1994) and b)
However,Yeung& Monsell(2003a) later showedthe reverseStroop effect; It was
easier to namethe coloursthan to namewords by training extensively; the word-
readingtask was the stronger (easier) task for participantsbecausethey had more
practice.
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minimisation of control: participants typically apply the minimum control to
perform the required task with a reasonable degree of accuracy (cf.
Goschke, 2000) as the top-down is effortful. By simulating their results in a
simple formula model, they emphasised that the importance of the
modelling work was to distinguish the use of the term 'switch cost' from
'task priming effect'. In other words, the implication of their model was to
ensure the term 'switch cost' should not be allowed to obscure the fact that
task priming effects benefit performance when a task is repeated as well as
disrupting performance when task requirements change. They suggested
that the expression of these positive and negative effects of task priming
would be influenced by the strength of top-down control biases applied to
ensure that the appropriate task was performed.
More recently, Logan & Schneider (2006) argued that switch costs reflect
priming of cue encoding when successive cues are identical or associatively
related. They agreed with Logan & Bundesen (2003, 2004) and Arrington &
Logan (2004)'5 idea that performance in the explicit task-cuing procedure
(ref. see the chapter 8, page 259-269) may reflect a compound stimulus
strategy ora compound retrieval cue strategy, in which subjects encode the
cue, encode the target, and use them as a joint retrieval cue to pull an
appropriate response from memory. However, Logan and Schneider (2006)
argued that the compound retrieval cue strategy does not explain the small
but persistent difference between task repetitions and task alternations that
often occurs with meaningful word cues although it explains the difference
between cue repetitions and task repetitions. Across experiments, this
difference ranges in magnitude from -2 ms (Logan & Bundesen, 2004) to
69 ms (Arrington & Logan, 2004). Schneider and Logan (2005) also noted
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that meaningful word cues assigned to the same task are semantically
related, so they may prime each other on task repetition trials. Thus,
Logan and Schneider (2006) questioned that these semantic or associative
priming effects on task repetition trials should be smaller than the
repetition priming effects on cue repetition trials. They also suggested that
task repetitions should be slower than cue repetitions but faster than task
alternation. In order to test this priming hypothesis, they used four cues for
two tasks (parity/ magnitude judgements for single digits). They used word
cues in order to manipulate the semantic and associative relations between
the cues asslqned to same and different tasks. They used word cues that
were arbitrarily related to the tasks to be performed: four pairs of
associated words - day/night, noun/verb, king/queen and salt/pepper. One
subject group (associated-within condition); both words in an associated
pair were assigned to the same task. For example, day/night for the
magnitude task and noun/verb for the parity task were assigned. The other
subject group (associated-between condition); the words in an associated
pair were assigned to different tasks. For example, day/noun was assigned
to the magnitude task and night/verb was assigned to the parity task. In
the unassociated condition, four words from different associated pairs were
asslqned to the two tasks. For example, day/noun for the magnitude task,
and queen/pepper for the parity task were assigned. By using two cues for
each task, it allowed the three transitions between trials: cue repetition,
task repetitions and task alternations. The novel contribution from their
experiments was to demonstrate cue-encoding benefits from semantic or
associative priming for task repetitions, in which the cue changed but the
task stayed the same. For these transitions, cue encoding was faster if
successive cues were semantically or associatively related than if they were
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unrelated. They demonstrated semantic or associative priming of cue
encoding in analyses of mean RTs and in fits of the models based on their
priming hypothesis to the time course function. From their results, they
suggested that those differences between task repetitions and task
alternations can be interpreted in terms of semantic or associative priming
between related cues, which would occur for task repetitions but not for
task alternations.
Note that Mayr and Kliegl (2003) previously reported experiments with two
cues for each task. Their research question was simple: Are switch costs
actually due to a trial-to-trial change in the task itself, or can they be
attributed to a trial-to-trial change in retrieval path? Because whenever
there is a change in cue, there is also a change in task; whenever cues stay
the same across the trials, tasks also stay the same. Thus, they wanted to
separate the cue-switch component and the actual task-switch component
which both contribute to total switch costs in an undifferentiated manner.
Like Logan and Bundesen (2003), they found large differences between cue
repetitions and task repetitions (298 ms in one experiment; 204 ms in
another), but Unlike Logan and Bundesen (2003)'s experiments, they found
large differences between task repetitions and task alternations (302ms in
one experiment; 204 ms In another). They also found that cue-switch costs
but not task-switch cost were sensitive to the practice and preparation
whereas task-switch costs were particularly sensitive to response-priming
effect and task-set inhibition.
Mayr and Kliegl (2003) interpreted their results as consistent with
reprogramming theories (reconfiguration theories) of task switching.
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Specifically, they proposed that two distinct, serial processing stages are
critical during changes of task configurations and thus for the emergence of
switch costs. The first stage is associated with cue-driven retrieval of rules
for upcoming task demands from long-term memory (LTM) into working
memory (retrieval stage). This stage cane be triggered through any internal
or external signal that indicates an upcoming task, and it can run off in an
antiCipatory manner (l.e., before the response relevant stimulus appears).
The second stage, which we refer to as the application stage, is much more
closely tied to the actual stimulus than to the task cues. During this stage,
task rules were applied in a relatively automatic manner once this stimulus
was presented (although they did not want to exclude the possibility that
an imagined stimulus may be sufficient). This two stage conceptualization
was similar to some other two-process accounts of task switching (e.g.,
Meiran, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001)
which I introduced earlier in this chapter.
In summary, the earlier models on task switching have focused on where
this reconfiguration actually occurs with different ideas. Later on, the
models have been more moved on to the carry-over (priming) theory by
implementing the data and simulating the formula. In the next section, I
will introduce the backward inhibition model based on PDPmodel by Gilbert
and Shallice (2002) in order to understand the relationship between switch
cost and backward inhibition.
In the next section, the conceptual model for the experiements will be
presented and then PDPmodel in backward inhibition will be discussed by
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providing the basic formula based on Gilbert and Shall ice (2002) model in
task switching.
B. PDP model in backward inhibition
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Figure 52. presents conceptual model in the current experimental paradigm.
* Note: The PDPmodel of cue-target mapping will be presented in the next
figure 53.
Figure 52 presents the dynamics between working memory and
long-term memory (LTM) while performing task switching in my
experimental paradigm. When participants perform the current task, they
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learn the meaning of cues for each task and twenty-four visual
representations are encoded in the LTM. During this stage, there is a
mediator- a kind of mental bridge- helps to encode all the twenty-four
visual representations in LTM. This is a hypothesis that 'mediator' helps
encoding to LTM in a fast and efficient way, by reflecting either the
activation of the abstract irrelevant-response category or the rule relating
the stimulus to the irrelevant category. However, it is still tentative to
define the role of mediator at this polnt. One of options for explaining the
role of mediator is that inner speech (verbalisation) would be responsible
for the efficient processing. The idea of inner speech has been previous
suggested (Carlson, 1997; Mecklinger et al., 1999; Goshke, 2000; Emerson
& Miyake; 2003). For example, Emerson & Miyake (2003) examined the
role of inner speech in task switching by dual-task and demonstrated that
disrupting inner speech via articulatory suppression dramatically increased
switch costs. They concluded that inner speech serves as an internal self-
cuing device by retrieving and activating a phonological representation of
the upcoming task. Goshke (2000, exp 2) also demonstrated that
participants showed the smaller switch costs between colour judgement and
letter judgement task who said the task name than among those who
verbalised an irrelevant word. In fact, the switch cost for participants who
verbalised the task name was virtually identical to the cost for participants
who had a long preparation interval of 1500ms without any verbalisation
requirement, whereas the switch cost for partiCipants who verbalised an
irrelevant word was similar to the cost observed for participants who
received a short preparation interval of 14ms. These findings suggest that
the opportunity to verbally remind oneself which task to perform next may
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indeed be an effective strategy to prepare for the forthcoming switch
(Emerson & Miyake, 2003).
Although the results from both of these studies poin to the role of inner
speech in task switching, they also raised a number of questions that need
to be answered. For example, it was unclear whether the switching
impairment associated with articulatory suppression go beyond the general
decrement often observed when two tasks are performed simultaneously.
In my current model, my aim was not focused on addressing these
questions but on the fact that inner speech would be one of hypotheses to
function mediator stage. For example, arrow and location tasks when there
was no verbal cues (e.g., Exp 1) compared to the word task with verbal
cues, these tasks are much needed for mediator. Once the mediator is
playing a role to links to the stimulus directly to the response, it will be
actively involved in task switching performance.
For instances, when participants prepare themselves for task switching,
some or all of LTM representation (twenty four representations) that were
used to make the classifications become a part of activated LTM. It is
assumed that mediator is highly accessible and efficient. Thus, when a
target stimulus is presented, both relevant response category (i.e., the
correct response for the current task) and the irrelevant category (i.e., the
correct response for the other two tasks) become activated.
In order to avoid the risk that participants apply the wrong response, they
had to activate the eight target representations (i.e. each task has eight
target representations) in their working memory and inhibit the rest of
target representations (sixteen representations). In the realm of working
memory, the activation of the upcoming task and inhibition of the previous
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tasks are always working for the successful task switching performance
(see Figure 54). Depending on the weights through this active stage, it will
facilitate or slows down the response selection (stage 4). Because of the
limited capacity of working memory, performance will suffer if WM load
increases. In fact, exp 4 with all arbitrary cues and exp 6 when the cue and
target are separately presented, switch costs and overall reaction time were
increased. Table 6 summarises the conceptual model in Figure 52.
Stage 1: All the task demand units are encoded in the LTM and mediator is the
bridge between cue-target representation and links directly to the stimulus from the
task demand unit in LTM.
Stage 2: Visual information of the cue and target for each tasks are represented
for interpreting the meaning of cues. Thus, this stage is about the cue-target
association.
Stage 3: Working memory load depends on the cue (e.g. arbitrary cues) and cue-
target separate presentation (e.g., exp 6a and exp 6b) and it is on-going process
between activation of the current task set and inhibition of the previous task set
while switching tasks.
Stage 4: Response selection process is made for the execution of the current task.
Here, it is assumed that participants might use the inner speech for self-instruction.
Table 6. presents four stage processing for the conceptual model in the figure 52.
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Figure 53. Architecture of PDPmodel in the current experimental paradigm
(e.g., the current task is the arrow task, the correct response is 'down')
--_.. : excitation (positive)
• inhibition (negative)
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Based on Gilbert and Shallice (2002),s PDP (parallel distributed
processing) model, the current model is composed of three separate
pathways, for the arrow, location and word task (see Figure 53).
It is composed of Task Input Units (cue input and target input) and
ResponseUnits (up/ down) and Task Demand Units. In each pathway, there
are eight input units representing the presentation of the stimulus in the
arrow, location and word task.
Each pathway has three output units, representing the response 'up' and
'down' for the each task. Thus, this model has a total twenty four input
units and six output units. Each input unit has a positive connection with its
corresponding output units. For example, in order to simulate a stimulus of
the word task (e.g., inside the arrow shape pointing up and located in the
bottom of the screen written 'down'), word stimulus input unit which is
single incongruent target presentation and the location stimulus input unit
(because the arrow target is located in the bottom of the screen) would
both be activated whereas the arrow stimulus input unit would be inhibited
(because the arrow is pointing up). This would send activation to the 'word
output unit' in the word task pathway and 'location output unit' in the
location pathway. Immediately, this would send activation to the 'down' in
ResponseUnits in both word and location task.
Processing in the model, i.e., the passing of activation between units along
their connections is iterated for a number of cycles. This allows the
Simulation of reaction time: on each cycle, "evidence" is collected from
activation values of the six output units, two of which represent each
possible response, 'up' or 'down'. When the evidence for one of these two
responses passesa fixed threshold, the trial is terminated. In this way, it is
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possible to compare the number of cycles required for the model to reach
its response threshold with the mean reaction time of participants.
The connection strengths from the input to the output units are
stronger in the word task pathway than the other two task pathway. This
simulates the greater experience that people have of reading written words
than paying attention to the point of the arrow or the location of the arrow
in my experimental paradigm. As a result, the word task output unit
become more strongly active than the arrow and location task output units
when the model is presented with an arrow stimulus. The evidence for the
response represented in the word task pathway is therefore greater than
the evidence for the response represented in the arrow and location task.
As a result, the model will tend to respond by 'reading out' the word task is
presented with whereas by making an 'inner speech' for the correct
response in the arrow and location task which is not presented with.
However, since both the word output unit and the location output unit -
because the correct response for these two tasks are 'down' even though
the current task is the word task - it is now in an activated state in the
Response untts for both tasks. In order to perform the word task, 'Task
Demand Units' have to send activation to their corresponding pathways. For
example, when the word task demand unit is activated, it sends activation
to the output units in the word task pathway, allowing them to win
competition with the output units in the location task pathway. As well as
sending a positive input to the output units of their corresponding pathway,
the task demand units also send a negative (i.e., inhibitory) input to the
output units of the other pathway.
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The word and location task output units also send activation back to
the task demand units. This introduces feedback as well as feedforward
connectivity into the model, allowing activity in the word and location
pathways to modulate activity in the task demand units (Gilbert & Shallice,
2002). The task demand units receive an additional "top-down control
input", which specifies which task the model should perform.
Three tasks 'output units are interconnected, so that congruent word
(written 'down') and location (located in the bottom of the screen so the
correct response is 'down' if the current task is the location task) response
units (e.g., the two 'down' units) have reciprocal positive connection and
incongruent pairs of units (e.g., word 'down' but arrow is pointing 'up')
have reciprocal negative connections. Finally, there are lateral inhibitory
connections between all units within each task output units and task
demand units. The weights of the connections between stimulus input and
task demand units are determined by Hebbian learning at the end of each
trial, so that the weight between co-active units are adjusted in proportion
to the product of their activation values. As can be seen in figure 53, the
concept of the model has two inputs: one for the 'top-down control input'
that indicates which task is currently appropriate, and another for the
'bottom-up input' that the task demand units receive from the stimulus
input units. Like Gilbert & Shallice (2002),s model, the top-down input is
not equal for the three task demand units. They assumed that the control
mechanism provided by the task demand units is required more for the
colour than the word task because the colour-naming pathway in their
Stroop task is weaker. Following their logic, I also assume that the top-
down input received by the location or arrow task demand unit, when the
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location or arrow task is the currently required task, is greater than the top-
down input received by the word task demand unit on word task trials.
Operation of the Model
1) The task demand units are set to a proportion of their activation values
at the end of the previous trials. In order to avoid the potential problem
that weights between a pair of repeatedly coactive units may lead to such a
strong input into the task demand units that the model is unable to switch
task, the weights between stimulus input and task demand units are reset
to zero at the end of each trial, before the new weights are calculated, so
that the effects of learning on trial N-l persist only for trial N. Note that this
is an simple assumption. Assuming that the activations of the stimulus
input and output units are set to zero as well, 2) the appropriate top-down
control input is added to the net input of the each task demand units,
depending on which task is required. This input is added to the task
demand unit's net input on every cycle. 3) When the preparation interval
begins, with all of stimulus input units set to zero after the cue input unit,
the top-down input is applied to the task demand units for the number of
cycles set as the preparation interval. The activation levels of the output
units are not updated during this period. 4) After the end of the preparation
interval, the appropriate task demand unit is activated as before and one
stimulus input unit has its activation values set to the maximum value, until
the end of the trial. Imagine that the current task is the word task:
Congruent (e.g., arrow pointing up with the word 'up' inside which is
located in the top of the screen) and single incongruent (e.g, arrow pointing
up with the word 'down' inside which is located in the bottom of the screen)
and double incongruent (e.g., arrow pointing up with the word 'down' inside
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which is located in the top of the screen) trials are simulated by activating
three stimulus input units, one in the word task pathway, the other two in
the arrow and location task pathway. 5} Activation is allowed to propagate
until a response threshold is reached. The number of cycles since stimulus
presentation is recorded as the 'reaction time'.
Activation Levels and Weights Updates
Activation levels are determined by the standard interactive
activation equations (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981). On every cycle, the
net input for each unit is calculated by summing the activation values of
each unit from which it receives a connection, multiplied in each case by
the appropriate connection weight. In addition, units in the task demand,
the arrow, location and word task each have a bias, a constant which is
added to their net inputs on every cycle as well as the inputs received from
other units. Each unit's activation value is then updated according to the
following equations:
If the net input is positive: ().act = step x net x (max - act)
If the net input is negative: ().act = step x net x (act - min)
• act= current activation
• step = step size (This parameter determines the magnitude of the
change in activation on each cycle, setting the speed of processing)
• net= net input
• max= maximum activation value
• min= minimum activation value
When the activation values have been updated for each unit, the net inputs
are calculated again and a new cycle begins. On each cycle, a random noise
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also added to the activation values of each unit. This term is drawn from a
Gaussian distribution (normal distribution), with a mean of zero; the
standard deviation of this distribution determines how much disruption is
caused by noise on each cycle. After noise has been added, the activation
levels of any units outside the maximum and minimum values are reset to
the relevant extreme.
At the end of each trial, the weights between the stimulus input and
task demand units are set according to the following equation:
W/1k= lrate x a} x ai x ak
• Wljk= weight of the connection unit j to unit i and to unit k
• lrate = learning rate(i.e., the magnitude of the change in weights for
each trial)
• a}, e., ak = the activation levels of units j, i and k respectively
Note that this equation does not take into account the previous weight of
the connection between the two relevant units. Thus, these weights are
calculated anew at the end of each trial, i.e., the weights derived from the
activation levels of the units at the end of the trial N-l only affect the
model's performance for trial N.
Competition
When activation propagates from the input units to each of the output units,
they compete with each other via the inhibitory connections until only one
remains active. This is the winner": the strengths of connections to the
winning output unit from active output units are increased and those from
2 In somecompetitivenetworks, there is a gradationof successfor different units,
not just one winner. But the principlesare similar, so for simplicity I will consider
networkswith a singlewinner in the model.
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inactive input units are decrease. To keep the calculations simple, I assume
that the output units have a linear activation function, so the activity is
proportional to the net input. The activities of the output units are compared
to determine the winner. The identification of the winner may be achieved
by selecting the unit with the highest activity value. Alternatively, units may
be set in direct competition with each other through their inhibitory
connections. The more active units will force the other to become inactive.
This operation identifies which output unit had the largest net input, that is,
the largest product between its weight vector and the input vector.
I1Wljk = 0 if unit i loses
= E( e, - WlJk) if unit i wins
• E= a learning rate parameter
• aj = the activity of input unit j when the cue p is presented
• WlJk = weight of the connection unit j to unit i and to unit k before the
trial
The Hebbian learning rule results in adjustment to the strengths of the
connections to the winning unit until each weight has the same value as the
activity of the corresponding input unit in that input pattern, that is, until
Wljk = aj. If WlJk is smaller than aj it is increased; if it is larger it is reduced.
E determines how quickly this process takes place. The result is that the
winning unit's weight vector is changed to make it more similar to the input
vector for which it was the winner.
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Response Threshold
The purpose of the response threshold is to provide a way to
determine the moment when enough evidence has been accumulated from
the word and colour units for a response to be emitted. This is implemented
as follows. At the end of each cycle, the arrow, location and word task
output unit with the greatest level of activation is compared with one
another, except for the unit which commands the same response in the
other stimulus dimension (e.g., the word task output unit if the arrow is
pointing down with the word 'down' which is located in the bottom of the
screen - "congruent"). The difference in activation between the most active
unit and the next most active unit is calculated. When this difference passes
a fixed threshold the trial is terminated. Thus, a response is simulated as
occurring when the amount of evidence for that response exceeds the
evidence for any other responses by a fixed amount (Gilbert & Shallice,
2002; logan & Gordon, 2001; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997).
Hypothetical explanations of the observed effects
Switch cost
Recall that the task demand unit bias processing in each task pathways so
that intended task is facilitated or excitated (i.e., receives positive
connections) and the unintended task is inhibited (i.e., receives negative
connections). Therefore, the task demand units help to resolve competition
between three tasks, leading to one of the output units in the correct
response dimension (up or down) becoming more active. On switch trials,
the task demand units take longer to reach the activation levels required to
facilitate the intended task and inhibit the unintended one. Thus,
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competition between the responses is extended, in comparison with repeat
trials, because the task demand units are less effective at biasing the
network toward the correct task (see Figure 53). Gilbert and Shallice (2002)
argued that this occurs for two reasons. First, the activation values of the
task demand units have the wrong sign at the beginning of the trial and so
take longer to reach activation levels which would facilitate the intended
task and inhibit the unintended one. This is caused by the carryover of the
task demand units' activation values from the previous trial. Second, this is
from network's learning mechanism and repetition of the same item for
three tasks, causing the relative ineffectiveness of the task demand units on
switch trials. Figure 54 presents the hypothetical figure between activation
of the current task and inhibition of the previous task set while switching
tasks to see the source of switch cost. According to the figure 54, the
activation level of the current task is overshadowed by the residual
activation of the other task when switching tasks. This residual activation of
the previous task and the current activation of the forthcoming task is the
by-product of the dynamics of inhibition and activation during the switching
trials. On the other hand, the activation of the current task becomes
stronger when repeating the single task. As a result, switch costs occurs
when there is no competition in repeating trials. In other words, there is no
use of inhibiting the previous task set in the repeating trials, causing the
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Figure 54. presents the hypothetical figure between activation of the current task
and inhibition of the previous task set while switching tasks to see the source of
switch cost
Alternating switch cost
As I discussed earlier, the role of task demand units is to facilitate the
intended task (i.e., receives positive connections) and inhibit the unintended
task (i.e., receives negative connections). Thus, during the alternating
switching sequence and double switching sequence, the role of task demand
units becomes more important to resolve competition between tasks
consecutively. As can be seen in Figure 55, the level of activation and
inhibition in three tasks at the task demand units are dynamically changing.
According to the figure 55, it is clear to see that the different weight of
activation level is as a result from the task on the previous trials (N-l trials)
but not the task on the N-2 trials, causing the alternating switch cost in the
alternating sequence on the N trials.
345
Double switch trials

















N-2 trials N-l trials N trials
Figure 55. presents the hypothetical figure between activation of the current task
and inhibition of the previous task set while alternating task and switch three tasks
(double switching trials) in order to see the source of alternating switch cost.
In several previous studies, BI was assumed to operate on task switch trials
in order to reduce interference from the previously relevant task set
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(Arbuthnott, 2005; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 2003). According
to these accounts BI must be strong if the previous task set is still activated
to a large extent (cf. Gade & Koch, 2005), or if the activation differences
between the relevant and irrelevant task sets are rather small (cf.
Arbuthnott, 2005), or both. However, although it seems reasonable to
assume that the strength of task-set inhibition depends on the (absolute
and relative) strengths of task-set activation, the results from the thesis
suggests that BI might be playing an role only when interference from the
previous trials are high (single incongruent condition).
Preparation effect
Preparation is simulated by activating the task demand units in advance of
the cue input and stimulus input units, without activating the output units.
Thus, the switch trials have more benefit to reduce switch costs from
preparation interval but little effect on repeat trials because the task
demand units on switch trials take longer to reach the activation levels
required to facilitate the intended task and inhibit the unintended one.
Congruency effect
Congruency effect is stimulated by activating task demand unit once the
task demand unit is restored in the Long-Term Memory. When three tvpes'
of representation for the task set reconfiguration is restored, there will be
an mediate route (mediator) for response selection which links the stimulus
directly to the response. Thus, when there is a target stimulus on the
screen, both the relevant response category (up/down) and the irrelevant
3 My hypothesis Is that cue representation, stimulus representation and response
representation are crucial for reconfiguring the task set but there will be the
transformation- a kind of bridge between them- representation that link altogether.
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category (up/down) will be competed with each other as they share the
same response either 'up' or 'down'. This activation might create the risk
that participants will apply the wrong task rules during making a response.
Activated LTM codes that are triggered by the target stimulus continue to
influence performance. As a result, this activation of the irrelevant task sets
can either facilitate or slow the response depending on the congruency
relationship whether the response of the current task is the same
(congruent) or different (incongruent) from the response of the other tasks.
In addition, the target stimulus activates three task-sets because only one
stimulus (Arrow shape) is used for three tasks and shares thee task
features. Thus, it activates both 'up' and 'down' response in the incongruent
condition as well as the task information (e.g., arrow task-see the point of
the arrow/ location task-see the position of the arrow/ word task-see the
word inside the arrow). Hence the congruent condition yields faster
response for two reasons. Firstly, there is no competition from the
alternative response. Secondly, both the relevant target feature and the
irrelevant target features activate the correct response (Meiran, 2000).
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Conclusion
To be considered as a general model, it must fit results from my
experimental paradigm and a variety of other experimental paradigms. In
order to achieve this, it is necessary to do the data implementation for
computational model and make theoretical framework afterwards.
However, it is noteworthy that the cognitive model in backward inhibition
has not been developed in the field of task switching. Thus, it is important
to expand the current model for the model-fitting and parameter estimation
in the near future. Furthermore, it will be ideal to compare with other
models in task switching. In summary, the model presented in this chapter
implements the idea that switch costs reflects ain interference effect caused
by a carry-over of task set and expand this to the backward inhibition. It
might seem that the task switching paradigm has less relevance to
executive control if the switch cost simply reflects an interference effect
caused by a carryover of task set. More importantly, the backward
inhibition in task switching is a by-product of the dynamics between
activation of the forthcoming task and inhibition of the previous task on N-l
trials. However, even if switch costs result from an automatic process of
response conflict, they can still reflects the states of executive control, i.e.,
the top-down control inputs that three tasks receives and the relationship
with LTM etc. Thus, it should be possible to study these top-down control
inputs indirectly, using the model to infer top-down input settings from




A. Synopsisof the results
The goal of the study was to explore the role of inhibition in task
switching by backward inhibition and to examine if backward inhibition was
the part of main processes or independent processing in cognitive control
mechanism. The major research question was raised from the assumption
that there were at least two control processes in task switching: 1)
overcoming the inhibition of a previously performed task when re-engaging
and 2) restarting a sequence of tasks after a period of interruption. One
mechanism to overcome the persisting inhibition of a previously performed
task was backward inhibition because it suppresses the 'to-be-abandoned-
task set' unconditionally for a certain period of time (Mayr and Keele, 2000).
This persistent activation of a previous task set would also affect the
switching performance, depending on whether it activates a response that
was the same (congruent) as or different (incongruent) from the response
activated by the new upcoming task set (current task set).
In order to see if task switching performance not only depends on the
currently relevant task set, but is also influenced by the set of temporary
irrelevant task set, three task switching experiments were developed in the
thesis. The experiments reported here was to examine the dynamics of task
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switching by showing switch cost, alternating switch cost and congruency
effect.
The present studies showed that the ability to switch from one task to
another were affected by the length of cue-target-interval, suggesting that
switch cost reflected the time consumed by the task set reconfiguration
process. In other words, all the experiments in the thesis showed the
significantly reduced switch costs when advance knowledge of the task set
was given for the upcoming task and enough time for preparation was
allowed. This preparation effect (see the chapter 1) clearly showed the
benefit of longer eT! (cue-target-interval) and a certain amount of time was
necessary to establish a task set to perform successfully. These results
supported the hypothesis that switch cost is the time consumed by task-set
reconfiguration (Roger & Monsell, 1995; Monsell, 2003). In addition, the
thesis showed that both transient and long-term carry-over of 'task-set'
activation and inhibition are also part of task switching by providing that
backward inhibition was immune to the length of preparation interval. In
other words, the magnitude of backward inhibition (measured by alternating
switch cost) was not influenced by the advanced reconfiguration processing
with ample amount of preparation. It indicates that backward inhibition
occurs on a level of representation that is insensitive to advanced preparation
of the task sets. It is noteworthy that the magnitude of switch costs was
substantially large compared to that of alternating switch costs, suggesting
that backward inhibition occurs in switching situation to suppress the old task
set which is no longer to use. On the other hand, it was not necessary to
suppress the previous task set when repeating one task and by the time you
have been repeating the task, it would give the current task set more weight
and/or strength to use the current task set which remains in an activated
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state. In this case, the suppressing the previous task set is not essentially
required, giving the supporting evidence to the hypothesis that task
switching requires two different processes: 1) activation of the upcoming
task set 2) inhibition of the previous task set. In contrast, it was necessary to
suppress the previous task set for switching to another upcoming task in
both alternating and double switch trials. Thus, alternating switch cost is the
extra time for overcoming the residual inhibition when switching back to the
task you have just abandoned (task A~ B~ A), causing the relatively small
RT differences from when you are switching to the new task consecutively
(C~ B~ A). In that sense, it might be possible to argue that backward
inhibition is more fundamental process for switching task successfully in
order to protect the performance on a currently-held goal from interference
and it is not necessarily to require the ample preparation interval.
In addition, congruency effects on the current trials were also insensitive to
the preparation intervals in all experiments. There was a little reduction of
the size during the long preparation interval, however congruency effects
were significant in both CTI= 100 and CTI= 1200, demonstrating that the
other task sets remained so strong and active. Furthermore, it suggests that
task switching needs a complex interplay between deliberate intentions that
are governed by goals ('endogenous' control) and the availability, recency
and level of interference of the other tasks afforded by the stimulus and its
context ('exogenous' influence). It is noteworthy that congruency effect on
the current trials was still observed in the repeat trials as well as switch
trials. As mentioned earlier, there was no need to suppress the previous task
set during repeating trials. Although the current task set have more weight
and/or strength and this accumulated weight through repeating one task
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would benefit the successful performance for the current task, it would also
allow the activation of the other task sets to be active and strong enough to
interfere with. Note that the stimulus for the experiments in this thesis
always has three different characteristics for each task, which lead to the
interference from the other task sets unless the level of the congruency on
the current task is the congruent condition. When the interference was more
dominant on the incongruent condition, competition between current task set
and the other task sets were high, causing more switch costs in the
incongruent condition.
It indicates that the persistent activation of the irrelevant task sets in the
current trials indeed interfered with the current task and backward
inhibition as one of mechanisms to overcome the persisting inhibition of a
previous task set failed to remove or at least to reduce the interference and
competition during task switching. One possible explanation was that
backward inhibition would occur and be present only when there is
sufficient interference with a current trial as I argued in the general
introduction.
In fact, the results from the thesis demonstrated the interesting evidence
for this. Arrow task at the single incongruent 2 condition during the short
preparation interval showed a large size of backward inhibition in all
experiments l(Expl: 310ms, Exp 3: 136ms, Exp 4: 385ms, Exp6a: 184ms
and Exp 6b: 277ms) except the Exp 5 (separate target information). These
results suggest that backward inhibition were present when the interference
from the previous trials was high.
1Chapter4 for POpatient experimentdid not run the further separateANOVA for
eachtask as it aimedto seethe group comparisonandthere wasno significant
groupdifferencein tasks. However,it will beworthwhileto seethe arrow task
separatelyfor both groups if they showa large sizeof backwardinhibition (by
alternating switch costs)during the short preparationinterval.
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In all the experiments reported in this thesis, there were trials when the
stimulus for the current task received the same response in three tasks
(congruent) as well as when the stimulus for the current task received the
different responses in three-tasks (incongruent). The results in all
experiments demonstrate that reaction time and error was increased during
the incongruent conditions (single 1, single 2 and double incongruent
condition).
Recently, Meiran and Kessler (2008) argued that reaction time task rule
congruency (RT-TRCEs) reflect faster response to stimuli for switch
competing task rules indicate the same correct response than to stimuli
indicating conflicting response. The author tested the hypothesis that RT-
TRCEreflects activated overlearned response category codes in long-term
memory (such as 'up or 'left' in their experiments). Their results supported
the hypothesis by showing that a) RT-TRCEwas absent for tasks for which
there were no response codes ready beforehand, b) RT-TRCEwas present
after these task were practiced, and c) these practice effects were found
only if the tasks permitted forming abstract response category codes.
In the current experiments, there were two types of congruency effect: 1)
response-level 2) stimulus-level. In other words, there was response-
congruency (I.e., the correct response of the current task is congruent to
the other tasks vs. the correct response of the current task is incongruent
to the other tasks) and stimulus-feature congruency (i.e., features of the
stimulus is all congruent-e.g., word inside says 'up' arrow points 'up' the
location vs. features of the stimulus is incongruent). Note that making
response is always between 'up' and 'down' when there are three-task
switching, causing the single incongruent condition. Furthermore, single
incongruent condition had two types of conditions which are determined by
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the previous trial N-l, Therefore, the results from the congruency effect is
rather complicated to interpret, however, the robust congruency effects
clearly demonstrated that the interference from the other task sets as well
as from their stimulus features were so strong and dominant that there
might be another inhibitory mechanism which could be used apart from
backward inhibition. Arbuthontt (2005) argued that backward inhibition is
an inhibitory mechanism of sequential control and it is not specific to one
particular type of cognitive processing. She argued that backward inhibition
selectively protects against interference from features of the most recently
abandoned thask set (Hubner et ai, 2003), facilitating the speed and
accuracy of switches in complex task situations. However, the studies
reported here are against previous studies (Hubner et ai, 2003; Arbuthnott,
2005). At this stage, it is not clear why backward inhibition could not
overcome the interference form the other task sets. On possible idea is that
backward inhibition mechanism is extremely flexible, responding selectively
to aspects of a task context that cause interference. It is likely that this
flexibility arises from a low-level mechanism, such as lateral inhibition of
category response rules (Arbuthnott, 2005; Gade & Koch, 2005; Schuch &
Koch, 2003). This inhibition combines with activation processes to influence
performance, which affects whether inhibition or activation dominates in
different contexts.
In summary, the present results in the thesis reconcile two opposing views
regarding the reduction in switching costs by prolonging the preparation
interval. According to the one view (Rogers & Monsell, 1995; De jong,
2002; Fagot, 1994; Goschke, 2002; Merian, 1996), the reduction of in
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switch costs by long preparation intervals reflects advanced task-se' t
reconfiguration. According to the alternative view (Allport et ai, 1994;
1996; Allport & Wylie, 2000; Logan and Schneider, 2003, 2006 a, 2000b),
reduction in switch cost reflects passive dissipation of the previous task set.
Mansell (2003) previously proposed that switch costs 'results from both
transient and long-term carry-over of 'task set' activation and inhibition as
well as time consumed by task-set reconfiguration processes' (p. 134).
SWitchcosts in the current experiments supported that these two views are
not mutually exclusive.
B. Inhibitory control in task switching
It is said that the ability to switch efficiently between two or more
tasks is thought to require executive control because the control setting
appropriate on one trial are no longer relevant when a new task is required.
As such, inhibitory mechanisms that suppress the now inappropriate task
may be required to facilitate switches between two or more tasks. If
inhibitory mechanisms are inefficient, irrelevant information from both the
past and present will disrupt performance on the current task. Cumulative
evidence suggests that inhibition of a just-performed task set does occur in
task switching (Allport et ai, 1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000; Arbuthnott &
Frank, 2000; Arbuthnott & Woodward, 2002; Dreher &Berman, 2002;
Dreisbach et al., 2002; HObner et ai, 2003; Koch, Gade & Philip, 2004;
Mayr, 2001, 2002; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Gillbert &
Shallice, 2002). Particularly, it has been argued that there must be a
mechanism that reduces activation of the current task set representation in
order to enable the cognitive system to switch to a different task. This
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deactivation of the task set could possibly take place in the form of
unspecific activation decay (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008) or in the form of
inhibition, which is presumably a faster process that is triggered by some
specific event (e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000).
Previously, Allport et al. (1994) already suggested that switch costs arise
from proactive interference resulting from having previously performed a
competing task (Yeung et ai, 2006). According to Allport & Wylie (1999),
the nature of this proactive interference can be as "continued priming of the
previous task (competitor priming) and suppression (negative priming) of
the currently intended task" (see page 293 in their article, see also general
introduction in the thesis). Thus, inhibitory processes (l.e., 'suppression')
could contribute to switch costs in a simple way. Presumably, the inhibition
of an irrelevant task set persists over time, so that it is more difficult to
perform this task when it becomes relevant again. Thus, persisting
inhibition could produce 'inertia' (see the general introduction) on the level
of task sets (Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999).
Goschke (2000) also suggested a similar contribution of inhibitory
processes in task switching. He argued that the degree of inhibition is
adjusted depending on the amount of response conflict evoked by a
stimulus. Likewise, Gilbert & Shallice (2002) proposed that lateral inhibition
of 'task demand units' to reduce or prevent the simultaneous activation of
two competing task sets.
However, it is noteworthy that persisting activation accounts could explain
switch costs as well as could persisting inhibition accounts. In other words,
persisting activation accounts predict a performance benefit from N-2 trial
repetition (alternating switch trials) relative to N-2 trial switch (double
switch trials), whereas perslstlnq inhibition accounts predict a performance
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cost (alternating switch cost) in the alternating switch trials. In fact, many
studies reported alternating switch costs (e.g., Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000;
Lien & Ruthruff, 2008; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Philip et al., 2007;Schuch &
Koch, 2003), suggesting that alternating switch costs for backward
inhibition is the good measure to study the inhibitory control in task
switching. Since these costs can be observed for a large variety of different
tasks, alternating switch costs occur when subjects switch between tasks
that differ in stimulus-related aspects (e.g., different stimulus dimensions)
as well as in response-related aspects (e.g., different response inhibition).
However, it is still ambiguous what kind of inhibitory control involved in
task switching. Tentatively, I proposed that at least three different types of
inhibitory control involved in task switching.
Inhibition of the just-performed response (response-related
inhibition)
Aron et al (2003) argued that RT and error rate are reduced when the
response is the same as the response produced on the previous trial,
providing the time-lag between stimulus and next response is short.
However, Roger and Monsell (1995) showed the reverse effect on the
switch trials. The response alternations were actually faster than response
repetitions. Roger and Monsell (1995) suggested that the normal interaction
between switch cost and response repetition is due to inhibition of any
ongoing response when a task changes. However, alternating hyphotheses
for this effect have been suggested, 'associative' (Rogers & Monsell, 1995)
and 'change signal' (Thomas & Allport, 2000) accounts. The 'associative'
hypothesis suggests that the response most recently produced in the
context of a particular task becomes associated with that task, and this
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'binding' has to be overcome when the task changes (cf. Allport & Wylie,
1999; Aron, 2003). This hypothesis would attribute to the current
congruency effect throughout the experiments in the thesis. The 'change
signal' hypothesis, by contrast, maintains that detecting any change
between n-1 and trial n biases the participants toward performing the
difference response and the presentation of a different task cue (as
happens with a switch) is a salient change (cf. Aron, 2003). On this
account, effect of previous congruency effect in the thesis indicates that
participants are more susceptible to such a bias (possibly because of
weaker endogenous control of task set); hence they have difficulty on
switch trials that are incongruent to the previous trials. There is another
evidence for inhibition associated with response-related aspects of task set.
For example, using a numerical judgement task that remained constant
across the entire experiment, Philipp & Koch (2005) had their subjects
switch among different responses (manual, vocal and foot-pedal
responses). The results of alternating switch costs suggested that inhibition
can also be observed for task sets that differ in terms of the response
modality. Moreover, Koch et al. (2004) had participants switch among three
tasks: two of them were numerical judgement tasks (i.e., parity and
magnitude), whereas the third task was a simple-response task that
required pressing both response keys simultaneously upon stimulus onset.
They also found the alternating switch costs even for the simple-response
tasks.
Taken together, these studies show that inhibition can be targeted also at
output-related aspects of processing. Hence, it appears that inhibition can
occur at many different levels of task processing (Houghton et ai, 2009).
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Inhibition of irrelevant task set on current trial (task-set
inhibition)
Arbuthnott (2005) argued that backward inhibition is to be an inhibitory
mechanism of sequential control and has been observed across a range of
perceptual and semantic judgement tasks (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Koch
etal., 2004; Mayr, 2002; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 2003),
indicating that it is not specific to one particular cognitive processing. In the
context of sequential choice behaviour, people sometimes entertain a
heuristic of expecting that all possible events are about equally distributed
even in short runs of events (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). This
hypothesis suggests that participants would develop some kind of
expectancy that a CBA sequence is more representative and thus more
likely to occur than an ABA sequence, which in turn might cause an
expectancy-based performance benefit in CBA sequences relative to that in
ABA sequences. However, if this is the case, alternating switch costs would
be due to the violation of expectancies rather than task inhibition.
However, the current results revealed the evidence that alternating switch
costs is not explained by sequential expectancy.
The alternating switch costs in the current experiments were different
depending on the task type (e.g., arrow task) and the level of congruency
(e.g., single incongruent 2), suggesting that inhibition is more sensitive to
the type of task and the strength of interference from irrelevant task sets.
If the sequential control is the account for the current results, all three
tasks should show the alternating switch costs conslstentlv regardless of
the congruency condition on the current trials. In other words, the
expectancy bias account would probably predict that alternating switches of
cue and thus participants knows exactly what they expect for the task.
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Probably, participants failed to inhibit the other task sets during performing
the arrow task only when it was incongruent to the previous trial N-l
whereas they managed to inhibit the other irrelevant task sets during
performing either location or word task no matter how strong interference
from the other tasks are (e.g., different congruent conditions).
Inhibition of Stimulus-Response mapping of irrelevant task
on current trial (S-R inhibition)
In addition to examining how the entire task set may be activated by the
irrelevant task set, the suppression of competing Stimulus-Response (S-R)
would playa role in overcoming the persistent and remaining activation of
the other task sets, especially when it activates a response that is different
(incongruent) from the response activated by the new upcoming task set
(current task set). In the current experiments, the congruency on the
current trial N might be related to the inhibition of S-R mapping of
irrelevant task because the current task stimulus always includes the
irrelevant task information of the other tasks.
One possible functional trigger of backward inhibition is conflict/interference
at the level of stimulus-attribute selection (e.g., Arbuthnott & Woodward,
2002; Hubner et al., 2003; Sdoia & Ferlazzo, 2008). What they argued is in
line with my previous accounts that stimulus-feature congruency also
influenced the size of alternating switch costs. Sdoia & Ferlazzo (2008)
found that conflict at stimulus selection during intentional encoding of
stimuli into short-term memory in trial N-l can cause alternating switch
costs. This finding suggests that stimulus conflict (interference from
stimulus feature in the current results) could play a role in alternating
switch costs.
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In conclusion, these three types of inhibition play an important role in task
switching and I suggest that the main trigger of task set inhibition is
interference from the stimulus as well as response. Thus, it will be
worthwhile to disentangle two levels of congruency and see the different
conflict processing then examine their influence on backward inhibition. For
example, if they have functionally similar role in showing alternating switch
costs or if these can be dissociated depending on the stimulus feature on
the task.
c. Neurological components in cognitive control
During the last decade, substantial effects have been made to
evaluate functional-neuroanatomical models of higher cognitive functions
by combining behavioural methods from cognitive psychology with new
neuroimaging techniques (Gruber & Goschke,2004). A large number of
studies suggests that the different executive processes like maintenance of
task-set information, conflict-monitoring, inhibition of prepotent responses,
and task switching may not be attribute to a single unitary brain system
which is against the earlier theories of cognitive controls that postulated a
unitary 'central executive' that controls, coordinates, and supervises task-
speclftc processing modules (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Norman & Shallice,
1986). Gruber & Goschke (2004) also assumed that the mainly two brain
systems have different functional roles in the cognitive control of goal-
directed action. The first of these working memory systems relies on
prefronto-parietal and prefronto-temporal cortical networks and appears to
be also involved in the top-down modulation of domain-specific sensory
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association areas towards task-relevant information. The second system
comprises mainly left hemispheric premotor and parietal brain regions
which also underlie language functions, including inner speech and verbal
rehearsal. The authors proposed that the second system plays a central role
in the retrieval and maintenance of verbal representations of goals and task
rules during the advance preparation for a novel task. According my model
in chapter 9, mediator plays an important role to connect between cue-
target mapping stage and LTMand it is assumed that inner speech and/or
verbal rehearsal are the function of mediator as an internal self-cuing
device (cf. Goschke, 2000). Taking up earlier suggestions by Luria (1961)
and Vygotski (1962), who stressed the significant role of inner speech and
verbal self-instructions in self-control and voluntary action, it would be
possible to think that the underlying mechanism of preparation effect will
be the retrieval of a verbal task or goal representation into working
memory (Goschke, 2000, 2003). Especially when subjects must switch
between novel and unpracticed tasks with arbitrary stimulus-response
mappings, it appears that a verbal representation of the to-be-performed
task must be retrieved before a response can be selected (Goschke, 2003;
cf. Emerson & Miyake, 2003). Mecklinger et al. (1999) also found that
patients with left-hemispheric brain damage suffering from central speech
disorders showed disproportionally large switch costs, compared to patients
without speech orders, suggesting that retrieval of a verbal task
representation or 'self-instruction' play an important role in advance
preparation for a task switch (Goschke, 2003). These results suggest that
the brain region for verbal working memory is particularly important for
task switching.
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On the other hand, Dreher & Berman (2002) investigated two control
processes: overcoming the inhibition of a previously performed task when
re-engaging it, and restarting a sequence of tasks after a period of
interruption by using event-related fMRI. Behaviorally, these processes
were reflected in the facts that: 1) switching to a recently performed task,
that is thus unlikely to have fully recovered from inhibition, takes longer
than switching to a task less recently performed- 'backward inhibition' and
2) re-engaging in a sequence of tasks after a period of interruption
transiently increases response time. The authors found that these
behavioral effects were accompanied by a double dissociation: the right
lateral prefrontal cortex was more activated when switching to a task
recently performed compared to a task less recently performed, while
anterior cingulated cortex was recruited when a sequence of tasks was
initiated. Their results provided insights into functional organization of the
frontal lobe and its role in distinct processes involved in cognitive control.
Recently, Sinai et al. (2007) used event-related potential (ERP) to
determine whether backward inhibition (BI) was exerted preferentially in
high interference environments, and whether ERPslocked to critical time
paints reflects BI during cue preparation and/or response stages. High
interference and low interference were created by manipulating task
difficulty. A reaction time BI effect (i.e., BI > control trials) was shown only
during high interference task. For high interference tasks, BI versus control
trial differences were reflected in a response-locked ERP negativity only
after response selection (indexed by the response locked lateralized
readiness potential), indicating that BI was a lateral inhibition mechanism-
whereby the activation of one task causes the suppression of competing
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tasks- exerted during response preparation. Their results were in line with
the current results that backward inhibition was only at present when the
interference was high. Note that backward inhibition was quite big at the
single incongruent 1 condition only for the arrow task in most experiments.
Another issue related to the current results in the thesis is about the
congruency effect. Although there is no imaging study to investigate the
congruency effect solemnly, it is assumed that the dynamic interactions
between the brain systems allow adjusting the balance between
maintenance and shifting of goals in a context-sensitive way depending on
the presence of response conflicts. In other words, it should be more
difficult to switch from one task to a different task, if the new task requires
responding to a stimulus dimension that on the preceding trial elicited a
response conflict (and thus had to be inhibited). Goschke (2000)
demonstrated that switch costs were significantly increased on trials that
were preceded by response-incongruent trials (i.e., trials on which the two
stimulus dimension were mapped to incompatible responses). This effect of
incongruence of the previous trial was not attenuated by advance
preparation for the next task, but persisted until the next stimulus was
processed. These results demonstrated that the degree of goal shielding is
adjusted in a context-sensitive way depending on the presence of response
conflicts. There is evidence that region of the medial prefrontal cortex,
including anterior cingulated cortex (e.g., Carter et al., 1998; Carter et al.,
2000; MacDonald et el., 2000) and/or adjacent regions (BA 8m) (Gruber et
al., 2003; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001) are involved in this kind of
conflict-induced goal shielding, presumably by signaling the demand for
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increased goal maintenance an/or intensified top-down modulation of task-
relevant processing systems.
Yeung et ai, (2006) also provided support for theories that propose a
control hierarchy comprising regions responsible for maintaining task-
specific information about rules or goals and, regions involved in
coordination of these goals. They used functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to investigate the nature of the interaction between brain
regions and the role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) in cognitive control as
subjects switched between simple face and word categorization tasks. They
found that activity in brain regions selective for the currently irrelevant task
predicted the behavioral costs associated with switching tasks. Task
switching was also associated with increased activity in a network of
regions implicated in cognitive control, including lateral PFCand parietal
cortex. Within this network of regions, they also observed dissociations
between task-selective and general purpose mechanisms.
However, the current results in here showed the inconsistent pattern:
Switch costs on the reaction time were not interacted with congruent
conditions. However there was some interaction effect with congruent
conditions on the error, depending on the manipulation of the experiments.
This suggests that the mechanism underlying congruency effect in the
current results is more complicated because there were two levels of
congruency: 1) response level, 2) stimulus level. Thus, it will be worthwhile
to investigate the congruency effect on the response and stimulus level to
see any sub-hierarchical neurological components.
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Conclusion
It is important to question what the relationship between switch cost
and backward inhibition effect is as they are observed in task switching
paradigm, yet they appears to have different underlying mechanisms.
Obviously, switch cost is from comparing repeating single task and
switching different tasks. In most task switching literature, it was robust
finding that switching two tasks required extra effort to reconfigure the
upcoming task while there is no need for extra effort when repeating only
one task. Thus, the cost was more substantial and obvious and it was
reduced by long preparation interval on the assumption that advance
preparation for a certain amount of time helps the switching performance.
Theoretically, one can simply argue that switching tasks require two
processesof activation: 1) activation of the current task set 2) inhibition of
the previous task set. A task set is typically assumed to include a
representation of a task goal (e.g., attend to stimulus colour), a set of task-
relevant stimuli (e.g., press a left or a right key), and a mapping of stimuli-
or stimulus categories-to responses (see, e.g., Monsell, 1996).
In order to investigate the particular inhibitory control in task switching,
backward inhibition phenomena enables to measure the inhibition on the
basis of the assumption that alternating tasks have more difficulties
overcoming the residual inhibition from the previous task which has been
just abandoned, yet has to switch back again. These were compared to
switching three tasks continuously when there is less need to overcome the
residual inhibition from the previous task as it has to be changed with
another different task. Thus, comparing between alternating switch and
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double switch trials may cause the smaller size of backward inhibition which
was measured by alternating switch costs in the thesis and there might be
another inhibitory mechanism related to the response selection.
Backward inhibition of a no-longer relevant task has been proposed to be
automatically triggered by competition between cognitive demands during
task disengagement because it occurs even when subjects know that the
inhibited task will become relevant again in the immediate future (Mayr &
Keele, 2000). This effect is an important result since inhibition has been
proposed to be a component process of executive control, yet it has been
difficult establish empirically (Mayr & Keel, 2000; Tipper, 2001).
In the present thesis, I reviewed the traditional debate on the
interpretation of switch costs in task switching and empirical evidence on
backward inhibition and congruency effect. Although backward inhibition as
inhibitory control mechanism is seemingly rather disputable and
ambiguous, the current results on backward inhibition provided the
evidence that it is present only when the inference from the other task sets
are strong and it is influenced by the level of congruency on the previous
trials N-l, It appears that inhibitory control mechanism is a diverse complex
of processes rather than a unitary concept and it suggests that there might
be another type of inhibitory control for overcoming the conflict
(interference) from the irrelevant information of the other task sets. In
addition, it is also likely to assume that backward inhibition is independent
and separate process from task switching because it is clearly observed in
other experimental paradigms such as go-no/go signals, flanker tasks.
However, it is noteworthy that these paradigms are particularly focused on
inhibition of competing responses, in other words, response inhibition.
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Compared to these paradigms, the current experimental paradigm
attempted to provide the evidence for different level of processing:
preparation processing, cue processing, stimulus processing and response
processing. It would be advisable to manipulate the response choices and
modality of response execution to overcome this. The results suggested
that backward inhibition was more sensitive to stimulus and response
processing when participants had to overcome the high conflicts from
previous trial N-l, The next research aim will be to data implementation for
computational modelling and dissociate backward inhibition on the level of
congruency (i.e., stimulus level/ response level). Furthermore, the ERP
study for the timing of these separate control processes and fMRI study for
the brain region will be helpful, yet it has to be carefully designed and
measured in the near future.
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• 5-Way ANOVA TABLE for group analysis
(CTI x trial type x task x congruency x group, and CTI x switch type x
task x congruency x group)
Group Analysis results by mean data
1. task-oriented cue experiment between Young and Old (Exp 1 and 2)
2. task-oriented cue vs. all verbal cue experiment (Exp 1 and 3)
3. all verbal cue experiment vs. all arbitrary cue experiment (Exp 3 and 4)
4. word information inside the arrow vs. word information outside the arrow
when both cues are verbally presented (Exp 3 and 5)
presented (Exp 3 and 6a)
5. cue-target joint vs. cue-target separate when both cues are verbally
6. cue-target joint vs. cue-target separate when both cues are arbitrarily
presented (Exp 4 and 6b)
presented (Exp 6a and 6b)
7. all verbal cue vs. all arbitrary cue when both cue and target are separately
Note> the aim of the group comparison between experiments are shown in
Table 2 in the chapter 2, page 58. Mean of median reaction time (ms) was used
for all the group comparison analysis and mean of error percentage (%) was
excluded except for chapter 4.
1. Exp 1 and 2 old control
CT! x Trial type x Task x Congruency
By Group
CT! x Switch type x Task x Congruency
By Group
1.CTI: F (1,38)=267, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,38)= 22, p<.OOl
2.Trial type: F(l, 38)=34, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,38)= 3.3, p =.07
3.Task: F (1, 43)=6.8, p=.Ol
x Group: F (1, 43)=6.6, p=.Ol
4. Congruency: F (1, 48)=19, P =.01
X Group: F (I, 48)= 2.7, P=l.O
5.CTI x Trial type: F(l, 38)=1.7, p =.19
x Group: F(l, 38)= .75, p =.39
6.CTI x task: F(2, 72)= 28, p<.OOl
1.CTI: F(l, 36)= 393, p<.OOl
x Group: F(l, 36)= 19, p<.OOl
2.Switch type :F (1,36)= 3.3, P =.08
x Group: F (1,36)= 2.5, p=.12
3. Task: F(2, 58)= 19, p <.001
x Group: F (2, 58)= 7.5, p=.002
4.Congruency: F (2, 84)= 25, p <.001
X Group: F(2, 84)= 1.7, p=.18
5.CTI x Switch type: F(l, 36)= .50, p=.48
x Group: F(1, 36)= .59, p= .45
6.CTI x task: F(l, 55)= 42, p<.OOl
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x Group: F(2, 72}= 8.6, p=.OOl
7.Trial type x task: F(2, 68)= 2.9, p=.07
x Group: F(2, 68}= .02, p=.97
a.CTI x Trial type x task: F(1,43)=.72,
p=.41
X Group: F (1, 43)= .88, p=.37
9. CTI x congruency: F (2,85)= 3.7,
p=.025
X Group: F (2,85)=1.2, p=.30
10. Trial type x congruency: F (2, 77)=
1.9, p=.15
X Group: F (2, 77)= 1.0, p=.35
11. CTI x Trial type x congruency
: F (1,50)= 3.8, p=.04
X Group: F (1, 50}=1.7, P=.16
12. Task x congruency: F (2, 88)=9.4, P
<.001
X Group: F(2, 88)= 1.9, p=.15
13. CT! x task x congruency:
F (2, 63)= 3, p=.08
X Group: F (2, 63)= 1.3, p=.28
14. Trial type x task x congruency:
F (2, 86)=4.5, p=.Oll
x Group: F (2, 86)= 2.3, p=.09
15. CTI x trial type x task x
congruency: F (2, 62)= 2.5, p=.10
X Group: F (2, 62}=1.7, p=.19
Between subject effect: F (1, 38)=24,
o-c.ooi
x Group: F(1, 55)= 42, p=.005
7.Switch type x task: F(2, 71)= 2.0, p=.14
x Group: F(2, 71)= 1.6, p =.21
8.CTI x Switch type x task: F (2, 62)= .80,
p=.44
X Group: F (2, 62}=.02, p=1.0
9.CTI x congruency: F(2, 87)=6.2, P =.002
X Group: F (2,87)= 1.0, p=.38
10. Switch type x congruency: F (2,91)=
2.8, p=.06
X Group: F (2,91)= 2.9, p=.05
11. CTI x Switch type x congruency:
F (2,95)= 4, p =.012
X Group: F (2, 95)= .78, p=.49
12. Task x congruency: F (3, 138)= 9.3, P
<.001
X Group: F (3, 138)= 1.7, p=.15
13. CTI x task x congruency: F (4, 146)=
4.1, p=.003
X Group: F (4, 146)=1.3, p=.25
14. Switch type x task x Congruency:
F(4, 141)=3.6, p=.008
x Group: F (4, 141)= 1.9, p=.12
15. CTI x switch type x task x
congruency: F (3, 121)= 5.5, p=.OOl
X Group: F (3,121)= .64, p=.61
Between subject effect: F (1, 36)= 22,
P <.001
2. Expl vs. Exp 3 (task-oriented cues vs. all verbal cues) (see the
chapter 5, page 165)
cn x Trial type x Task x Congruency
By Group
CTr x Switch type x Task x Congruency
By Group
1. CTI: F (1, 40)=250, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,40)= 2, p=.17
2. Trial type: F(l, 40)=66, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,40)= 4.5, p =.04
3. Task: F (2, 72)=46, p<.001
x Group: F (2, 72}=1.2, p=.31
4. Congruency: F (2,89)=53, P <.001
X Group: F (2,89)= .55, P=.59
5. CTI x Trial type: F(l, 40)=39, P
<.001
x Group: F(1, 31}= .31, p =.58
6. CTI x task: F(2, 73)= 17, p<.OOl
x Group: F(2, 73)= .35, p=.68
1. CTI: F(l, 40)= 314, p<.OOl
x Group: F(l, 40}= 5.5, p=.02
2. Switch type :F (1,40)= 2.2, p =.15
x Group: F (1, 40)= 1, p=.31
3. Task: F(2, 72)= 34, p <.001
x Group: F (2, 72)= 1.0, p=.35
4. Congruency: F (2,97)= 62, P <.001
X Group: F (2, 97)= .08, p=.95
5. CTI x Switch type: F(l, 40)= .10,
p=.92
x Group: F(1, 40)= .00, p= .10
6. CTI x task: F(l, 59)= 27, p<.OOl
x Group: F{1, 59)= 1.7, p=.20
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7. Trial type x task: F(2, 76)= 1.1,
p=.32
x Group: F(2, 76)= 3.2, p=.05
8. CTI x Trial type x task: F(2,75)=2.8,
p=.07
X Group: F (2, 75)= 4.8, p=.012
9. CTI x congruency: F (2,98)= 3.2,
p=.03
X Group: F (2,98)=.15, p=.90
10. Trial type x congruency: F (3,
104)=.48, p=.67
X Group: F (3, 104)= .41, p=.72
11. CTI x Trial type x congruency
: F (3, 110)= 1.8, p=.16
X Group: F (3, 110)=1.1, P=3.5
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 174)=14, P
<.001
X Group: F (4, 174)= 2.8, p=.03
13. cn X task x congruency:
F (4,176)= 4.5, p=.001
X Group: F (4, 176)= .60, p=.68
9. Trial type x task x congruency:
F (5, 195)=3.6, p=.004
x Group: F (5, 195)= .64, p=.67
15. cn x trial type x task x
congruency: F (5, 188)= 2.4, p=.04
X Group: F (5, 188)= 1.2, p=.33
Between subject effect: F (1, 40)=.08,
p=.78
7. Switch type x task: F(2, 71)= .09,
p=.89
x Group: F(2, 71)= .18, p =.81
8. CTI x Switch type x task: F (2,
77)= 2.5, p=.08
X Group: F (2, 77)=.91, p=.40
9. CTI x congruency: F(2, 99)=2.8, p
=.05
X Group: F (2, 99)= .54, p=.62
10. Switch type x congruency: F
(3,112)= 1.2, p=.32
X Group: F ( 3,112)= 1.2, p=.32
11. CTI x Switch type x congruency:
F (3,112)= 7.7, p <.001
X Group: F (3, 112)= 2.2, p=.09
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 170)= 13,
P <.001
X Group : F(4, 170)= 1.7, p=.14
13. CTI x task x congruency: F (3,
144)= 1.3, p=.26
X Group: F (3,144)=1.7, p=.17
14. Switch type x task x Congruency:
F(4, 169)=1.5, p=.20
x Group: F (4, 169)= 1.7, p=.21
15. CTI x switch type x task x
congruency: F (3, 135)= 5.6,
p=.OOl
X Group: F (3,135)= 1.6, p.19
Between subject effect: F (1,40)= .08, p=.77
4. Exp 3 vs. Exp 4 (all verbal cues vs. all arbitrary cues) (see the
chapter 6, page 206-208)
CT! x Trial type x Task x Congruency
By Group
CT! x Switch type x Task x Congruency
By Group
1.CTI: F (1, 38)=560, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,38)= 44, p<.OOl
2.Trial type: F(l, 38)=57, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,38)= 7.5, p =.009
3.Task: F(l, 60)=44, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,60)=1.8, p=.17
4. Congruency: F (2, 86)=28, p <.001
X Group: F (2, 86)= .47, P=.65
5.CTI x Trial type: F(l, 38)=68, p <.001
x Group: F(1, 38)= 3.0, p =.09
6.CTI x task: F(2, 74)= 8.2, p=.OOl
x Group: F(2, 74)= .18, p=.83
7.Trial type x task: F(2, 65)= .027,p=.96
1.CTI: F(l, 38)= 279, p<.OOl
x Group: F(1, 38)= 25, o-c.oo:
2.Switch type :F (1,38)= 6.8, p =.02
x Group: F (1, 38)= 1.2, p=.28
3. Task: F(2, 70)= 3D, p <.001
x Group: F (2, 70)= .24, p=.77
4.Congruency: F (2,95)= 25, p <.001
X Group: F(2, 95)= 1.1, p=.33
5.CTI x Switch type: F(l, 38)= .16, p=.69
x Group: F(1, 38)= .13, p= .72
6.CTI x task: F(2, 68)= 11, p<.OOl
x Group: F(2, 68)= 2.2, p=.12
7.Switch type x task: F(2, 69)= 1.7, p=.19
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x Group: F(2, 65)= .83, p=.42 x Group: F(2, 69)= 1.3, p =.27
a.CTI x Trial type x task: F(2,66)=3.2,
p=.05
X Group: F (2,66)= 6.4, p=.004
9.CTI x congruency: F (3,102)= 6.2,
p=.OOl
X Group: F (3, 102)=.12, p=.93
10. Trial type x congruency: F (2, 93)=
2.7, p=.06
X Group: F (2, 93)= 2.0, p=.14
11. CTI x Trial type x congruency
: F (2, 87)= 3.8, p=.02
X Group: F (2, 87)=2.5, P=.07
12. Task x congruency: F (4,158)=11, P
<.001
X Group: F (4, 178)= 1.1, p=.37
13. CTI x task x congruency:
F (3, 136)= 4.2, p=.004
X Group: F (3, 136)= .68, p=.59
14. Trial type x task x congruency:
F (5, 190)=7.5, p<.OOl
x Group: F (5, 190)= 1.4, p=.20
15. CTI x trial type x task x congruency:
F (4, 163)= 3.9, p=.003
X Group: F (4, 163)= 2.5, p=.04
Between subject effect: F (1,38)= 4.1,
p=.05
8.CTI x Switch type x task: F (2, 65)= .45,
p=.60
X Group: F (2, 65)= .77, p=.45
9.CTI x congruency: F(2, 92)= 1.9, p =.13
X Group: F (2, 92)= 1.0, p=.36
10. Switch type x congruency: F
(3,104)= .42, p=.72
X Group: F( 3,104)= 1.7, p=.17
11. CTI x Switch type x congruency:
F (2,84)= 3.4, p =.03
X Group: F(2, 84)= 1.7, p=.19
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 140)= 11, P
<.001
X Group: F (4, 140)= 1.3, p=.28
13. CTI x task x congruency: F (4, 146)=
2.3, p=.06
X Group: F (4, 146)=1.1, p=.36
14. Switch type x task x Congruency:
F(3, 104)=1.3, p=.27
x Group: F (3,104)= .91, p=.43
15. CTI x switch type x task x
congruency: F (4, 164)= 3.4, p=.008
X Group: F (4,164)= 1.4, p.23
Between subject effect: F (1, 38)= 6.3, p=.016
s. Exp 3 vs. Exp 5 (all verbal cues vs. response information out)
(see the chapter 7, page 246-247)
en x Trial type x Task x Congruency
By Group
cn x Switch type x Task x Congruency
By Group
1.CTI: F (1, 38)=265, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1, 38)= .35, p=.55
2.Trial type: F(l, 38)=51, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,38)= 5.9, p =.02
3.Task: F (2, 71)=87, p<.OOl
x Group: F (2, 71)= 4.1, p=.02
4. Congruency: F (2, 66)=30, P <.001
X Group: F (2,66)= 1.6, P=.21
S.CTI x Trial type: F(2, 82)=48, p <.001
x Group: F(2, 82)= .53, p =.61
6.CTI x task: F(2, 64)= 13, p<.OOl
x Group: F(2, 64)= 1.5, p=.23
7.Trial type x task: F(2, 71)= .63,p=.52
x Group: F(2, 71)= .47, p=.61
1. CTI: F(l, 38)= 303, p<.OOl
x Group: F(1, 38)= 1.6, p=.21
2.Switch type :F (1,38)= 13, P =.001
x Group: F (1,38)= 2, p=.17
3. Task: F(2, 67)= 61, P <.001
x Group: F (2,67)= 1.1, p=.34
4.Congruency: F (2,86)= 35, P <.001
X Group: F (2,86)= 2.0, p=.13
S.CTI x Switch type: F(l, 38)= .34, p=.56
x Group: F(l, 38)= .24, p= .62
6.CTlxtask: F(2, 71)= 17, p<.OOl
x Group: F(2, 71)= 3.0, p=.06
7.Switch type x task: F(2, 76)= .76, p=.47
x Group: F(2, 76)= .18, p =.83
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a.CTI x Trial type x task: F(2,65)=1.6,
p=.22
X Group: F (2,65)= 2.4, p=.10
9.CTI x congruency: F (3,107)= 3.3,
p=.03
X Group: F (3,107)=.88, p=.45
10. Trial type x congruency: F (3, 100)=
1.2, p=.30
X Group: F (3, 100)= .43, p=.71
11. CTI x Trial type x congruency
: F (3, 110)= 1.2, p=.30
X Group: F (3, 110}=.46, P=.70
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 150)=18, P
<.001
X Group: F(4, 150)= 1.7, p=.16
13. CTI x task x congruency:
F (5,188)= 4.2, p=.OOl
X Group: F (5, 188)= .31, p=.90
14. Trial type x task x congruency:
F (4, 171)= 3.1, p=.012
x Group: F(4, 171)= 1.7, p=.13
15. CT! x trial type x task x congruency:
F (5, 192)= 1.6, p= .16
X Group: F (5, 192)= .52, p=.77
Between subject effect: F (1, 38)= 3.8,
p=.06
B.CTI x Switch type x task: F (2,72)= 1.2,
p=.31
X Group: F(2, 72}= .70, p=.49
9.CTI x congruency: F(2, 88)= 2.6, P =.07
X Group: F (2, 88)= .18, p=.86
10. Switch type x congruency: F (3,102)=
1.2, p=.31
X Group: F (3,102)= .58, p=.61
11. CTI x Switch type x congruency:
F (2,96)= 3.1, p =.04
X Group: F (2, 96)= 1.8, p=.15
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 155)= 7.4, P
<.001
X Group: F (4, 155)= 3.0, p=.02
13. CTI x task x congruency: F (4, 152)=
2.4, p=.05
X Group: F(4, 152}=.78, p=.54
14. Switch type x task x Congruency:
F(4,171)=.72, p=.59
x Group: F (4,171)= 1.3, p=.27
15. CTI x switch type x task x
congruency: F (4, 164)= 1.4, p=.23
X Group: F (4, 164)= 2.5, p.04
Between subject effect: F (1~38)= .67, p=.47
6. Exp 3 vs. Exp 6a (cue-target joint vs. cue-target separate
with verbal cues)
CT! x Trial type x Task x Congruency
By Group
cn x Switch type x Task x Congruency
By Group
1. CTI: F (1,38)=250, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,38)= .004, p<.94
2. Trial type: F(l, 38)=59, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,38)= .14, P =.71
3. Task: F (2, 68)=46, p<.OOl
x Group: F (2,68)=.30, p=.72
4. Congruency: F (2,66)=30, P <.001
X Group: F (2, 66)= 1.6, P=.21
9.CTI x Trial type: F(l, 38)=63, p <.001
x Group: F(l, 38)= 1.1, p =.29
10. CTI x task: F(2, 66)= 9.2, p<.OOl
x Group: F(2, 66)= 4.3, p=.02
11. Trial type x task: F(2, 66)= 3.1,p=.05
x Group: F(2, 66)= .79, p=.44
12. CTI x Trial type x task: F(2,71)=2.9,
p=.06
X Group: F (2,71)= .79, p=.45
1. CTI: F(1, 38)= 261, p<.OOl
x Group: F(1, 38}= .58, p=.45
2. Switch type :F (1, 38)= 4.2, p =.05
x Group: F (1, 38)= .09, p=.76
3. Task: F(2, 73)= 86, p <.001
x Group: F (2, 73)= 1.2, p=.31
4. Congruency: F (2, 92)= 65, p <.001
X Group: F (2, 92)= 1.2, p=.30
5. CTI x Switch type: F(l, 38)= .16, p=.69
x Group: F(1, 38)= .24, p= .62
6. CTI x task: F(2, 73)= 13, p<.OOl
x Group: F(2, 73)= 4.5, p=.015
7. Switch type x task: F(2, 75)= .42,
p=.65
x Group: F(2, 75)= 1.1, p =.34
B. CTI x Switch type x task: F (2, 67)=
1.4, p-.24
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9.CTI x congruency: F (3,107)= 4.5,
p=.006
X Group: F (3, 107)=.51, p=.66
10. Trial type x congruency: F (3,
108)= .78, p=.50
X Group: F (3, 108)= .60, p=.61
11. CTI x Trial type x congruency
: F (3, 108)= 1.4, p=.24
X Group: F (3, 108)=.25, P=.85
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 156)=7.1, P
<.001
X Group: F (4, 156)= 2.6, p=.03
13. CTI x task x congruency:
F (5,181)= 2.8, p=.02
X Group: F (5, 181)= .95, p=.45
15. Trial type x task x congruency:
F (5, 185)=.75, p=.58
x Group: F (5, 185)= .75, p=.58
15. cn x trial type x task x congruency:
F (5, 193)= 2.2, p=.05
X Group: F (5, 193)= 1.1, p=.37
Between subject effect: F (1, 38)= .73,
p=.40
X Group: F (2, 67)= .83, p=.42
9. CTI x congruency: F(2, 89)= 3.8, p =.02
X Group: F (2,89)= .758, p=.49
10. Switch type x congruency: F (2,89)=
3.8, p=.02
X Group: F (2,89)= .75, p=.49
11. CTI x Switch type x congruency:
F (3,105)= 8.8, p <.001
X Group: F (3, 105)= .38, p=. 75
12. Task x congruency: F (5,181)= 14, P
<.001
X Group: F (5, 181)= .99, p=.42
13. CTI x task x congruency: F (5, 185)=
1.8, p=.l1
X Group: F (5, 185)=.55, p=.73
14. Switch type x task x Congruency:
F(4, 176)=.24, p=.94
x Group: F (4,176)= .77, p=.56
15. CTI x switch type x task x
congruency: F (5, 190)= 4.9, p<.OOl
X Group: F (5, 190)= 1.3, p=.27
Between subject effect: F (1,38)= 4.3, p=.044
7. Exp 4 vs. Exp 6b (cue-target joint vs. cue-target separate
with arbitrary cues)
Cf I x Trial type x Task x Congruency
By Group
CT! x Switch type x Task x Congruency
By Group
1. CTI: F (1,31)=435, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,31)= 2.3, p=.14
2. Trial type: F(l, 31)=40, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,31)= 2.0, P =.17
3. Task: F (2, 49)=28, p<.OOl
x Group: F (2, 49)=1.7, p=.20
4. Congruency: F (2, 75)=19, P <.001
X Group: F (2, 75)= 1.3, P=.26
5. CTI x Trial type: F(l, 31)=76, P <.001
x Group: F(l, 31)= .97, p =.33
6. CTI x task: F(2, 55)= 1.8, p=.18
x Group:F(2, 55)= .92, p=.40
7. Trial type x task: F(2, 56)= .21,p=.79
x Group: F(2, 56)= .23, p=.77
8. CTI x Trial type x task: F(2,6l)=5.5,
p=.006
X Group: F (2, 61)= .86, p=.43
9.CTI x congruency: F (2,82)= 3.0, p=.04
X Group: F (2,82)=.68, p=.55
1. CTI: F(l, 33)= 225, p<.OOl
x Group: F(1, 33)= .20, p=.65
2. Switch type :F (1,33)= 4.7, p =.04
x Group: F (1, 33)= .06, p=.80
3. Task: F(2, 58)= 20, P <.001
x Group: F (2, 58)= .26, p=.74
4. Congruency: F (3, 90)= 13, p <.001
X Group: F (3, 90)= .13, p=.92
5. CTI x Switch type: F(l, 33)= .77, p=.39
x Group: F(l, 33)= .12, p= .73
6. CTI x task: F(2, 56)= 7.9, p=.002
x Group: F(2, 56)= .35, p=.67
7. Switch type x task: F(2, 62)= .95,
p=.39
x Group: F(2, 62)= .10, P =.37
8. CTI x Switch type x task: F (2,64)= 16,
p=.85
X Group: F(2, 64)= .13, p=.87
9. CTI x congruency: F(3, 91)= 3.5, p =.02
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10. Trial type x congruency: F (2, 66)=
4.3, p=.02
X Group: F (2, 66)= .70, p=.50
11. CTI x Trial type x congruency
: F (2,76)= 4.3, p=.Ol
X Group: F (2, 76)= 1.1, P=.33
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 140)=7.1, P
<.001
X Group: F (4, 140)= 1.3, p=.28
13. CTI x task x congruency:
F (3, 104)= 2.5, p=.06
X Group: F (3, 104)= .86, p=.47
16. Trial type x task x congruency:
F (4, 137)=4.8, p=.OOl
x Group: F (4, 137)= 1.4, p=.22
15. CTI x trial type x task x congruency:
F (4, 133)= 5.4, p<.OOl
X Group: F (4, 133)= 1.5, p=.21
Between subject effect: F (1,31)= 2.1,
p=.16
X Group: F (3, 91)= .30, p=.81
10. Switch type x congruency: F
(3,89)= .48, p=.67
X Group: F (3,89)= .48, p=.67
11. CTI x Switch type x congruency:
F (2,82)= 3.5, p =.02
X Group: F (3, 91)= .30, p=.81
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 147)= 8.7, P
<.001
X Group: F (4, 147)= .71, p=.60
13. CTI x task x congruency: F (4, 134)=
2.5, p=.04
X Group: F (4, 134)=.71, p=.58
14. Switch type x task x Congruency:
F(3, 109)= 1.5, p=.20
x Group: F (3, 109)= .45, p=.73
15. CTI x switch type x task x
congruency: F (5, 156)= 2.4, p=.04
X Group: F (5, 156)= .95, p=.45
Between subject effect: F (1,33)= 2.5, p=.12
8. Exp 6a vs. Exp 6b (verbal cues vs. arbitrary cues when both
cue-target are separately displayed) (see the chapter 8, page
314-315)
CT! x Trial type x Task x Congruency
By Group
cn x Switch type x Task x Congruency
By Group
1. CTI: F (1,31)=237, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1, 31)= 14, p=.OOl
2. Trial type: F(l, 31)=32, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,31)= 7.1, P =.01
3. Task: F (2, 58)=57, p<.OOl
x Group: F (2, 58)=2.2, p=.12
4. Congruency: F (2, 66)=40, P <.001
X Group: F (2,66)= .29, P=.76
9. CTI x Trial type: F(l, 31)=58, P <.001
x Group: F(1, 31)= 7.9, p =.009
10. CTI x task: F(2, 60)= 2.1, p=.13
x Group: F(2, 60)= .45, p=.63
11. Trial type x task: F(2, 60)= .52,p=.59
x Group: F(2, 60)= .003, p=.99
12. CTI x Trial type x task: F(2,62)=3,
p=.06
X Group: F (2, 62)= 1.2, p=.31
9.CTI x congruency: F (3,84)= 1.3, p=.27
X Group: F (3,84)=.39, p=.74
1. CTI: F(l, 33)= 185, p<.OOl
x Group: F(1, 33)= 25, p<.OOl
2. Switch type :F (1, 33)= 2.8, P =.10
x Group: F (1,33)= 1.1, p=.31
3. Task: F(2, 55)= 43, P <.001
x Group: F (2,55)= .30, p=.70
4. Congruency: F (2, 84)= 33, p <.001
X Group: F (2, 84)= .04, p=.98
5. CTI x Switch type: F(l, 33)= .41, p=.52
x Group: F(1, 33)= 1.1, p= .29
6. CTI x task: F(2, 57)= 5.7, p=.008
x Group: F(2, 57)= 1.7, p=.19
7. Switch type x task: F(2, 65)= .34,
p=.70
x Group: F(2, 65)= .56, p =.57
8. CTI x Switch type x task: F (2,
65)= .15, p=.86
X Group: F (2, 65)= .10, p=.90
9. CTI x congruency: Fe3, 96)= 4.3, p
=.008
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10. Trial type x congruency: F (2, 80)=
3.2, p=.03
X Group: F (2, 80)= 1.2, p=.30
11. CTI x Trial type x congruency
: F (3, 88)= 2.5, p=.07
X Group: F (3, 88)= 1.2, P=.30
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 129)=14, P
<.001
X Group: F (4, 129)= .62, p=.65
13. CTI x task x congruency:
F (4, 131)= 2.7, p=.03
X Group: F (4, 131)= .48, p=.76
17. Trial type x task x congruency:
F (4, 136)=2.7, p=.03
x Group: F (4, 136)= .43, p=.80
15. CTI x trial type x task x congruency:
F (5, 145)= 3.2, p<.OOl
X Group: F (5, 145)= 2.9, p=.02
Between subject effect: F (1, 31)= 4.1,
p=.05
X Group: F (3, 96)= 1.5, p=.20
1.O. Switch type x congruency: F
(3,87)= .23, p=.85
X Group: F (3,87)= .45, p=.69
11. CTI x Switch type x congruency:
F (3,92)= 5.1, p =.003
X Group: F (3, 92)= .38, p=.75
12. Task x congruency: F (5, 162)= 9.7, P
<.001
X Group: F (5, 162)= 1.1, p=.37
13. CTI x task x congruency: F (4, 132)=
2.5, p=.05
X Group: F (4, 132)=1.2, p=.33
14. Switch type x task x Congruency:
F(4, 148)= 1.2, p=.31
x Group: F (4, 148)= .84, p=.51
15. CTI x switch type x task x
congruency: F (4, 140)= 1.9, p=.l1
X Group: F (4, 140)= 2, p=.13
Between subject effect: F (1, 33)= 8.6, p=.13
Chapter 4. Old controls vs.
Patients with early Parkinson's disease
a) Reaction time ems)
eTI x Trial type x Task x Congruency
By Group
cn x Switch type x Task x Congruency
By Group
1. CTI: F (1,32)=172, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1, 32)= .48, p=.49
2. Trial type: F(l, 32)=23, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1,32)= .12, p =.57
3. Task: F (1, 38)=16, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1, 38}=.12, p=.78
4. Congruency: F (1,43)=23, P <.001
XGroup: F (1,43)= .21, P=.72
5. CTI x Trial type: F(l, 32)=8.3, P
=.007
x Group: F(1, 32}= 1.4, p =.24
6. eTI x task: F(l, 45)= 17, p<.OOl
x Group: F(1, 45}= .82, p=.41
7. Trial type x task: F(2, 61)= 3.3,
p=.05
x Group: F(2, 61}= 1.4, p=.87
8. eTI x Trial type x task: F(1,37)=.86,
p=.37
X Group: F (1,37)= .18, p=.71
9. eTI x congruency: F (2,58)= 14,
p<.OOl
1.. eTI: F(l, 31)= 2.3, p=.14
x Group: F(1, 31}= .94, p=.34
2. Switch type :F (1,31)= 303, P
<.001
x Group: F (1, 31)= 61, p=.44
3. Task: F(!, 47)= 24, p <.001
x Group: F (1,47)= 2.6, p=.10
4. Congruency: F (2,72)= 29, p <.001
X Group: F (2, 72)= .75, p=.49
5. eTI x Switch type: F(l, 31)= 1.2,
p=.28
x Group: F(l, 31)= .06, p= .80
6. eTI x task: F(2, 52)= 1.3, p=.27
x Group: F(2, 52)= .69, p=.48
7. Switch type x task: F(2, 60)= 33,
p<.OOl
x Group: F(2, 60)= 2.1, p =.13
8. eTI x Switch type x task: F (2,
56)= .23, p=.77
X Group: F (2, 56)=.04, p=.95
9. eTI x congruency: F(3, 90)=6.4, P
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XGroup: F (2,58)=.15, p=.84 =.001
X Group: F (3,90)= .02, p=.l0
10. Trial type x congruency: F (2, 53)=
4.8, p=.02
X Group: F (2, 53)= 4.8, p=.02
11. CTI x Trial type x congruency
: F (2, 60)= 7.9, p=.OOl
X Group: F (2, 60)=.42, P=.65
12. Taskx congruency: F(2, 77)=12, P
<.001
X Group: F (2, 77)= .05, p=.97
13. CTI x task x congruency:
F (2,52)= 3.2, p=.06
X Group: F (2, 52)= .52, p=.56
14.Trial type x task x congruency:
F (3, 103)=11, p<.OOl
x Group: F (3, 103)= 1.1, p=.37
15. CTI x trial type x task x
congruency: F (2,59)= 4.4, p=.02
X Group: F (2, 59)= .34, p=.69
Between subject effect: F (1, 32)=.53,
p=.47
10. Switch type x congruency: F
(2,71)= 5.3, p=005
X Group: F (2,71)= .40, p=.70
11. CTI x Switch type x congruency:
F (2,77)= 2.7, P =.06
X Group: F (2, 77)= .15, p=.90
12. Task x congruency: F (4, 119)= 9.0,
P <.001
X Group: F (4, 119)= .85, p=.49
13. CTI x task x congruency: F (4,
129)= 3.5, p=.009
X Group: F (4, 129)=1.8, p=.13
14. Switch type x task x Congruency:
F(4, 122)=5.8, p<.OOl
x Group: F (4, 122)= .50, p=.73
15. CTI x switch type x task x
congruency: F (4, 133)= 4.1,
p=.003
X Group: F (4, 133)= .77, p=.55
Between subject effect: F (1,31)= 1.9, p=.18
b) Error (0/0)
CT! x Trial type x Task x Congruency
By Group
CT! x Switch type x Task x Congruency
By Group
1. CTI: F (1,32)=195, p<.OOl
x Group: F (1, 32)= .55, p=.46
9. Trial type: F(l, 32)=9.7, p=.004
x Group: F (1,32)= 1.9, p =17
10. Task: F (1, 40)=12, p<.OOl
x Group: F(l, 40)=.15, p=.76
4. Congruency: F (1, 32)=314, P <.001
XGroup: F (1,32)= .74, P=.40
S. CTI x Trial type: F(l, 32)=.94, P
=.34
x Group: F(l, 32)= .18, p =.68
6. CTI x task: F(2, 58)= 10, p<.OOl
x Group: F(2, 58)= .83, p=.43
7. Trial type x task: F(2, 58)= 1.1,
p=.33
x Group: F(2, 53)= .47, p=.61
8. CTI x Trial type x task: F(2,55)=.07,
p=.95
X Group: F (2,55)= .85, p=.42
9. CTI x congruency: F (1,32)= 195,
p<.OOl
X Group: F (1, 32)=.56, p=.46
10. Trial type x congruency: F (1, 32)=
16. CTI: F(l, 32)= .007, p=.94
x Group: F(l, 32)= .69, p=.41
17. Switch type:F (1,32)= 8.1, P <.001
x Group: F (1, 32)= .08, p=.78
18. Task: F(2, 60)= 7.7, p =.001
x Group: F (2,60)= .07, p=.92
19. Congruency: F (1, 35)= 10, p =.002
X Group: F (1,35)= .54, p=.48
20. CTI x Switch type: F(l, 32)= 1.4,
p=.24
x Group: F(l, 32)= .06, p= .81
21. CTI x task: F(2, 56)= 16, p=.83
x Group: F(2, 56)= .003, p=.99
22. Switch type x task: F(2, 62)= .47,
p=.62
x Group: F(2, 62)= .25, p =.77
23. CTI x Switch type x task: F (2,
56)= 1.1, p=.33
X Group: F (2,56)=.05, p=.93
24. CTI x congruency: F(2, 60)=2.5, P
= 1.0
X Group: F (2,60)= 1.2, p=.30
25. Switch type x congruency: F
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9.7, p=.004
X Group: F (1,32)= 1.9, p=.17
(2,60)= 1.7,p=.19
X Group: F (2,60)= .28, p=.74
11. CTI x Trial type x congruency
: F (1,32)= .94, p=.34
X Group: F (1,32)=.18, P=.67
12. Task x congruency: F (1,40)=12, P
<.001
X Group: F (1, 40)= .15, p=.76
13. CTI x task x congruency:
F (2,57)= 10, p<.OOl
X Group: F (2, 57)= .83, p=.43
14. Trial type x task x congruency:
F (2,57)=1.1, p=.33
x Group: F (2, 57)= .47, p=.61
15. CTI x trial type x task x
congruency: F (2,55)= .07, p=.90
X Group: F (2, 55)= .85, p=.42
Between subject effect: F (1,32)=.74,
p=.40
26. CTI x Switch type x congruency:
F (2,45)= .13, p =.80
X Group: F (2, 45)= .23, p=.72
27. Task x congruency: F (2, 73)= 6.7,
P=.001
X Group: F (2, 73)= .12, p=.91
28. CTI x task x congruency: F (2,
70)= .64, p=.55
X Group: F (2, 70)=.50, p=.63
29. Switch type x task x Congruency:
F(2,82)=2, p=.12
x Group: F (2,82)= 1.2, p=.30
30. CTI x switch type x task x
congruency: F (2, 58)= 1.3, p=.85
X Group: F (2,58)= .34, p=.67
Between subject effect: F (1, 32)= .39, p=.53
c) Effect of Previous congruency (Error data)
SwitchLReReat(Trial t~Rel
CTI=100 CTI=1200
Switch Repeat Switch Repeat
Arrow Previous Previous
congruency : congruency:
F (1, 32)=.07, F (1,32)=.003, F (1,32)=.11, F (1,32)=.00
p=.80 P=.96 p=.74 P=1.0
X group: X group:
F (1, 32)= F (1,32)=.97, F (1, 32)= 2.6, F (1,32)= .60,
2.04, p=.16 p=.33 p=.12 p=.44
Between Between subject
subject effect: effect: F (1,




F (1, 32)= .36, F (1, 32)= 3.4, F (1, 32)= 1.3, F (1, 32)= 5.2,
p=.55 p=.07 p=.26 p=.03
X Group: X group:
F (1,32)=.36, F (1, 32)=.08, F (1,32)= 2.6, F (1, 32)= 1.3,
p=.55 p=.77 p=.12 p=.26
Between Between subject
subject effect: effect: F (1,





F (1, 32)= .23, F (1, 32)= 3.4, F (1,32)= 1.3, F (1, 32)= 3.7,
p=.64 P=.07 p=.25 p=.09
X Group: X Group:
F (1,32)= 4.3, F(1,32)= .08,p= F (1, 32)= 1.3, F (1,32)=.34,
p=.05 .77 p=.25 p=.56
Between Between subject
subject effect: effect: F (1,
F (1, 32)= 041, F (1,32)=.50, 32)=.65, p=.42 F (1,32)= .34,
p=.53 P=A8 p=.56
Alternating switchLDouble switch (switch ty~e)
CTI=100 CTI=1200




F (1, 32)= 1.3, F (1,32)=.99, F (1, 32)=1.7 F (1, 32)=.14
p=.26 P=.33 p=.20 P=.71
X group: X group:
F (1, 32)= 2.. F (1,32)=.05, F (1,32)= 1.3, F (1,32)= .91,
4, p=.13 p=.82 p=.26 p=.35
Between Between subject
subject effect: effect: F (1,




F (1, 32)= .26, F (1, 32)= .45, F (1,32)= 1.9, F (1,32)= 1.9,
p=.61 p=.51 p=.17 p=.18
X Group: X group:
F (1,32)=.87, F (1, 32)=.03, F (1,32)= 1.8, F (1,32)= .31,
p=.36 p=.86 p=.18 p=.58
Between Between subject
subject effect: effect: F (1,




F (1, 32)= .22, F (1,32)= .76, F (1,32)= .01, F (1,32)= 2.1,
p=.64 P=.39 p=.91 p=.15
X Group: X Group:
F (1, 32)= 4.0, F(l,32)= .38,p= F (1,32)= .17, F (1,32)=.81,
p=.Of .54 p=.68 p=.37
Between Between subject
subject effect: effect: F (1,
F (1, 32)= .22, F (1, 32)=.28, 32)=.20, p=.66 F (1,32)= 1.1,
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p=.64 P=.SO p=.29
• 4-Way ANOVA TABLE for each chapter
(note: chapter 4 was presented previously)
Chapter 3 (Experiment 1)
1. Effect of Trial type (Switch/Repeat), CTI, Task and
Congruency (see the chapter 3, page 73)
a) On Reaction Time ems)
Effect Df F P
cn 1,20 156 P <.001
Trial type 1,20 30 P<.OOl
Task 2,37 22 P<.OOl
Congruency 2,40 32 P<.001
cn x trial type 1,20 32 P<.001
CTI x task 2,35 7.7 P=.OO2
Trial type x task 2,33 1.6 P=.209
cn x trial type x task 2,37 4.1 P=.026
cn x Congruency 2,34 .98 P=.37
Trial type x Congruency 3,57 .37 P=.76
CTl x Trial type x Congruency 2,43 2.1 P=.12
Task x Congruency 3,70 6.7 P<.OO1
cn x task x Congruency 4,75 2.4 P=.06
Trial type x task x Congruency 4, 86 1.4 P=.23
cn x trial type x task x 4, 93 2.4 P=.05
congruency
b) On Error (Ofo)
Effect Df F P
CTI 1, 20 .65 P =.43
Trial type 1,20 15 P=.OOl
Task 2,37 .24 P=.77
Congruency 2, 35 29 P<.OOl
CTI x trial type 1,20 .26 P=.62
CTI x task 2, 38 2.9 P=.07
Trial type x task 2, 35 3.3 P=.05
CTI x trial type x task 2, 38 .64 P=.54
cn x Congruency 2, 35 5.2 P=.02
Trial type x Congruency 2,40 3.1 P=.06
CTI x Trial type x Congruency 2,40 .45 P=.63
Task x Congruency 3, 68 1.5 P=.21
CTI x task x Congruency 3,61 2.5 P=.07
Trial type x task x Congruency 3, 71 1.9 P=.12




2. Effect of Switch type (Alternating/Double switch), CTI, Task
and Congruency (see the chapter 3, page 87)
a) On Reaction time (ms)
Effect Of F P
CT! 1,20 193 P <.001
Switch type 1,20 .09 P=.76
Task 2, 34 12 P <.001
Congruency 2, 50 29 P <.001
CT! x switch type 1, 20 .007 P=.93
CT! x task 1,27 14 P <.001
Switch type x task 1, 31 .09 P=.87
CT! x switch type x task 2, 37 1.6 p=.21
CTI x Congruency 2, 50 2 P=.13
Switch type x Congruency 2,44 .89 P=A3
CTI x Switch type x Congruency 2,49 6.1 P=.002
Task x Congruency 3, 69 8.1 P <.001
CTI x task x Congruency 3,56 1.7 P=.17
Switch type x task x Congruency 3, 69 2.0 P=.10
CTI x switch type x task x 2, 47 3.6 P=.03
congruency
b) On Error(%)
Effect Df F P
CT! 1,20 1.0 P =.33
Switch type 1,20 AD P=.53
Task 2, 35 .18 P =.80
Congruency 1,30 17 P <.001
CT! x switch type 1,20 1.5 P=.23
CT! x task 2,39 2.3 P =.11
Switch type x task 2,34 .42 P=.63
CT! x switch type x task 2, 38 .70 p=.50
CT! x Congruency 2, 46 3.3 P=.04
Switch type x Congruency 2,47 .85 P=.45
CT! x Switch type x Congruency 2,46 .63 P=.56
Task x Congruency 3, 66 1.4 P=.24
CTI x task x Congruency 4, 74 2.8 P=.03
Switch type x task x Congruency 4, 83 1.5 P=.20
CT! x switch type x task x 3,67 .58 P=.65
congruency
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Chapter 5 (Experiment 3)
1. Effect of Trial type (Switch/Repeat), CTI, Task and
Congruency (see the chapter 5, page 141-142)






CT! x trial type
CT! x task
Trial type x task
CT! x trial type x task
CT! x Congruency
Trial type x Congruency
CT! x Trial type x Congruency
Task x Congruency
CT! x task x Congruency
Trial type x task x Congruency





















































CT! x trial type
CT! x task
Trial type x task
CTI x trial type x task
CTI x Congruency
Trial type x Congruency
CTI x Trial type x Congruency
Task x Congruency
CT! x task x Congruency
Trial type x task x Congruency
















































2. Effect of Switch type (Alternating/Double switch), CTI, Task
and Congruency (see the chapter 5, page 153)
a) On Reaction time (RT)
Effect Of F P
CTI 1, 20 124 P <.001
Switch type 1,20 .36 P=.07
Task 2, 35 30 P <.001
Congruency 2,41 32 P <.001
CTI x switch type 1,20 .004 P=.95
CTI x task 2,37 16 P <.001
Switch type x task 2, 39 .19 P=.82
CT! x switch type x task 2, 35 1.8 p=.18
CTI x Congruency 2, 44 1.2 P=.30
Switch type x Congruency 2, 48 2 P=.18
CTI x Switch type x Congruency 3,53 3.7 P=.02
Task x Congruency 4, 80 6.2 P <.001
CTI x task x Congruency 4,83 1.1 P=.35
Switch type x task x Congruency 4, 86 .56 P=.70
CT! x switch type x task x 4, 92 3.5 P=.007
congruency
b) On Error (010)
Effect Of F P
CTI 1, 19 .33 p =.57
Switch type 1, 19 .007 P=.93
Task 2, 31 .12 P =.87
Congruency 2, 31 29 P <.001
CTI x switch type 1, 19 .00 P=.99
CTI x task 2, 32 4.3 P =.03
Switch type x task 2, 32 1.8 P=.17
CTI x switch type x task 1,29 .34 p=.66
CTI x Congruency 2, 38 .78 P=.47
Switch type x Congruency 2, 39 .04 P=.97
CTI x Switch type x Congruency 2,45 3.1 P=.05
Task x Congruency 3,61 3.5 P=.02
CTI x task x Congruency 3,63 23 P=.08
Switch type x task x Congruency 3,62 1.2 P=.33
CTI x switch type x task x 4, 75 .37 P=.82
congruency
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Chapter 6 (Experiment 4)
1. Effect of Trial type (Switch/Repeat), CTI, Task and
Congruency (see the chapter 6, page 182)






CT! x trial type
CT! x task
Trial type x task
CT! x trial type x task
CT! x Congruency
Trial type x Congruency
CTl x Trial type x Congruency
Task x Congruency
CT! x task x Congruency
Trial type x task x Congruency





















































cn x trial type
CTI x task
Trial type x task
cn x trial type x task
CTI x Congruency
Trial type x Congruency
CTI x Trial type x Congruency
Task x Congruency
CTI x task x Congruency
Trial type x task x Congruency
















































2. Effect of Switch type (Alternating/Double switch), CTI, Task
and Congruency
a) On Reaction time (RT)
Effect Df F P
CT! 1, 18 153 P <.001
Switch type 1, 18 3.8 P=.07
Task 2, 33 9.9
P =.001
Congruency 2,46 5.8 P =.003
CTI x switch type 1, 18 .15 P=.70
CT! x task 2, 31 4.9
P =.02
Switch type x task 2,30 1.7 P=.21
CT! x switch type x task 1, 28 .20 p=.76
CT! x Congruency 2,42 1.5 P=.23
Switch type x Congruency 2,44 .81 P=.47
CT! x Switch type x Congruency 2, 31 2.1 P=.15
Task x Congruency 3, 50 6.1 P=.002
CT! x task x Congruency 3,58 1.7 P=.17
Switch type x task x Congruency 2, 40 1.1 P=.35
CT! x switch type x task x 4, 71 2.0 P=.10
congruency
b) On Error (Ofo)
Effect Df F P
CTr 1, 18 7.5 P =.02




Congruency 1, 21 6.5 P =.01
CTr x switch type 1, 18 4 P=.06
CTr x task 2,34 .18
P =.82
Switch type x task 2, 31 2.5 P=.10
CTr x switch type x task 2, 32 1.9 p=.16
CT! x Congruency 2,29 2.4 P=.12
Switch type x Congruency 2, 32 1.2 P=.31
CT! x Switch type x Congruency 2,42 3.4 P=.03
Task x Congruency 1,22 1.1 P=.31
CT! x task x Congruency 3,49 1.9 P=.15
Switch type x task x Congruency 3, 63 .57 P=.66
CT! x switch type x task x 4, 67 2.1 P=.10
congruency
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Chapter 7 (Experiment 5)
1. Effect of Trial type (Switch/Repeat), eTI, Task and
Congruency (see the chapter 7, page 224-225)







cn x trial type
cn x task
Trial type x task
cn x trial type x task
cn x Congruency
Trial type x Congruency
cn x Trial type x Congruency
Task x Congruency
cn x task x Congruency
Trial type x task x Congruency






















































CT! x trial type
CTl x task
Trial type x task
cn x trial type x task
CT! x Congruency
Trial type x Congruency
CT! x Trial type x Congruency
Task x Congruency
CT! x task x Congruency
Trial type x task x Congruency


















































2. Effect of Switch type (Alternating/Double switch), CTI, Task
and Congruency (see the chapter 7, page 235-236)
a) On Reaction time (RT)
Effect Df F P
CT! 1, 18 197 P <.001
Switch type 1,18 12 P=.003
Task 2, 31 36 P <.001
Congruency 2,42 17 P <.001
CT! x switch type 1, 18 1.1 P=.31
CT! x task 2, 34 2.8 P =.07
Switch type x task 2, 35 .14 P=.86
CT! x switch type x task 2, 35 .37 p=.68
CT! x Congruency 3, 50 2.1 P=.ll
Switch type x Congruency 2,42 .34 P=.75
CT! x Switch type x Congruency 3, 50 1.4 P=.25
Task x Congruency 3,58 3.3 P=.024
CTI x task x Congruency 4,65 1.8 P=.14
Switch type x task x Congruency 3,64 1.3 P=.28
CTI x switch type x task x 3, 61 1.1 P=.34
congruency
b} On Error (Ofo)
Effect Df F P
CTI 1, 18 .61 P =.45
Switch type 1, 18 .10 P=.75
Task 2, 34 2.4
P =.11
Congruency 1,28 16 P <.001
CTI x switch type 1, 18 5.8 P=.03
CTI x task 2,29 2.9
P =.08
Switch type x task 1,26 4.7 P=.03
CTI x switch type x task 2, 34 2.8 p=.08
CT! x Congruency 2,35 3.5 P=.04
Switch type x Congruency 2,41 .69 P=.52
CT! x Switch type x Congruency 3,51 .89 P=.45
Task x Congruency 3,60 2.8 P=.04
CTI x task x Congruency 3, 64 2.1 P=.10
Switch type x task x Congruency 4, 73 1.2 P=.31
CT! x switch type x task x 4, 69 .74 P=.54
congruency
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Chapter 8 (Experiment 6a)
1. Effect of Trial type (Switch/Repeat), CTI, Task and
Congruency (see the chapter 8, page 269)







CT! x trial type
CT! x task
Trial type x task
CT! x trial type x task
CT! x Congruency
Trial type x Congruency
CT! x Trial type x Congruency
Task x Congruency
CT! x task x Congruency
Trial type x task x Congruency






















































CTI x trial type
CTI x task
Trial type x task
CT! x trial type x task
CTI x Congruency
Trial type x Congruency
CT! x Trial type x Congruency
Task x Congruency
CT! x task x Congruency
Trial type x task x Congruency
















































2. Effect of Switch type (Alternating/Double switch), CTI, Task
and Congruency (see the chapter 8, page 280-281)
a) On Reaction time (ms)
Effect Of F P
CT! 1, 18 149 P <.001
Switch type 1, 18 1.2 P=.30
Task 2, 33 85 P <.001
Congruency 3,49 38 P <.001
CT! x switch type 1, 18 .49 P=.49
CTI x task 2, 33 1.8 P =.18
Switch type x task 2, 34 1.6 P=.22
CT! x switch type x task 1,27 .17 p=.78
CT! x Congruency 2,46 4.1 P=.014
Switch type x Congruency 2,40 .81 P=.46
CT! x Switch type x Congruency 2,46 6.7 P=.OOl
Task x Congruency 5,88 10 P<.OOl
CT! x task x Congruency 4, 69 1.3 P=.27
Switch type x task x Congruency 4, 76 .45 P=.78
CT! x switch type x task x 4, 79 2.6 P=.04
congruency
b) On Error (%)
Effect Df F P
CTI 1, 18 6.9 p =.02
Switch type 1, 18 .19 P=.67
Task 2,30 5.3 P =.02
Congruency 2,39 24 P <.001
CTI x switch type 1, 18 .98 P=.33
CTI x task 2,35 2.2 P =.12
Switch type x task 2,35 .012 P=.98
CTI x switch type x task 2,31 .69 p=.48
CTI x Congruency 3,50 2.8 P=.05
Switch type x Congruency 1,27 1.6 P=.21
CT! x SWitch type x Congruency 2,41 4.4 P=.Ol
Task x Congruency 3,64 5 P=.002
CTI x task x Congruency 4,71 2.8 P=.03
Switch type x task x Congruency 3,54 1.4 P=.26
CTI x switch type x task x 4, 70 .99 P=.41
congruency
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Chapter 8 (Experiment 6b)
1. Effect of Trial type (Switch/Repeat), CTI, Task
and Congruency (see the chapter 8, page 292)
a) On Reaction Time (ms)
Effect Df
CTI 1, 13
Trial type 1, 13
Task 2, 21
Congruency 2, 24
CT! x trial type 1, 18
CTI x task 2, 22
Trial type x task 2, 24
CTI x trial type x task 2, 25
CTI x Congruency 2, 30
Trial type x Congruency 2, 33
CTI x Trial type x Congruency 2, 34
Task x Congruency 3, 50
CTI x task x Congruency 3, 46
Trial type x task x Congruency 3, 45





















Trial type 1, 16
Task 2, 31
Congruency 1, 19
CT! x trial type 1, 16
CT! x task 2, 28
Trial type x task 2, 28
CT! x trial type x task 2, 28
CT! x Congruency 2, 37
Trial type x Congruency 2, 37
CT! x Trial type x Congruency 2, 36
Task x Congruency 1, 25
CT! x task x Congruency 4, 60
Trial type x task x Congruency 3, 47
CT! x trial type x task x 4, 63
congruency
F p
18 P =.001
5.2 P=.04
1.0 P=.36
18 P<.OOl
.01 P=.92
3.3 P=.05
.06 P=.93
1.2 P=.32
2.8 P=.06
2.1 P=.13
.44 P=.67
1.2 P=.30
.99 P=.42
.85 P=.47
1.6 P=.19
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